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I. INTODUCTION AND THEORY OF THE CASE
The Sports Authority entered its chapter 11 bankruptcy as most do, up to its eyeballs in
debt and with high fixed costs such as rent and debt service obligations. The Sports Authority’s
case provides an interesting case study on several levels, from the specifics of how it got into its
distressed predicament to how it handled its “reorganization” once it entered into chapter 11,
including the dynamics of how the case was resolved.
As for The Sports Authority’s road to bankruptcy, lately there has been much talk of a
“retail apocalypse” in which traditional brick and mortar retail stores fall due to the rise of online
retail shopping.1 A number of straight-forward reasons have generally been cited for the retail
apocalypse, including: an excess capacity of retail space;2 a decline in shopping mall visits;3
shifts in consumer spending from shopping to restaurants, travel, and technology;4 and a
“downward spiral” effect for distressed malls caused by co-tenancy clauses.5 While these reasons
are at least acknowledged as contributing factors, other, more nuanced, factors seem to be at play
when separating the retail winners from the losers. Specifically, the dynamics of retail success
seem to also be affected by relative market position6 and private equity ownership.7
See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, “The retail apocalypse has officially descended on America,”
Business Insider, March 21, 2017, (last visited April 25, 2017) (stating that more than 3,500
brick and mortar stores are to close in “the next couple of months,” including brand names such
as JCPenny, Macy’s, Sears, Kmart, BCBG, Guess, Abercrombie & Fitch, Bebe, Payless,
RadioShack, The Limited, and Wet Seal).
1

2

Id. (stating that the United States has 23.5 square feet of retail space per person as compared to
16.4 square feet and 11.1 square feet of retail space in Canada and Australia, respectively).
3

Id. (stating that shopping mall visits declined by 50% between 2010 and 2013).

4

Id.

5

Id. (stating that downward spirals ensue because co-tenancy clauses allow other mall tenants to
terminate or renegotiate their leases when an anchor tenant leaves).
Lillian Rizzo, “Dick's Sporting Goods Wins Sports Authority Brand Name in Bankruptcy
Auction,” The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2016.
6

Lisa Abramowicz & Shelly Banjo, “Private Equity’s Retail Carnage,” Bloomberg Gadfly,
March 17, 2017 (last visited April 25, 2017), (discussing corporate bond yields for retailers
owned by private equity firms and stating that bond yields for private equity owned retails are
four times higher, i.e., are risker, than yields for retailers not owned by private equity firms);
Aisha Al-Muslim, “Analysis: Private equity ownership common in retail bankruptcies,”
7

5

As for relative market position, the rise of online retail has created a dynamic in which “if
you’re not first, you’re last.”8 That is, top-tier retailers, such as Dick’s Sporting Goods, are doing
well while second-tier retailers, such as The Sports Authority, are seeing their market share eaten
up by online retailers such as Amazon.9 The underlying logic by consumers seems to be: “if I’m
not going to buy this online, then I’m at least going to go into the best store.”
As for private equity ownership, high rates of bankruptcy are attributed to the high debt
burdens, and the costs of servicing that debt, imposed on companies through leveraged
buyouts.10 Specifically, these high debt loads become a problem when those retailers are
confronted with the more traditional headwinds discussed above, rendering them unable to
service the debt and thus the retailers are forced into bankruptcy.11
In the case of The Sports Authority, much of their secured debt stemmed from a $1.3
billion leveraged buyout by Leonard Green & Partners, L.P. in May 2006, and they lagged
behind Dick’s Sporting Goods in market share.12 Common sense would suggest that the Great
Recession likely compounded financial strains, thus creating the perfect storm to drive The
Sports Authority into bankruptcy.
The story of the The Sports Authority’s bankruptcy roughly resembles an epic, all-out
battle with three principal “fronts”—the Store Closing Plan Front, the DIP Financing Front, and
the Consignment Sales Front. The Sports Authority (the “Debtors”) along with their secured
lenders led a blitzkrieg charge into the beginning of the case having already spent months
preparing for their filing. Their attack plan was to: (1) assume a pre-negotiated Store Closing
Plan; (2) “roll-up” their secured financing into DIP Financing with the same secured lenders; and
(3) leave their consigned inventory providers and unsecured creditors to fight over the scraps
Newsday, Business, April 21, 2017 (last visited April 25, 2017), available at (discussing the
relationship between private equity ownership of retail firms and bankruptcy).
Lillian Rizzo, “Dick's Sporting Goods Wins Sports Authority Brand Name in Bankruptcy
Auction,” The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2016.
8

9

Id.

Aisha Al-Muslim, “Analysis: Private equity ownership common in retail bankruptcies,”
Newsday, Business, April 21, 2017 (last visited April 25, 2017).
10

11

Id.

Charisse Jones, “Sports Authority Shutting Down with Giant Going-out-of-business Sale.”
USA Today. 23 May 2016 (the “Giant Going-out-of-business Sale”).
12
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once the secured lenders had been paid in full (plus healthy fees). The Debtors and secured
lender’s assault found heavy resistance from a number of parties, but most significantly from
Landlords, Consignment Vendors, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. These
resistors put up a decent fight, objecting to the Debtors’ and secured lender’s attempts to overrun
them with some success. However, while the Consignment Vendors, Landlords, and Unsecured
Creditors were able to obtain some relief from the court and extract concessions from the
Debtors, ultimately the secured lenders would be paid in full and everyone else would generally
receive pennies on the dollar.13

Amy DiPierro, “Sports Authority Bankruptcy: Suppliers to Get Nickels on the Dollar,”
BusinessDen, February 14, 2017 (last visited April 25, 2017),(stating that Nike received $1
million for even though the Sports Authority received $23 million worth of Nike goods during
the 20 days before filing for bankruptcy, or 4.89 cents on the dollar).
13
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II. CAST OF CHARACTERS

Jeremy Aguilar:

The Chief Financial Officer of Sports Authority.
Aguilar joined Sports Authority on February 3,
2014. During the case, he filed five declarations in
support of various motions.

Amazon.com:

An American electronic commerce and cloud
computing company that was founded on July 5,
1994, by Jeff Bezos and is based in Seattle,
Washington. It is the largest Internet-based retailer
in the world by total sales and market capitalization.
The introduction of Amazon contributed to the
decrease in Sports Authority’s customers and
contributed to its declining sales.

Agron, Inc.:

Supplier of Consigned Goods to the Debtors,
including Adidas branded “[d]uffel bags and
sackpacks, men's and women's underwear, small
accessories such as compression sleeves and head
and wristbands, soccer and other goods.
Represented by Gellert Scalid Busenkell & Brown,
LLC and Sulmeyer, Kupetz, A Professional
Corporation; Lead attorneys: Margaret F. England
and David S. Kupetz, Jessica L. Vogel.

ASICS America Corporation:

A Japanese multinational athletic
equipment company which produces footwear and
sports equipment designed for a wide range of
sports, generally in the upper price range.
Chairman, President and CEO, Representative
Director: Motoi Oyama. On record for filing six
Objections, Request for Production of Documents,
conducting three Depositions. Represented by
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C.;
Lead attorneys: Adrienne K. Walker, Eric R.
Blythe, Jeffery A. Davis.

Bank of America:

A secured lender, identified as an agent under that
certain Second Amended and Restated Credit
Agreement, dated as of May 17, 2012 by and
among The Sports Authority, Inc. and TSA Stores,

8

Inc., as borrowers, Slap Shot Holdings Corp. and
TSA Gift Card, Inc., as guarantors, Bank of
America, N.A., as administrative agent, and the
lenders parties thereto, which provided up to $650
million in aggregate loans in the form of an assetbased revolving credit facility and matures on May
17, 2017; Represented by Riemer & Braunstein,
LLP. and Ashby & Geddes, P.A.; Lead attorneys,
respectively: Donald E. Rothman, Marjorie S
Crider, Gregory A. Taylor, Benjamin W. Keenan
Brixmor Property Group, Inc.:

Landlord to a large Sports Authority store. Filed
their own objection to the DIP Financing Motion
and were subsequently joined by various landlords.
Represented by: Ballard Spahr LLP; Lead attorneys:
David L. Pollack, Leslie Heilman

Carousel Center Company, LP:

A privately held company in Syracuse, NY.
Categorized under Operators of Nonresidential
Buildings. Established in 1995 and incorporated in
New York. Managing Partner: Bruce Kenan.
Represented by Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, PC;
Lead attorney: Kevin M. Newman.

CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc.:

A factoring company who created tailored
technology and equipment financing and leasing
programs for Sports Authority that were designed to
help them increase their top and bottom line
performance. Represented by McCarter & English,
LLP; Lead attorneys: Matthew J. Rifino, LIsa
Bonsall.

Stephen Coulombe:

During the case Coulolme was the Managing
Director at Berkeley Research Group and Senior
Managing Director of Corporate
Finance/Restructuring group at FTI Consulting, Inc.
since February 10, 2005. In September 2015, Mr.
Coulombe became the Chief Restructuring Officer
of Quiksilver Inc. as well. On record as filing three
Declarations in support of the Debtors and being
subjected to an oral examination.

9

Dick’s Sporting:

Dick’s Sporting Goods, sometimes shortened to
“Dick's”, is a Fortune 500 American sporting goods
retailing corporation headquartered in Moon
Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania in
Greater Pittsburgh, with a mailing address in nearby
Coraopolis. Dick's has 610 stores in 47 states (no
stores in Alaska, Hawaii, and Montana as of midMarch 2016), primarily in the Eastern United
States. Independent Vice Chairman of the Board:
Mr. William J. Colombo. Gave Sports Authority a
run for their money by being their top competitor.
Received substantially all Sports Authority’s assets.

Forensic Technologies International Ltd.: A business advisory firm headquartered in
Washington, DC. The company specializes in the
fields of corporate finance and restructuring,
economic consulting, forensic and litigation
consulting, strategic communications and
technology. Founded as Forensic Technologies
International Ltd in 1982, FTI Consulting employs
more than 4,600 staff in 28 countries. Consulted
with Sports Authority to analyze, assist and advise
them on the institution of a Store Closing Plan.
Michael E. Foss:

The Chief Executive Officer of The Sports
Authority. Foss joined Sports Authority in since
June 2013. He previously served at PETCO and
Circuit City.

Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, LLP:

Counsel to the Debtors in the Chapter 11 Filing.
Lead attorneys representing Sports Authority:
Robert A. Klyman, Matthew J. Williams, Jeremy L.
Graves, and Sabina Jacobs.

Gordini USA, Inc.:

A consignment vendor of Sports Authority. Joined
nearly all objections filed by Ameriform, Agron,
and ASICS. Represented by Chipman Brown
Cicero & Cole, LLP; Lead attorneys: William
Chipman, Jr., Mark D. Olivere.

Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, LLC: An advisory, lending and investment firm that was
founded in 1903. The company is headquartered in
Boston, Massachusetts. In Europe, the company
trades as Gordon Brothers Europe. The company
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has been in dealings with many well-known
American companies including CompUSA, Linens
'n Things, The Sharper Image, Borders Group,
Syms, KB Toys, Blockbuster and Aeropostale.
Aided Sports Authority in the liquidation of Store
Assets and execution of the Store Closing Plan.
Kurtzman Carson Consultants:

Administrative Advisors to Sports Authority.
Provided industry expertise and innovative
technology solutions to support Sports Authority’s
critical business processes and transactions.

Leonard Green & Partners:

Leonard Green & Partners, L.P. ("LGP") is a
leading private equity investment firm founded in
1989. Based in Los Angeles, the firm partners with
experienced management teams and often with
founders to invest in market-leading companies.
Since inception, LGP has invested in over 80
companies in the form of traditional buyouts, goingprivate transactions, recapitalizations, growth
equity, and selective public equity and debt
positions.

Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors:

Rothschild, Inc.:

Nike, Asics, Realty Income Corporation, GGP
Limited Partnership, New York Life Investment
Management, Cresent Capital Group, LP, Under
Armour, among others, made up the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors. Represented by:
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP; Lead
attorneys: Bradford J. Sandler, Robert Feinstein,
Jeffery N. Pomerantz

A boutique investment banking firm that provides
financial advisory services including mergers and
acquisitions, divestitures, initial public
offerings, privatization, corporate restructuring,
private placements, and financial planning advisory
services as well as due diligence, negotiation,
execution, market research, and transaction closing
services. Authorized by Sports Authority to initiate
the process of securing DIP financing. Represented
by Debevoise & Plimpton LLP and Womble Carlyl
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Sandridge & Rice, LLP: Lead attorneys,
respectively: Richard F. Hahn, Wendy B. Reilly,
Erica S. Weisgerber, Johanna N. Skrzypczyk, Nick
S. Kaluk, III and Mark L. Desgrosseilliers, Nicholas
T. Verna.
Sports Authority Holdings, Inc.:

Sports Authority Holdings, Inc. was incorporated in
2015 and is based in Englewood, Colorado. On
March 2, 2016, Sports Authority Holdings, Inc.
along with its affiliates, filed a voluntary petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

Slap Hot Holdings, Corp.:

Slap Shot Holdings Corp was incorporated in 2006
and is based in Los Angeles, California. Slap Shot
Holdings Corp operates as a subsidiary of Sports
Authority Holdings, Inc. On March 2, 2016, Slap
Shot Holdings Corp filed a voluntary petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. It is
in joint administration with Sports Authority
Holdings, Inc.

The Sports Authority, Inc:

Owner of Oshman’ Sporting Goods Inc., Sportmart
Inc., TSA Stores Inc, TSA Gift Card, Inc., TSA
Ponce, Inc., and TSA Caribe, Inc. The Sports
Authority, Inc. retailed sporting goods and apparel.
The Company offered a wide range of products
within fitness, camping, boating, apparel, hunting
and fishing, team sports, games, outdoor
furnishings, and exercise equipment. The Sports
Authority served customers through their internet
website and stores throughout the United States. On
March 2, 2016, The Sports Authority filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter
11 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware.

TSA Stores, Inc.:

TSA Stores, Inc. operated sporting goods stores in
the United States. It also served customers online.
TSA Stores, Inc. was formerly known as Gart
Sports Company and changed its name to TSA
Stores, Inc. in August 2003. The company was
founded in 1928 and was headquartered in
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Englewood, Colorado. TSA Stores, Inc. operated as
a subsidiary of Slap Shot Holdings Corp. On March
2, 2016, TSA Stores, Inc. filed a voluntary petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. It is
in joint administration with Sports Authority
Holdings, Inc.
TSA Gift Card, Inc:

See TSA Stores, Inc.

TSA Ponce, Inc.:

See TSA Stores, Inc.

TSA Caribe, Inc.:

See TSA Stores, Inc.

Tiger Capital Group, LLC:

Tiger Capital Group, LLC along with other
services, the company provides planning,
promotion, and management of store-closing events
related to mergers, acquisitions, downsizing,
corporate divestitures, and Chapter 11 proceedings
for various industries. Tiger Capital Group, along
with Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, were the
main liquidation consultants for The Sports
Authority in regard to the liquidation of Store
Assets and execution of the Store Closing Plan.

Hon. Judge Mary F. Walrath:

Presiding bankruptcy judge in the Sports
Authority’s case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware. Still currently presiding as
a bankruptcy judge for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association: Served as the DIP FILO agent to Sports Authority.
Represented by: Choate, Hall & Stewart LLP and
Richards, Layton & Finger, PA; Lead attorneys,
respectively: Kevin J. Simard and Mark D. Collins,
Andrew M. Dean.
Wigwam Mills, Inc:

A hosiery company based in Sheboygan,
Wisconsin. A major consignment vendor who
played an important role in both th Consignment
Sales Motion as well as the DIP Financing Motion.

13

Filed nine documents during the case, six of which
were objections to various Motions from Sports
Authority. Represented by: Sullivan Allinson LLC;
Lead attorney: William A. Hazeltine.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB: Successor Administrative Agent Under the
Prepetition Term Loan Credit Agreement.
Represented by Browns Rudnick LLP and Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP; Lead attorneys,
respectively: Robert J. Stark, Bennett S. Silverberg,
Steven B. Levine and Robert J. Dehney, Gregory
W. Werkheiser, Tamara K. Minott.

Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP: Counsel to the Debtors in the Chapter 11 Filing;
Lead attorneys representing Sports Authority:
Andrew L. Magaziner, Kenneth J. Enos, Michael R.
Nestor.

14

III. THE DEBTORS’ BUSINESS
Sports Authority, Inc. (“Sports Authority”) was a private sports retailer in the United
States that was headquartered in Englewood, Colorado, and operated more than 460 stores in 45
U.S. states, as well as the territory of Puerto Rico. Sports Authority employed approximately
5,400 full-time employees and 9,100 part-time employees.
A. Business Operations
The company focused their retail sales on apparel, footwear, and sports & exercise
equipment. Its large format stores, virtually all of which exceed 40,000 square feet, carried more
than 700 brand names, including Nike, Adidas, Asics, Champion, Coleman, K2, Salomon,
Timberland, and Wilson.14 Over half of the company’s annual revenue was generated from the
sale of “hard lines”—equipment for team sports, fitness, hunting, fishing, camping, golf, racquet
sports, cycling, water sports, marine, snow sports, and general merchandise. However, its most
profitable products, apparel and footwear, make up the rest.15
The company initially formed as a result of a merger between Gart Sports and The Sports
Authority, Inc.16 Gart Sports began in 1928, when Nathan Gart started the company with $50 in
fishing rod samples. In 1971, Gart Sports Company opened the “Sportscastle” superstore in
Denver, Colorado. The 1980’s marked a period of substantial growth for the company through a
series of acquisitions. These mergers included Hagan's Sports Ltd. (1987) and Stevens Brown of
Salt Lake City (1987).
The Sports Authority, Inc. was founded in Lakes Mall in Fort Lauderdale, Florida by a
syndicate of venture capital groups and several key founding executives. Jack A. Smith, CEO;
Roy M. Cohen, Senior Vice President and General Merchandise Manager; Richard Lynch,
Senior Vice President and CFO and Arnold Sedel, Vice President of Stores Operations were the
founding executives of Sports Authority.17 The venture capital syndicate was led by William
Blair Venture Partners18 and included First Chicago Venture Partners,19 Bain Capital,20 Phillips14

“Sports Authority.” Wikipedia. 11 Mar. 2017 (the “Sports Authority Wiki”).

Charisse Jones, “Sports Authority Shutting Down with Giant Going-out-of-business Sale.”
USA Today. 23 May 2016 (the “Giant Going-out-of-business Sale”).
15

16

“Sports Authority Wiki,”

17

Id.

18

William Blair & Company, L.L.C. is an employee-owned financial services firm that offers
investment banking, equity research, institutional and private brokerage, and asset management
15

Smith Venture Partners,21 Marquette Venture Partners,22 and Bessemer Investment
Management.23 The Sports Authority, Inc. opened its first store in November 1987. In 1990,
Kmart acquired the company. Five years later, The Sports Authority had expanded to 136 stores
in 26 states, and was spun off from parent Kmart.24
On August 4, 2003, Gart Sports, which also operated Oshman’s and Sportmart,
completed a “merger of equals” with The Sports Authority.25 At the time of its merger with Gart
Sports Company, the Sports Authority was the largest full-line sporting goods retailer in the
United States, and had 205 stores in 33 states.26 The combined company adopted the “Sports
to individual, institutional, and issuing clients. Bloomberg Company Profile, (last visited April
20, 2017).
19

Chicago Venture Partners, L.P. is a private equity firm specializing in PIPEs investments to
emerging and growth stage small cap companies. The firm primarily invests in biotech and
pharma; technology and communications; media and entertainment; resources and energy;
consumer products; and others. Bloomberg Company Profile, (last visited April 20, 2017).
20

Bain Capital, LP is an investment holding company operating through its subsidiaries, Sankaty
Advisors, LP; Brookside Capital Management, LLC; Bain Capital Ventures; Bain Capital Public
Equity; Bain Capital Private Equity; and Absolute Return Capital, LLC. Bloomberg Company
Profile, (last visited April 20, 2017).
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Phillips-Smith-Machens Venture Partners is a venture capital firm. It seeks to invest in
consumer oriented business with a focus on retail stores and restaurants, consumer related
support services, consumer products and services, distributors and direct marketers of consumer
products, and multi location consumer or small business services. Bloomberg Company Profile,
(last visited April 20, 2017).
22

Marquette Venture Partners is a venture capital and private equity firm specializing in
investments in early, start-up, later, and expansion stages; emerging growth companies; special
situations; recapitalization; and leveraged and management buyouts. Bloomberg Company
Profile, (last visited April 20, 2017).
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Bessemer Investment Management LLC is a privately owned investment manager. It provides
its services to banking and thrift institutions and investment companies. The firm manages
separate client-focused equity, fixed income, and balanced portfolios for its clients. It also
manages mutual funds and hedge funds for its clients. Bloomberg Company Profile, (last visited
April 20, 2017).
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“Sports Authority Wiki,”
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Authority” name and trademark. The new company was based in Englewood, Colorado, which
was the home of Gart Sports.
In January 2006, Sports Authority agreed to be purchased in a leveraged buyout by
affiliates of Leonard Green & Partners, a private equity investment firm, in a transaction valued
at $1.3 billion.27 Shareholders approved the deal in May 2006. Upon completion of the merger,
Sports Authority ceased to be a publicly listed stock. Thus, it no longer filed financial statements
with the SEC and no public bonds were outstanding.28
B. Corporate Structure
Sports Authority Holdings was a privately held company incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in Englewood, Colorado. Sports Authority Holdings directly or indirectly owns all
or substantially all of the equity in the following six active direct and indirect subsidiaries, each
of which is a Debtor: (a) Slap Shot Holdings, Corp., a Delaware corporation (“Slap Shot”),
which was formed in January 2006 for the sole purpose of acquiring The Sports Authority, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation (“TSA”) and serves as an intermediate holding company; (b) TSA, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Slap Shot, which was acquired on May 3, 2006 and serves as
another intermediate holding company; (c) TSA Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“TSA
Stores”), a wholly owned subsidiary of TSA and the primary operating entity; (d) TSA Gift
Card, Inc., a Virginia corporation (“Gift Card”), a wholly owned subsidiary of TSA Stores that
issues the Debtors’ gift cards; (e) TSA Ponce, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Ponce”), a wholly
owned subsidiary of TSA that serves as a holding company of TSA Caribe, Inc., a Puerto Rico
corporation (“Caribe”); and (f) Caribe, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ponce, which serves as the
primary operating entity and acts as the lessor for the Debtors stores in Puerto Rico. 29

27

28

“Giant Going-out-of-business Sale”
Id.
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In Re: Debtors. Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., Et Al.,1 2-49. UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE. 2 Mar. 2016 at 4-5, (In Re:
Debtors”)
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C. Key Liabilities
1. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors owed a total of approximately $1.3 billion in
principal plus accrued interest on the Secured Debt Obligations.
2. ABL Loan: provided up to $650 million in aggregate loans in the form of an
asset-based revolving credit facility and was scheduled to mature on May 17,
2017, subject to the conditions in the ABL Credit Agreement.
3. FILO Loan: the Debtors owed approximately $95.3 million in principal on the
loan.
4. Term Loan: extended original principal amount of approximately $300 million
(the “Term Loan”; collectively with the ABL Loan and the FILO Loan, the
“Secured Debt Obligations”) with a stated maturity date of November 16, 2017.
5. Trade Debt: in the ordinary course of business, the Debtors source, order, and
purchase inventory from their preferred suppliers on credit based on standard
industry terms is approximately $178.9 million.
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IV. EVENTS LEADING TO BANKRUPTCY AND COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Events Leading to Bankruptcy
Sports Authority’s Mission:
“Our mission is simple —create a shopping experience establishing Sports Authority as
the first choice for the sports, leisure and recreational customer. Our strategy to achieve this
goal is to offer our customers: an extensive selection of quality brand name merchandise;
powerfully merchandised megastores that provide ease of shopping; competitive prices that
create value; premium customer service and product knowledge; and convenient locations
throughout our markets.”
Although their mission may appear ‘simple’ on its face, Sports Authority ultimately had
trouble delivering on that mission. On February 4, 2016, it was widely reported that Sports
Authority was set to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy due to financial problems.30 On March 2,
2016, The Sports Authority filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. After considering restructuring, The Sports Authority announced that on April 26, they
would sell all of their assets, including all of the remaining store locations, to Dick’s Sporting
Goods.31 Moreover, Dick’s Sporting Goods prevailed at the auction for Sports Authority
Holdings Inc.’s brand name and other intellectual property with a bid of $15 million.32 As of
January 29, 2017, the Sports Authority website redirects to the Dick’s Sporting Goods website.33
The question is: How did one of the country’s biggest sporting retailers fail? One of The
Sports Authority’s biggest problems was unquestionably its debt, according to analysts. “When
we picked up coverage on Sports Authority in May 2015, earnings weren’t that great,” said
Reshmi Basu, associate editor at Debtwire, a business intelligence service that researches and
reports on corporate debt situations.34 “The company’s revenues were flat from 2013 to 2014, but
also, they were trying to invest heavily in e-commerce and store remodels. It’s a very over-

30

Lara Ewen, "How Sports Authority Went Bankrupt-and Who Could Be next to Fall," Retail
Dive, Mar. 15, 2016. Available at https://perma.cc/LJ6E-PBL4.
31

Id.

Lillian Rizzo, “Dick's Sporting Goods Wins Sports Authority Brand Name in Bankruptcy
Auction,” The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2016.
32

33

Id.

34

Id.
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leveraged company, and it had $1 billion in debt coming due over the next two years.”35 Much of
Sports Authority’s debt stems from a $1.3 billion leveraged buyout by Leonard Green & Partners
in 2006. Basu said that in addition to its debt problems, Sports Authority had to compete with
Dick’s, which has the liquidity and sales figures to weather market fluctuations, and Amazon,
which was taking away market share from many big box stores.36
Retail differentiation was also an issue. Competition from omnichannel merchants, as
well as brands themselves, made it difficult for Sports Authority to stand out in the marketplace.
“From a high level, Sports Authority failed to differentiate itself as a brand over the last few
years,” said Lee Peterson, executive vice president, brand, strategy and design, at WD Partners, a
customer experience expert for global food and retail brands.37 Peterson said that this strategic
error allowed the big box stores such as Wal-Mart and Target, as well as Dick’s and brands such
as Nike (which has its own stores), to push Sports Authority towards irrelevancy.38
Then there was the issue of online encroachment. “From a more tactical level, Sports
Authority moved too slowly to compensate for the mass consumer movement to shopping online,
and Amazon in particular. [If you] still have over 450 stores in dire need of a refresh in this day
and age, you’d better have a great private label brand, wonderful sales people, and a great store
environment. Sports Authority [had] none of that,” Peterson said.39
Basu agreed that the online threat was a big problem for retailers such as Sports
Authority. “Amazon Prime makes it more accessible to shop with them,” she said. “The way I
look at retail is that the number two brick-and-mortar player isn’t big enough for the market to
absorb.40 For example, Linens 'n Things market share went to Bed Bath & Beyond. The number
two player has kinda fallen off lately. The market can’t absorb it.”41
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At the time of the leveraged buyout in 2006, the company's chairman and CEO, Doug
Morton claimed that, “as a private company, Sports Authority will have greater flexibility to
accomplish its long-term goals.”42 Companies tend to grow under the stewardship of privateequity firms, which aim to deliver their investors double-digit annual returns. However, in the
case of Sports Authority, it may have been better off remaining public: Its revenue for the 12
months ended in May 2008 “approached” $2.7 billion, according to Moody’s Investors Servicebarely higher than the $2.5 billion in sales that the company reported in 2005. It had around 400
stores when Leonard Green & Partners LP took control, compared to around 470 at the time of
filing, according to Moody's.43
Although retailers may have had a hard time due to the increasing appeal of online
shopping and sites such as Amazon.com, one of The Sports Authority’s public rivals, Dick’s
Sporting Goods, has grown revenue to $6.8 billion this year from $2.1 billion in 2005 and nearly
tripled its store count to 694 over the same period.44 Thus, the combined devastating effects of
the 2008 recession, the company’s enormous outstanding debt & liabilities, and the widely
trending e-commerce market competition were the catalysts causing the need for comprehensive
restructuring of their business operations and their debt obligations under the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Chapter 11 Petitions and Requests for First Day Relief

As of the petition date, March 2, 2016, the Debtors had continued to operate their
businesses and manage their property as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and
1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.45 Concurrently, the Debtors (“The Sports Authority”) had filed a
motion seeking joint administration of the Chapter 11 cases pursuant to Rule 1015(b) of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.46 To enable the Debtors to operate effectively and
minimize potential adverse effects from the commencement of these Chapter 11 cases, the
Debtors have requested certain relief in “first day” motions and applications filed with the Court
(collectively, the “First Day Motions”).47 The First Day Motions, summarized below, seek,
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Denver Business Journal “Sports Authority in Buyout Deal,” Business Journal, 23 Jan. 2006.
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Gillian Tan, "Haunted by the Pre-Crisis Past," Bloomberg, Dec. 3, 2015.
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“In Re: Debtors.”
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Id. at 2.
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among other things, to (a) ensure the continuation of the Debtors’ cash management system and
other business operations without interruption, (b) allow the Debtors to continue using cash
collateral and enter into a postpetition financing arrangement, (c) preserve the Debtors’ valuable
relationships with suppliers, customers, and other interested parties, (d) permit the Debtors to
continue to sell their goods in the ordinary course of business, (e) maintain employee morale and
confidence, (f) authorize the Debtors to continue their value-maximization efforts to liquidate the
inventory at additional unprofitable retail locations, and (g) implement certain administrative
procedures that will promote a seamless transition into chapter 11.48
C. Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases

To restructure their operations, the Debtors decided to run a dual-track process: the
Debtors initiated an expedited sale process, and at the same time negotiated with their creditors
regarding a plan of reorganization, via a DIP (Debtor in Possession) Credit Agreement. The
Debtors believed that this bankruptcy process would maximize value for the Debtors’ creditors
and other parties-in-interest.49 The Debtors and their professionals entered into negotiations with
their key creditor constituencies. The long-term goal of these discussions was to ascertain the
viability of, and implement, a consensual restructuring of the Debtors’ capital structure.50
Notwithstanding the good faith attempts of the parties, the Debtors were ultimately unable to
reach an agreement on the terms of a consensual, comprehensive forbearance prior to the date of
the scheduled interest payment.51 The sudden loss of some key vendor support required the
Debtors to quickly change strategy.52 Although the Debtors continued to explore a range of
strategies and restructuring constructs, they intensified their efforts to locate a going-concern
buyer.53 Following extensive, arms’-length negotiations, the Debtors and the DIP Lenders
reached agreement on a case timeline that adequately balanced the Debtors’ need to execute a
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Id.
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Id. at 15.
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Id.
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Id.
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robust marketing process for their business with the need of all stakeholders to realize asset value
on an expeditious basis.54
The DIP Credit Agreement was conditioned on the following case milestones:
● Petition Date: Debtors must file (i) the Bid Procedures Motion, (ii) a motion seeking
authority to close and liquidate up to 180 stores operated by the Debtors and to engage a
liquidator in respect thereof (the “Store Closing Motion”), and (iii) a motion seeking to
extend the time period to assume or reject leases to not less than 210 days from the
Petition Date (the “Lease Designation Extension Motion”);
● March 16, 2016: Debtors must have obtained an order approving the Store Closing
Motion on an interim basis;
● April 1, 2016: Debtors must have obtained an order approving the Lease Designation
Extension Motion;
● April 11, 2016: To the extent not previously delivered, the Debtors must deliver bid
packages to any potential bidders for the Debtors’ businesses or assets that are identified
by the DIP Agent;
● April 21, 2016: Deadline to receive/submit binding bids with respect to the Proposed Sale
Transaction;
● April 25, 2016: Auction (if necessary);
● April 27, 2016: Hearing for the Proposed Sale Transaction; and
● April 28, 2016: Deadline to close Proposed Sale Transaction.
Despite genuine effort to restructure via the DIP Credit Agreement, Sports Authority
announced that on April 26, 2016, they would sell all of their assets, including all of the
remaining store locations to Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc.

54

Id. at 17.
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V. THE FIRST WAVE—DEBTORS’ (AND SECURED LENDERS’) BLITZKRIEG:
FIRST DAY MOTIONS

A. Introduction and Overview

Along with its bankruptcy petitions, Sports Authority and its affiliates (collectively the
“Debtors”)55 filed several first-day motions intended to facilitate the smooth administration of
the estate, as well as to address the continued operation of some of the stores during the
pendency of the case. These motions were supported by a declaration of the Debtors Chief
Financial Officer (“CFO”) Jeremy Aguilar.56
B. Uncontested First Day Motions
1. Motion for Joint Administration
The first of such motions was a Motion for Joint Administration of seven cases of the
following affiliates: Sports Authority Holdings, Inc.; Slap Shot Holdings, Corp.; The Sports
Authority, Inc.; TSA Stores, Inc.; TSA Gift Card, Inc.; TSA Ponce, Inc.; and TSA Caribe, Inc.. 57
The Motion for Joint Administration, without objection from the creditors, was granted by the
court and the case was ordered to be administered as In re Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 16-10527.58 This allowed the related cases of the affiliates within the Debtors’
corporate structure to be addressed, for procedural purposes, in one venue, facilitating efficient
and economical administration of estates with substantial interests in common.59

55

The Debtors are comprised of: Sports Authority Holdings, Inc.; Slap Shot Holdings, Corp.;
The Sports Authority, Inc.; TSA Stores, Inc.; TSA Gift Card, Inc.; TSA Ponce, Inc.; and TSA
Caribe, Inc.
Declaration of Jeremy Aguilar in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and Requests
for First Day Relief, Doc. No. 22.
56

Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Directing Joint Administration of Related Chapter 11
Cases for Procedural Purposes Only, Doc. No. 2.
57

58

Order Directing Joint Administration of Related Chapter 11 Cases for Procedural Purposes
Only, Doc. No. 123.
Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Directing Joint Administration of Related Chapter 11
Cases for Procedural Purposes Only, Doc. No. 2, at p. 5.
59
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2. Brief Overview of Other Uncontested Motions
Other fairly straight-forward and uncontested motions include: Application to Approve
the Retention and Appointment of Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC (“KCC”) as Claims and
Noticing Agent for the Debtors;60 Motion for Order Authorizing Continuation of, and Payment
of Prepetition Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary Course of Business in Connection With
Various Insurance Policies;61 Motion to Authorize Payment of Prepetition Claims for Employee
Compensation;62 Motion to Pay for Prepetition Orders that have been Delivered;63 and a Motion
Debtors’ Application for Entry of an Order, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 156(c), Approving the
Retention and Appointment of Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as Claims and Noticing Agent
for the Debtors, Effective as of the Petition Date, Doc. No. 3. See also, Order, Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 156(c), Approving the Retention and Appointment of Kurtzman Carson Consultants
LLC as Claims and Noticing Agent for the Debtors, Effective as of the Petition Date, Doc. No.
127.
60

Debtors’ Motion for Order (A) Authorizing Continuation of, and Payment of Prepetition
Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary Course of Business in Connection With Various Insurance
Policies, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Honor and Process Checks and Electronic Transfer
Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 8. See also, Order (A) Authorizing Continuation of, and
Payment of Prepetition Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary Course of Business in Connection
With Various Insurance Policies, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Honor and Process Checks and
Electronic Transfer Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 132.
61

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Order (A) Authorizing Payment of Certain
Prepetition Workforce Claims, Including Wages, Salaries and Other Compensation; (B)
Authorizing Payment of Certain Employee Benefits and Confirming Right to Continue
Employee Benefits on Postpetition Basis, (C) Authorizing Payment of Reimbursement to
Employees for Expenses Incurred Prepetition, (D) Authorizing Payment of Withholding and
Payroll-Related Taxes, (E) Authorizing Payment of Workers’ Compensation Obligations, and (F)
Authorizing Payment of Prepetition Claims Owing to Administrators and Third Party Providers,
Doc. No. 10. See also, Interim Order (A) Authorizing Payment of Certain Prepetition Workforce
Claims, Including Wages, Salaries and Other Compensation; (B) Authorizing Payment of
Certain Employee Benefits and Confirming Right to Continue Employee Benefits on
Postpetition Basis, (C) Authorizing Payment of Reimbursement to Employees for Expenses
Incurred Prepetition, (D) Authorizing Payment of Withholding and Payroll-Related Taxes, (E)
Authorizing Payment of Workers’ Compensation Obligations, and (F) Authorizing Payment of
Prepetition Claims Owing to Administrators and Third Party Providers, Doc. No. 133.
62

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay, In
the Ordinary Course of Business, Claims for Goods Ordered Prepetition and Delivered
Postpetition; (B) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims of Shippers, Lien
Claimants, and Import Claimants; and (C) Authorizing Financial Institutions to Honor and
Process Related Checks and Transfers, Doc. No. 12. See also, Interim Order (A) Authorizing the
Debtors to Pay, In the Ordinary Course of Business, Claims for Goods Ordered Prepetition and
63
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for Interim and Final Orders Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims of
Critical Vendors.64 All of these motions were granted by the court with no objections arising
from creditors.
3. Other Uncontested First Day Motions Warranting Discussion
Moreover, the Debtors also filed several first day motions that, while being unopposed by
the creditors, warrant further discussion. These motions include: Motion for Interim and Final
Orders Authorizing (A) Continued Cash Management Systems, (B) Maintaining Existing Bank
Accounts, (C) Continued Use of Existing Business Forms, (D) Continued Performance of
Intercompany Transactions in the Ordinary Course of Business and Grant of Administrative
Expense Status for Postpetition Intercompany Claims, and (E) Interim Waiver of section 345(b)
Deposit and Investment Requirements;65 Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (A)
Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Transfers of Equity Securities and Claims of
Worthless Stock Deductions, and (B) Establishing a Record date for Notice and Sell-Down
Procedures for Trading in Claims Against the Debtors’ Estates;66 a motion authorizing the
Delivered Postpetition; (B) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims of
Shippers, Lien Claimants, and Import Claimants; and (C) Authorizing Financial Institutions to
Honor and Process Related Checks and Transfers, Doc. No. 135.
Debtors’ Motion Interim and Final Orders Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition
Claims of Critical Vendors, Doc. No. 19. See also, Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Pay
Certain Prepetition Claims of Critical Vendors, Doc. No. 136.
64

Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders Authorizing (A) Continued Cash Management
Systems; (B) Maintaining Existing Bank Accounts; (C) Continued Use of Existing Business
Forms; (D) Continued Performance of Intercompany Transactions in the Ordinary Course of
Business and Grant of Administrative Expense Status for Postpetition Intercompany Claims; and
(E) Interim Waiver of section 345(b) Deposit and Investment Requirements, Doc. No. 4 (the
“Cash Management and Bank Accounts Motion”). See also, Interim Order Authorizing (A)
Continued Cash Management Systems; (B) Maintaining Existing Bank Accounts; (C) Continued
Use of Existing Business Forms; (D) Continued Performance of Intercompany Transactions in
the Ordinary Course of Business and Grant of Administrative Expense Status for Postpetition
Intercompany Claims; and (E) Interim Waiver of section 345(b) Deposit and Investment
Requirements, Doc. No. 128; Final Order Authorizing (A) Continued Cash Management
Systems; (B) Maintaining Existing Bank Accounts; (C) Continued Use of Existing Business
Forms; (D) Continued Performance of Intercompany Transactions in the Ordinary Course of
Business and Grant of Administrative Expense Status for Postpetition Intercompany Claims; and
(E) Interim Waiver of section 345(b) Deposit and Investment Requirements, Doc. No. 811.
65

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (A) Establishing Notice and Objection
Procedures for Transfers of Equity securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions, and (B)
Establishing a Record date for Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims Against
the Debtors’ Estates, Doc. No. 5 (the “Securities and Claims Trading Procedures Motion”). See
66
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payment of sales, use, value-added, property, franchise, and income taxes (collectively the
“Taxes”);67 and a Motion to Continue Customer Programs.68
i. Cash Management and Bank Accounts Motion
In the Cash Management and Bank Accounts Motion, the Debtors argued that their cash
management system was vital to their ordinary course of business and if the court did not allow
continuation of such system there would not be a way for them to sell and liquidate their assets.69
Furthermore, the Debtors argued that the cash management system was a “mainstay of [their]
ordinary, usual, and essential business practices.70 Debtors argued that section 363(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code authorized such continuation of their cash management system.71 The Debtors
also, Interim Order (A) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Transfers of Equity
securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions, and (B) Establishing a Record date for
Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims Against the Debtors’ Estates, Doc. No.
129; Final Order (A) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Transfers of Equity
securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions, and (B) Establishing a Record date for
Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims Against the Debtors’ Estates, Doc. No.
814.
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Order (A) Authorizing the Payment of Certain
Prepetition Taxes and Fees, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Receive, Process, and Honor Checks
Issued and Electronic Payment Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 7 (the “Prepetition Taxes
Motion”). See also, Interim Order (A) Authorizing the Payment of Certain Prepetition Taxes and
Fees, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Receive, Process, and Honor Checks Issued and Electronic
Payment Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 131.
67

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of (A) An Order (I) Authorizing Debtors to Honor and Continue
Certain Customer Programs and Customer Obligations in the Ordinary Course of Business, and
(II) Approving Agreement by and Between Debtors and Zurich American Insurance Company
Relating to Prepetition Bonds, On an Interim basis; and (B) A Supplemental Order Approving
Such Bonding Agreement on a Final Basis and Granting Related Relief, Doc. No. 11 (the
“Customer Programs Motion”). See also, Order (A) Authorizing Debtors to Honor and Continue
Certain Customer Programs and Customer Obligations in the Ordinary Course of Business, and
(B) Approving the Bonding Agreement on an Interim Basis, Doc. No. 134; Supplemental Order
Approving the Bonding Agreement and the Provisions Therein, Doc. No. 805.
68

69

Id. at 3.
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Id. at 5.

Id. at 8. authorizes a debtor in possession to “use property of the estate in the ordinary course
of business, without notice or a hearing.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1). Section 363(c)(1) is intended to
provide a debtor in possession with the flexibility to engage in the ordinary transactions required
to operate its business. See, e.g., In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1992); see also
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also sought to use existing business forms and check stock in order to avoid unnecessary
confusion between them and their employees, customers as well as suppliers.72
The Debtors seemed to argue that if the court did not authorize their Cash Management
Motion, there would be this domino effect on Landlords, Utility providers, creditors, and others.
The Debtors were worried that as a result of their filings the banks would no longer acknowledge
their accounts.73 Which led the Debtors to specifically request the authorization for the banks to
continue to maintain, service, and administer the Debtors bank accounts.74 Without the
continuation of services from the bank, the Debtors would spend valuable time trying to
minimize the repercussions. The Debtors saw no issue with the continuation with any of the
requested systems by providing the court with evidence of up-to-date records.75
The Court fully authorized the Cash Management and Bank Accounts Motion; provided,
the Debtors only pay up to $100,000 in outstanding balances, charges, and fees of the P-Cards,
the Corporate Purchasing Cards, and the Travel Account and proper notice be given to respective
parties.76 Seeing as no party contested such motion, the Final Order was the Interim Order
verbatim.77

In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 796 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Included within the
purview of section 363(c) is a debtor’s ability to continue the routine transactions necessitated by
its cash management system. See Amdura Nat’l Distrib. Co. v. Amdura Corp. (In re Amdura
Corp.), 75 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Id. at Exhibit B, C, and D. See, e.g., In re The Standard Register Company, Case No. 15-10541
(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 13, 2015); In re Brookstone Holdings Corp, No. 14-10752 (BLS)
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 4, 2014); In re F&H Acquisition Corp., No. 13-13220 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del.
Dec. 17, 2013); In re Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., No. 12-20000 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del.
Jan. 24, 2013); In re Vertis Holdings, Inc., No. 12-12821 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2012);
In re THQ Inc., No. 12- 13398 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 20, 2012); In re Delta Petroleum
Corp., No. 11-14006 (KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 16, 2011).
76

Interim Orders Authorizing (A) Continued Use of Cash Management System; (B)
Maintenance of Existing Bank Accounts; (C) Continued Use of Existing Business Forms; (D)
Continued Performance of Intercompany Transactions in the Ordinary Course of Business and
Grant of Administrative Expense Status for Postpetition Intercompany Claims; and (E) Interim
Waiver of Section 345(b) Deposit and Investment Requirements. Doc. No. 128.
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ii. Equities and Claims Trading Procedures Motion
In the Equities and Claims Trading Procedures Motion, the Debtors requested approval of
specific procedures to govern the transfers of Equity Securities and the claiming of worthless
stock deductions.78 The Debtors argued that if the court did not approve their proposed
procedures they would be stifled by the Internal Revenue Code.79 The Debtors main reason for
such request was to protect their ability to maximize the use of their net operating losses and
avoid the limitations of the Internal Revenue Code.80 The Debtors proposed procedures focused
on a reasonable amount of notice so that they would be able to analyze and assess the situation
with enough time to formulate a compromise that would best benefit both parties.81 The Debtors
77

Final Order Authorizing (A) Continued Use of Cash Management System; (B) Maintenance of
Existing Bank Accounts; (C) Continued Use of Existing Business Forms; (D) Continued
Performance of Intercompany Transactions in the Ordinary Course of Business and Grant of
Administrative Expense Status for Postpetition Intercompany Claims; and (E) Interim Waiver of
Section 345(b) Deposit and Investment Requirements
78

Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (A) Establishing Notice and Objection
Procedures for Transfers of Equity Securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions; and
(B) Establishing a Record Date for Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims
Against the Debtors' Estates at 3. Doc. No. 5.
79

Id. at 5. When an ownership change occurs, section 382 of the IRC limits the amount of future
taxable income that a company can offset by its “pre-change losses” in any taxable year (or a
portion thereof) generally to an annual amount equal to (a) the value of its stock prior to the
ownership change, multiplied by (b) the long-term, tax-exempt interest rate. See IRC § 382(b).
80

Id. at 8.
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Id. at 8-10. The Debtors propose the following notice and objection procedures for holding and
transferring Equity Securities (the “Equity Transfer Procedures”):
i. Certain Defined Terms. For purposes of this Motion and the Interim Order and
Final Order: (A) a “Substantial Equityholder” is any person or entity that beneficially owns at
least 1,920,000 shares (representing approximately 4.5% of the 42.7 million issued and
outstanding shares)6 of Sports Authority; (B) “beneficial ownership” of Equity Securities shall
be determined in accordance with applicable rules under section 382 of the IRC and the
regulations promulgated thereunder and shall include (i) direct and indirect ownership, (ii)
ownership by attribution from shareholders, subsidiaries, partnerships, trusts and other related
entities and persons, (iii) ownership by such holder’s family members, (iv) aggregate ownership
of persons acting in concert with such holder to make a coordinated acquisition of stock and (v)
ownership of options to acquire stock, which include any contingent purchase, warrant,
convertible debt, put, stock subject to risk of forfeiture, contract to acquire stock or similar
interest, regardless of whether it is contingent or otherwise not currently exercisable; and (C) a
“Transfer” means any transfer, within the meaning of section 382 of the IRC and the regulations
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promulgated thereunder, of Equity Securities to the extent described in paragraph 19(iii) below
(Stock Acquisition Notice) and/or paragraph 19(iv) below (Stock Disposition Notice).
ii. Notice of Substantial Equityholder Status. Any person or entity who currently
is or becomes a Substantial Equityholder shall (A) file with the Court and (B) serve upon
proposed counsel to the Debtors, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, 333 South Grand Avenue, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-1512 (Attn: Robert A. Klyman), and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor,
LLP, 1000 North King Street, Rodney Square, Wilmington, DE 19801 (Attn: Michael R.
Nestor), a notice of such status, in the form attached as Exhibit 2 to the Interim Order (a “Notice
of Substantial Equityholder Status”), on or before the later of (i) 14 days after entry of the
Interim Order or (ii) 14 days after becoming a Substantial Equityholder.
iii. Stock Acquisition Notice. At least 28 days prior to any transfer of Equity
Securities that would result in an increase in the amount of Equity Securities beneficially owned
by a Substantial Equityholder or would result in a person or entity becoming a Substantial
Equityholder, such Substantial Equityholder or potential Substantial Equityholder shall (A) file
with the Court and (B) serve on proposed counsel the Debtors (at the addresses set forth in
paragraph 19(ii) above), advance written notice of the intended transfer of Equity Securities, in
the form attached as Exhibit 3 to the Interim Order (a “Stock Acquisition Notice”).
iv. Stock Disposition Notice. Prior to any transfer of Equity Securities that would
result in a decrease in the amount of Equity Securities beneficially owned by a Substantial
Equityholder or would result in a person or entity ceasing to be a Substantial Equityholder, such
Substantial Equityholder shall (A) file with the Court and (B) serve on proposed counsel to the
Debtors (at the addresses set forth in paragraph 19(ii) above), advance written notice of the
intended transfer of Equity Securities, in the form attached as Exhibit 4 to the Interim Order (a
“Stock Disposition Notice”).
v. Worthless Stock Deduction Notice. At least 28 days prior to claiming any
deduction for worthless stock that that would result in a decrease in the amount of Equity
Securities beneficially owned by a Substantial Equityholder or would result in a person or entity
ceasing to be a Substantial Equityholder, such Substantial Equityholder or potential Substantial
Equityholder shall (A) file with the Court and (B) serve on proposed counsel to the Debtors (at
the addresses set forth in paragraph 19(ii) above), advance written notice of the intended
worthless stock deduction, in the form attached as Exhibit 5 to the Interim Order (a “Worthless
Stock Deduction Notice”).
vi. Objection Procedures. The Debtors shall have 21 days after receipt of a Stock
Acquisition Notice, a Stock Disposition Notice, or a Worthless Stock Deduction Notice (each, a
“Transfer Notice”) to file with the Court and serve on the party filing the Transfer Notice an
objection to the proposed Transfer or worthless stock deduction on the grounds that such
Transfer or deduction may adversely affect the Debtors’ ability to utilize their NOLs. If the
Debtors file an objection, the proposed Transfer or deduction will not be effective unless and
until approved by a final and non-appealable order of this Court. If the Debtors do not object
within such 21-day period, the Transfer or deduction may proceed solely as set forth in the
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argued that they were entitled to such notice because their net operating losses were property of
the Debtors estates which were entitled to protection, the procedures were narrowly tailored, and
the Debtors would suffer irreparable harm should the court not approve the procedures.82
The following day, the court approved the Interim Order as proposed by the Debtors.83
Seeing as no parties contested such motion court entered a Final Order verbatim to the Interim
Order.84
iii. Prepetition Taxes Motion
Later in the case issues arose regarding the Debtors’ past-due taxes. Namely, in the
Prepetition Taxes Motion,85 the Debtors represented that they owed, as of the petition date, pastdue: sales taxes of approximately $16.9 million; franchise and income taxes of approximately
Transfer Notice. Further Transfers within the scope of this paragraph must comply with the
Equity Transfer Procedures set forth in this paragraph 19(vi).
vii. Unauthorized Transfers of Equity Securities or Worthless Stock Deductions.
Effective as of the Petition Date and until further order of this Court to the contrary, any
acquisition or disposition of Equity Securities, or claims of a worthless stock deductions, in
violation of the Equity Transfer Procedures shall be null and void ab initio as an act in violation
of the automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.
82

Id. at 17-19. In re Radioshack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 9, 2015)
(“Radioshack Order”); In re Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., Case No. 12-20000 (Bankr. D.
Del. Nov. 15, 2012) (“Overseas Shipholding Order”); In re VeraSun Energy Corp., Case No. 0812606 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 6, 2008) (“VeraSun Order”); In re NII Holdings, Inc., Case No 1412611 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“NII Holdings Order”); In re Legend Parent,
Inc., Case No. 14-10701 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014) (“Legend Parent Order”); In re
Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., Case No. 12-11873 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) (“Hawker
Beechcraft Order”); In re AMR Corp., Case No. 11-15463 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2012) (“AMR Order”); In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 15, 2012) (“Eastman Kodak Order”).
83

Interim Orders (a) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Transfers of Equity
Securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions; and (b) Establishing a Record Date for
Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims Against the Debtors' Estates; and (c)
Scheduling a Final Hearing. Doc. No. 129.
84

Final Order (A) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Transfers of Equity
Securities and Claims of Worthless Stock Deductions; and (B) Establishing a Record Date for
Notice and Sell-Down Procedures for Trading in Claims Against the Debtors' Estates. Doc. No.
814.
85

Prepetition Taxes Motion at p. 4-7.
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$438,000; real property taxes of $13,700; certain state personal property taxes of approximately
$5.2 million; and state fees arising from certain licenses and permits totaling approximately
$298,000.86 Later, the Debtors discovered that they owed an additional $150,000 in fees
associated with past due taxes, as well as an additional $184,000 in property taxes.87 After a final
hearing on the matter, the court approved the Debtors’ motion on a final basis, provided that the
Debtors’ agreed not to make payment of past due fees and property taxes until the Debtors
submitted a revised final order accompanied by a certification of counsel.88 Subsequently, the
Debtors fixed their earlier mistake.89
iv. Customer Programs Motion
In the Customer Programs Motion, the Debtors requested entry of an order authorizing
the Debtors to honor and continue their customer obligations and programs such as: “(1) Sports
Authority rewards program; (2) gift cards; (3) returns, exchanges, and refunds; (4)
complimentary certificates; (5) custoer deposits; (6) merchant credit card agreements; (7)
extended warranties and service contractms; (8) assembly and delivery program; (9) price match
policy; (10) posted bonds related to the issuance of licenses and permits; and (11) promotions
and all such other similar policies, programs, and practices of the Debtors.”90 These programs
were instituted to generate and build customer relationships. However, due to the bankruptcy,
various obligations were owned to third parties encompassed within these rewards programs.
Thus, the Debtor requested continuance of such customer programs in order to maintain
customer loyalty and goodwill in the winding down process. On March 3, 2016, the Court
approved the relief requested by the Debtor regarding the continuance of the Customer Programs
in the ordinary course of business.91

86

Id.

87

Certification of Counsel Regarding Revised Final Order (A) Authorizing the Payment of
Certain Prepetition Taxes and Fees, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Receive, Process, and Honor
Checks Issued and Electronic Payment Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 911.
88

Certification of Counsel Regarding Revised Final Order (A) Authorizing the Payment of
Certain Prepetition Taxes and Fees, and (B) Authorizing Banks to Receive, Process, and Honor
Checks Issued and Electronic Payment Requests Related Thereto, Doc. No. 1061, at p. 2.
89

Id.

90

The Customer Programs Motion, at p. 3.

91

Order (A) Authorizing Debtors to Honor and Continue Certain Customer Programs and
Customer Obligations in the Ordinary Course of Business, and (B) Approving the Bonding
Agreement on an Interim Basis.
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C. Contested First Day Motions
1. Introduction and Overview
The Debtors also filed several other motions that were objected to by creditors, to varying
degrees, such as: Motion to Prohibit Utilities from Cutting Off Service, Approval of Debtor’s
Proposed Adequate Assurances for Payment of Postpetition Services, and Establishing
Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurances;92 Motion to Continue
Selling Items on Consignment Free and Clear of Liens;93 a Motion to Approve Debtor’s Store
Closing Plan;94 and Motion to Approve Debtor in Possession (“DIP”) Financing.95 Each of these
motions is discussed below.
2. Utilities Services Motion
In the Debtor’s motion regarding utilities services, the debtors asked to the court to (a)
prohibit the Debtors’ various utility providers who administer traditional utility services to the
Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering,
Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors’ Proposed Adequate Assurance
of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests
for Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 6 (the “Utilities Services Motion”).
92

Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to (I) Continue to
Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of Business Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims
and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative Expense Priority to Consignment Vendors for
Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B) Grant Replacement Liens to Consignment
Vendors With Perfected Security Interests in Consigned Goods and/or Remit the Consignment
Sales Price Arising From Sale of Consigned Goods to Putative Consignment Vendors, Doc. No.
9 (the “Consignment Sales Motion”).
93

Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to
Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B) Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free
and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of
Customary Employee Bonus Program and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving
Dispute Resolution Procedures, and (E) Approving the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 15
(the “Store Closing Plan Motion”).
94

Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition
Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and
Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III)
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition
Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and
364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and
Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 20 (the “DIP Financing Motion”).
95
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Debtors’ retail stores (each “Utility Provider” and collectively, the “Utility Providers”), for
among other things, electricity, water, gas, local and long-distance telecommunication services,
data services, waste disposal, sewer service, and other similar services (collectively, the “Utility
Services”) from altering, refusing, or discontinuing utility services to, or discriminating against,
the Debtors on account of any outstanding amounts for services rendered prepetition or (ii)
drawing upon any existing security deposit, surety bond, or other form of security to secure
future payments for utility services; (b) determining that adequate assurance of payment for post
petition utility services has been furnished to the Utility Providers providing services to the
Debtors; and (c) establishing procedures for resolving future requests by any Utility Provider for
additional adequate assurance of payment.96
The Debtors argued that the need for utility services outweighed the Utility Providers
need for a great assurance.97 Without the Services from the Utility Providers the Debtors would
not be able to operate their stores and liquidate their assets.98
On average, the Debtors paid approximately $4,300,000 per month for utility services
during 2015. On February 19, 2016, the Debtors stopped making payments to the Utility
Providers. At the time of filing its utility motion, to the best of their knowledge, the Utility
Providers argued that the Debtors owed approximately $2,100,000 in arrearages of undisputed
invoices for Utility Services.99 At approximately 97% of the Debtors’ utility accounts are
managed by Ecova, Inc. (“Ecova”).100 Among other things, Ecova managed the Utility Services,
96

Utilities Services Motion.

97

11 U.S.C. 366 specifically (c)(2) and (3); See In Re Hanratty, 907 F.2d 1418, 1424 (3d Cir.
1990). Section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code balances a debtor's need for utility services from a
provider that holds a monopoly on such services with the need of the utility to ensure itself and
its ratepayers that it receives payment for providing these essential services.
The deposit or other security “should bear a reasonable relationship to expected or anticipated
utility consumption by a debtor.”98 In making such a determination, it is appropriate for the
Court to consider the length of time necessary for the utility to effect termination once one
billing cycle is missed.” In Re Begley, 760 F2.d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1985). That being said, Section
366 of the Bankruptcy Code does not require an absolute guarantee of payment; however, it does
allow the following forms as assurance of payment: (i) a cash deposit; (ii) a letter of credit: (iii) a
certificate of deposit: (iv) a surety bond; (v) a prepayment of utility consumption; and (vi)
another form of security that is mutually agreed upon between the utility and the debtor or the
trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 366(c)(1)(A).
98

99

Utilities Services Motion at p. 3.

100

Id. at 4.
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reviewing bills for the Utility Services, paying bills for the Utility Services as an agent of the
Debtors (after receiving funds from the Debtors for such payments) establishing new Utility
Services, terminating Utility Services for closing locations and providing accounting information
to the Debtors with respect to the Utility Services managed by Ecova.101 By the time the petition
was filed, the Debtors had cancelled payments to Ecova and the Debtors argued for there to be
no outstanding pre-petition amount owed to Ecova.102
As adequate assurance for the utility providers, the Debtors proposed that they would
deposit, within 20 days of the Petition Date, an amount equal to the estimated cost for two weeks
of Utility Services (i.e. approximately $2,000,000) calculated based on the historical data for the
past year.103 Such funds were to be segregated into a single bank account designated for the
deposit for the sole benefit of the Utility Providers.104 After the two weeks, the Debtors proposed
to adjust the amount in the account to reflect the termination of Utility Services by the Debtors
regardless of additional requests from the Utility Providers and agreements reached with the
Utility Providers.105 The was an effort from the Debtor to please the Utility Providers yet still
keep them off the hook of owing two weeks of utility payments to each Utility Provider.
Another effort by the Debtor to adequately protect the Utility Providers was instituting a
procedure in which an aggravated Utility Provider, on an individual basis, would be able to
evaluate the assurance and request additional adequate assurance.106 In addition, the Debtors
included a list of requests that had a possibility of coming into play in the future.107
101

Id.

102

Id.

Id. (providing that section 366 defines “assurance of payment to mean several forms of
security, including, cash deposits, letters of credit, prepayment of utility services.”) 11 U.S.C.
§366(c)(1)(A). However, it is immediately followed by explicitly excluding offering
administrative expense priority as adequate assurance of payment. 11 U.S.C. 366(c)(1)(B)).
103

104

Id. at 6.

105

Id. at 9.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 14; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(h). Debtors requested that they be allowed to subsequently
modify the Utility Providers List without further order of the Court. The Debtors requested the
ability for modification in order to preserve the ability to add Utility Providers who, at the time
of filing the Motion, were unknown. Furthermore, the Debtors requested a final hearing on the
motion to be held within 30 days of the Petition Date to ensure that the Debtors would have the
opportunity to request modifications to the assurance procedures to avoid any potential
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The Debtors were not trying to short hand the Utility Providers, in fact, they saw their
inability to continue full payment of Utilities and proposed a compromise. A compromise that
would not leave the Utility Providers high and dry but would supplement payments until the
Debtors were able to get through their reorganization.
3. Motion to Approve the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan
i. Introduction and Overview
To begin their Store Closing Plan, the Debtors filed with the court the Debtor's'
Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the
Closing Store Agreement, (B) Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of
All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary
Employee Bonus Program and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute
Resolution Procedures, and (E) Approving the Debtors' Store Closing Plan (Motion for Store
Closing Plan”).108 Before filing their chapter 11 petition, the Debtors had analyzed all 464 stores
in 40 different states to analyze profitability and viability to determine what the Debtor’s next
move should be.109 Debtor’s consulted with Forensic Technologic International Ltd. (“FTI”) to
create a Store Closing Plan that identified underperforming and unprofitable store locations.110
The Debtors sought to close these stores in order to conserve resources and maximize
profitability.111 Through the Plan, the Debtors successfully identified up to 200 additional
underperforming and/or unprofitable store locations (“Closing Stores”). Additionally, FTI
advised the Debtors to immediately prepare for the closure of two of their five distribution
centers.112
ii. Institution of the Store Closing Agreement

termination of Utility Services. Additionally, the Debtors requested a waiver of stay of the
effectiveness of the order approving such Motion.
108

See Store Closing Plan Motion.

109

Id. at 4.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

36

The Debtors negotiated and set up the store closing agreement, presumably with the
consent of the lenders, prepetition and then sought to assume it in the bankruptcy case as an
executory contract. By doing this, they appear to have been angling to avoid piecemeal
alteration of their proposed store closing plan by objecting creditors, which would have been
much easier if it were merely a proposal for which approval was sought. Because it was entered
into as an executory contract, post petition it could technically only be assumed or rejected under
365(a) in total, i.e., in one piece. While this is technically true, there is still the possibility that
renegotiation of the agreement prior to assumption would be possible, but it would have to be on
the basis of agreement by the parties to the agreement, not a unilateral assertion by a creditor or
an order of the court. This was an attempt to lock the arrangement down and prevent any
variation by retailers, landlords, or any other affected party.
iii. Retention of a Liquidation Consultant
Under the Store Closing Plan, the Debtors retained the Liquidation Consultant to conduct
the Closing Sales at the Closing Stores.113 The Debtors and the Liquidation Consultant agreed
and executed the Store Closing Agreement on February 17, 2016.114 The Store Closing
Agreement detailed the procedure which the Liquidation Consultant was to follow to aid stores
in order to execute an efficient market exit. The Liquidation Consultant was more or less a
middle-man between the Debtors and the Closing Stores. The Liquidation Consultant was
required to keep an eye on the Closing Stores and, if a situation presented itself, identify the
problem and make sure that such problem is handled with prestige and efficiency.115 Seeing that
the Liquidation Consultant was an invaluable participant, the Debtors included detailed
provisions regarding expenses, compensation, indemnification as well as typical boilerplate
provisions.116
Five days after, the Liquidation Consultant began preparations and officially launched the
Closing Sales set to commence on March 4, 2016.117
iv. Interim and Final Orders Approving the Store Closing Plan

113

Id. at p. 5.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at Exhibit 3.

117

Id.
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The Motion for Store Closing Plan sought the entry of interim and final orders approving
the Store Closing Plan.118 Within the Store Closing Plan the Debtors included the Sale
Guidelines that were to be followed by each store. The Sale Guidelines had three main goals: (1)
all sales of Store Assets would be deemed free and clear of all encumbrances; (2) merchandise
could be sold with the benefit of various marketing techniques and price markdowns to promote
efficient liquidation; and (3) the Debtors would be able to utilize their business judgment in
relation to Store Assets which could not be promptly liquidated.119 The Debtors wanted the Court
to declare their Store Closing Agreement effective as proposed without discussions with the
affected parties.120 The Debtors argued that pursuing the Court's approval of the Store Closing
Agreement would minimize administrative expenses thus creating a smoother liquidation
process.121 Furthermore, the Debtors asserted that should the Court not allow them to assume the
Store Closing Agreement, they would “suffer significant and irreparable harm.”122
v. Proposed Bonus Plan
The proposed Bonus Plan was an effort from the Debtors to incentivize what they called
the “Closing Sales Team” to continue pursuing the best interest of the Debtors despite the
inevitable job loss.123 The Debtors argued that giving the Closing Sales Team bonuses would
prevent turnover and “reduce shrink at the Closing Stores, and thereby maximize profits” which
would produce “maximum productivity and cooperation during the Closing Sales, resulting in
higher revenues in a shorter timeframe.”124 They stressed the idea that the benefits that stemmed

118

Id.

119

Id. at 9.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

Id. at 10-11. The “Closing Sales Team” consisted of: (a) the three district managers calculated
based on a combination of sales revenues and retention of personnel (collectively, the “District
Managers”); (b) the store manager at each Closing Store, the assistant store manager at each
Closing Store, the two assistant sales managers at each Closing Store, and five team sales people
(collectively, the “Closing Store Management Team”) and (c) certain additional employees
specifically charged with asset protection (“AP Personnel” and collectively with the District
Managers and the Closing Store Management Team, the “Closing Sales Team”).
123

124

Id. at 12.
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from the Closing Bonuses would outweigh the cost to the Debtors.125 The Debtors argued that
without the Bonus Program, the Debtors would be unable to retain the Closing Sales Team.126
Losing the Closing Sales Team would require the Debtors to delegate time away from the
reorganization efforts to hire new employees to manage the Closing Stores.127 Such employees
would not likely be familiar with the merchandise and the operations of the Closing Stores and
this would cause delays in the Liquidation Process and reduce overall success and profitability of
the Closing Stores.128 The Debtors reminded the Court that Bonus Programs are normal and
typically expected in a Chapter 11 case.129
The Debtors’ acknowledged the type of sales requested in the Motion for Store Closing
Plan would be subject to various federal, state or local statute, ordinance, or rule or licensing,
etc.130 To promote efficiency, the Debtors requested the Court to exempt the sales from those
requirements131 with respect to the Closing Sales.132 As consideration for waiving such laws,

125

Id.

126

Id. at 26.

127

Id. at 27.

128

Id.

129

Id. (citing In re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015); In re
RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015); In re Ultimate
Acquisition Partners, LP, Case No. 11-10245 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 2011); In re KB Toys,
Case No. 08-13269 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 18, 2008)).
130

Id. at 12.

131

Many states take actions to regulate GOB sales in order to protect consumers. Regulators fear
that stores will use the allure of a GOB to short hand consumers with lower quality goods. Most
state law address the length of the sales as well as the amount and nature of the goods which are
being discounted. Courts will also look to the disclaimers in the GOB Sales. Although a
company may place “as-is” and “all sales final” signs around the store, there are still defects
which a consumer cannot discern and a product standard that store is held to. However, the
biggest problem with blanket waivers lies in each states right to have its own laws regarding
GOB sales. A company must devote extensive time (and money) to be compliant in every state
in which they plan to close stores. A detailed analysis of the state law implications for GOB
sales, while a worthy topic of study, is beyond the scope of this piece and therefore largely
omitted.
132

Id.
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Debtor proposed to serve notice to all affected parties within three business days of entry of
Interim Order and Final Order, copies of such Orders and the Sale Guidelines.133
The Debtors relied heavily on the business judgement rule when requesting the Court to
assume the Closing Store Agreement.134 The Debtors argued that Chapter 11 should be governed
by the business judgment rule from start to finish.135 The Debtors argued that the Closing Store
Agreement is in their best interest because it would help maximize efficiency and increase
overall profitability.136 There was a need to close these stores because they were either
unprofitable or underperformed thus weighing down on the Debtors who were trying to speed up
the Chapter 11 process.137 The Debtors argued that by allowing the Closing Sales to proceed
would in turn monetize the Store Assets in a uniform and orderly process.138 The Liquidation
Consultant was seen as a vital asset due to the numerous stores in various states. Acquiring a
Liquidation Consultant who possessed invaluable strategic, managerial, and accounting services
would allow the Debtors to delegate duties while focusing their own attention to key aspects of
their reorganization efforts.139
133

Id.

134

See 11 U.S.C. §365(a). See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc. 290 B.R. 507, 511 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2003) (stating that debtor’s rejection of executory contract is governed by business
judgment standard and can only be overturned if decision was product of bad faith, whim, or
caprice).
Store Closing Plan Motion at p 14. (stating that “The business judgment rule ‘is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest
of the company.’”) (quoting Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res.,
Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985))). The business judgment rule applies in chapter 11 cases. See Integrated Res., 147
B.R. at 656 (“Delaware business judgment rule principles have ‘vitality by analogy’ in Chapter
11.”); see also Comm. of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors v. Johns-Manville Corp.
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]he Code favors
the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a presumption of reasonableness attaches
to a Debtor’s management decisions.”).”
135

136

Store Closing Plan Motion at p. 15.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id. Furthermore, the Debtors reminded the Court that a failure to secure an order approving
the Closing Sales by March 16, 2016 was an event of default under the Debtor’s proposed DIP
financing agreement.
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The Debtors alleged that if they did not enter into the Closing Store Agreement then they
would waste valuable time dealing with each store location along with the respective governing
bodies.140 Additionally, the Debtors remind the Court that this would not be the first time the
Court had approved the assumption of similar agreements.141
Similar to their argument for assumption of the Closing Store Agreement, the Debtors
argued that it is in their best interest to assume the Sale Guidelines. The proposed Sale
Guidelines would allow the Liquidation Consultant to uniformly monetize the Store Assets at the
Closing Stores.142 The Debtors stressed the fact that there was great magnitude of stores across
various states and assuming the Sale Guidelines would alleviate the Debtor from going store to
store and negotiating on a case-by-case basis.143 The Debtors believe that without the Sale
Guidelines, the liquidation process and restructuring process would be negatively impacted.144
Again, the Debtors remind the Court that similar store closure sales, liquidations, and disposals
of assets have been approved by this court.145
The Debtor relies simply on the statute to persuade the Court to allow the DIP to sell their
property free and clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances.146 Since the Bankruptcy Code does

140

Id. at 16.

141

Id. (citing, e.g., In re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015); In
re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2015); In re Coldwater Creek
Inc., Case No. 14- 10867 (Bankr. D. Del. May 7, 2014); In re Samsonite Co. Stores, LLC, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 4839 (Sept. 10, 2009).
142

Store Closing Plan Motion at 18.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id. (citing, e.g., In re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015); In
re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015); In re Coldwater Creek
Inc., Case No. 14-10867 (Bankr. D. Del. May 7, 2014); In re Samsonite Co. Stores, LLC, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 4839 (Sept. 10, 2009).
146

Id.
“A debtor in possession may sell property under section 363(b) and section 363(f)
of the Bankruptcy Code ‘free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate’ if any one of the following conditions is satisfied: ‘(1)
applicable non-bankruptcy law permits the sale of such property free and clear of
such interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at
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not specifically define “any interest,” the Debtor utilizes the Third Circuit's interpretation toward
a “broader interpretation which includes other obligations that may flow from ownership of the
property.”147 The Debtor argued that they satisfied section 363(f)(2) because the lenders under
(a) ABL Credit Agreement, and (b) the FILO Agreement, which have first priority perfected
security interests in the Store Assets, had already expressly consented to the sale of the Store
Assets free and clear of encumbrances.148
Once again, the Debtor called attention to similar cases in which the Court approved
similar relief.149
Given that many contracts dealing with retail including leases, agreements, licenses, and
recorded documents try to protect the landlord, the Debtor's petition the Court to waive all such
Contractual Restrictions preventing the Debtors’ ability to conduct the Closing Sales at the
Closing Stores.150 Here, the Debtors rely less on the business judgment rule and more on the
necessity of such waiver. The Debtors claimed that for reasons discussed therein and in the First
Day Declaration, Closing Sales “are an essential and critical component of [their] restructuring
strategy.”151
which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on
such property; (4) such interest is a bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of
such interest.’ 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).”
147

Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir.
2000).
148

Id. at 20.

149

Id. (citing In re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015); In re
RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015).
150

Id. at 20.

151

Id. at 21. Debtors argue that store closing or liquidation sales have become a well-known
aspect of a chapter 11 case. So much so that courts consistently approve store closing or
liquidation sales despite purposeful and strategic drafted provisions. (citing In re R.H. Macy &
Co., 170 B.R. 69, 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (restrictive lease provision is unenforceable against
debtor seeking to conduct going-out-of-business sale “because it conflicts with the Debtor’s
fiduciary duty to maximize estate assets”); In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 136 B.R. 357, 359
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]o enforce the anti-[going out-of-business] sale clause of the Lease
would contravene overriding federal policy requiring Debtor to maximize estate assets by
imposing additional constraints never envisioned by Congress.”); In re Tobago Bay Trading Co.,
112 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) (clause in lease prohibiting going-out-of-business
sales is unenforceable)).
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Same argument, different request: exemption from Liquidation Laws. The Debtors, being
aware of the various state and local rules, laws, ordinances, and regulations that pertain to
liquidation of assets, argued that they were entitled to an exemption from respective laws.152
Through much research the Debtors noted that many state and local rules provided that courtordered liquidation sales were exempt from compliance; however, the Debtors were focused on
those states that did not expressly waive compliance.153 The Debtors claimed that such laws
would directly interfere with the Debtors’ ability to “marshal and maximize assets for the
benefits of the creditors”154 which was required of the Debtors, pursuant to section 363.155
However, the Debtors proposed that any governmental unit or other party could dispute such
waiver in accordance with the Resolution Procedures set forth therein.156 Again, Debtor noted
that the Court had previously granted similar relief.157
In addition to closing stores that were underperforming and/or unprofitable, the Debtors
wanted to be able to abandon certain property should it becomes apparent that they were losing
money trying to liquidate the assets.158 Debtor foresaw a possibility that keeping a store open
merely to liquidated the assets could cost more than the revenue produced by the liquidated
assets.159 Should that issue surface, the Debtors wanted to the ability to abandon such property in
connection with the Closing Sale.160 The Debtors argued that section 554 of the Bankruptcy code

152

Id. at 22.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

156

See 11 U.S.C. §363.
Store Closing Plan Motion at 23.

157

Id. (citing, e.g., In re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015); In
re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015); In re Coldwater Creek
Inc., Case No. 14-10867 (Bankr. D. Del. May 7, 2014); In re Namco, LLC, Case No. 13-10610
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 12, 2013); In re Borders Grp., Inc., Case No. 11-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2011); In re Blockbuster Inc., Case No. 10-14997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011); In re
Anchor Blue Retail Grp., Case No. 09-11770 (Bankr. D. Del. June 18, 2009)).
158

Id. at 24.

159

Id.

160

Id.
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warranted the abandonment of certain property in connection with the Closing Sales and in
accordance with the Sale Guidelines.161 The Debtors sought to liquidate not only the
Merchandise but the offered furniture, fixtures, and equipment (“Offered FF&E”) as well.162 The
Debtors were worried that any remaining Store Assets could potentially create a financial burden
on the stores, in the form of storage and removal costs.163 The Debtor’s goal was to maximize the
value of their assets and minimize unnecessary costs.164 Allowing the Debtors to abandon the
Remaining Property would maximize the value of the Debtor's’ assets while minimizing
unnecessary costs to the Closing Stores.165 Again, the Debtors argued that similar relief had been
approved by courts in this jurisdiction.166
The Debtors disclose to the Court that they have no intention to sell any personally
identifiable information during the Closing Sale; therefore, a consumer privacy ombudsman (a
“CPO”)167 need not be appointed.168 In fact, the Debtors assured the court that no confidential
161

Id. (citing Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that after notice and a hearing, a
debtor “may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(a); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v.
Tyco Indus., Inc., 500 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1974) (“[A trustee] may abandon his claim to any
asset, including a cause of action, he deems less valuable than the cost of asserting that claim.”).
See, e.g., In re Contract Research Solutions, Inc., Case No. 12-11004, 2013 WL 1910286, at *4
(Bankr. D. Del. May 1, 2013) (“[A debtor] need only demonstrate that [it] has exercised sound
business judgment in making the determination to abandon.”)).
162

Id. at p. 5.

163

Id. at p. 24 (such remaining Store Assets, the “Remaining Property”).

164

Id. at p. 25.

Id. The decision to abandon property would be made by the Debtors “determin[ing] in the
exercise of their sound business judgment that such Remaining Property to be abandoned by the
Debtors is either (a) burdensome to the estates because removal and storage costs for the
Remaining Property are likely to exceed any net proceeds therefrom or (b) of inconsequential
value and benefit to the [Closing Stores].” Id. Once Remaining Property was deemed
abandonable, the Debtors would use commercially reasonable efforts to ensure that any
confidential or personal identifying information is removed prior to property being sold or
abandoned. Id.
165

166

Id. (citing In re Coldwater Creek Inc., Case No. 14-10867 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 2, 2015); In
re Quicksilver, Inc., Case No. 15-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2015)).
167

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 332 (Requiring the appointment of the CPO no less than seven days
in the advance of a hearing on a sale under section 363(b)(1) so that such CPO can assist the
Court in its consideration of a “proposed sale or lease of personally identifiable information
under section 363(b)”).
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and personally identifiable information would be transferred through the sale of any such assets
because they planned to scrub all Store Assets.169
The Debtors requested a waiver of stay so the Closing Stores could resume business and
liquidate Merchandise.170 They argued that a waiver of stay was essential and necessary to this
Motion for the Closing Plan so that Debtors can maximize the return from the Closing Sales.171
vi. Declaration by Stephen Coulombe in Support of Debtor’s Emergency
Motion for Interim and Final Orders
Stephen Coulombe,172 Senior Managing Director at FTI Consulting, Inc, filed a
Declaration in Support of the Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders.173
Coulombe filed this Motion to reinforce the necessity of the Interim Motion. Coulombe was

168

Store Closing Plan Motion at p. 28. Although the Debtors do not see a need for a CPO to be
appointed in the regards to selling such Merchandise and FF&E; however, they do “recognize
that there may be other sales under section 363(b)(1) in these Chapter 11 Cases where the
appointment of a CPO may be necessary and/or advisable, and intend to work cooperatively with
the U.S. Trustee in connection therewith.”
169

Id.

The Stay was imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 6004(h), which provides that “[a]n order
authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property other than cash collateral is stayed until the
expiration of 14 days after entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise.” Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 6004(h).
170

The Stay was imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 6004(h), which provides that “[a]n order
authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property other than cash collateral is stayed until the
expiration of 14 days after entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise.” Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 6004(h).
171

Coulombe served as the Debtor’s financial advisor beginning on November 28, 2015. At the
time of engagement, Coulombe had eighteen years of experience serving as financial advisor and
providing performance improvement services to corporations, various creditors class, equity
owners, and directors of underperforming companies.
172

173

Declaration of Stephen Coulombe in Support of the Debtors' Emergency Motion for Interim
and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B)
Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program
and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and
(E) Approving the Debtors' Store Closing Plan (the “Coulombe Declaration”), at p. 1.
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instrumental in aiding the Debtors with the configuration of their Store Closing Plan. Coulombe
helped identify up to 200 stores which were underperforming or unprofitable that needed to be
designated as Closing Stores.174 The Debtors, in consultation with FTI, determined that it would
be in the best interest of the Debtor to immediately prepare up to 200 stores and two of their five
distribution centers for closure.175
vii. Retention of Gordon Brothers Retail Partners and Tiger Capital
Group, LLC
The Debtors retained Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, LLC (“GBRP”) and Tiger Capital
Group, LLC (“TCG” and, collectively with GBRP, the “Liquidation Consultant”) to aid in an
orderly liquidation of the inventory (the “Merchandise”) and certain furniture, fixtures,
equipment and other assets that the Debtors do not wish to retain (collectively, the “Offered
FF&E” and collectively, with the Inventory and any other assets located in a Closing Store, the
“Store Assets”) at the respective Closing Stores.176 The main goal of the Liquidation Consultant
was to maximize revenues and value for the Debtors and their creditors. The Store Closing
Program was by and between GBPR, TCG and TSA, Stores, Inc.177 Liquidation Consultant was
retained exclusively as an independent consultant specifically to conduct the Closing Sales at the
Closing Stores during the Sale Term.178 In addition the Store Closing Program the Liquidation
174

Id. at p. 3.

175

Id. at p. 3.

176

Id.

177

Id. at p. 14.

Id. The Liquidation Consultants duties included: “(1) recommend appropriate discounting to
effectively sell all of the Merchandise in accordance with a store closing or other mutually
agreeable theme, and recommend appropriate point-of-purchase, point-of-sale, and other internal
and external advertising in connection therewith; (2) provide a sufficient number of qualified
supervisors with respect to the [Closing Stores] to oversee the conduct of the [Closing Sales] and
to oversee the [Closing Sale] process in the [Closing Stores] as may be required to maximize
sales. Such supervision shall consist of personnel engaged by [Liquidation Consultant], and
mutually agreed upon regional/district managers employed by [Debtors] who [were] assigned by
[Debtors] to serve as supervisors in connection with the [Closing Sale]; (3) maintain focused and
constant communication with Store-level employees and managers to keep them abreast of
strategy and timing and to properly effect Store-level communication by [Debtors’] by category,
sales and reporting and expense monitoring; (4) Establish and monitor accounting functions for
the [Closing Sale], including evaluation of sales of Merchandise by category, sales reporting and
expense monitoring; (5) coordinate with [Debtor] so that the operation of the [Closing Stores]
was being properly maintained including ongoing customer service and housekeeping activities;
(6) recommend appropriate staffing levels for the [Closing Stores] and appropriate bonus and/or
178
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Consultant “develop, implement, monitor/benchmark, and refine a Customer Transition Program
which was instituted in order to assist the Debtors in transitioning Closing Store customers to the
Debtors’ ongoing stores and ecommerce platforms.179 Although the Customer Transition
Program was created to be fluid and change as customer moral changes, there were a few
initiatives that each party thought to be vital.180 The Sale term was to commence on February 32,
2016 and end on or about June 7, 2016.181
Coulombe’s Declaration outlined the process in which the Closing Sales would be
prepared to close.182 Coulombe wanted to make sure that the Court knew that there was much
incentive programs for Store employees; (7) recommend loss prevention initiatives; (8) advise
[Debtor] with respect to the legal requirements of affecting the [Closing Sale] as a ‘store closing’
or other mutually agreed upon theme in compliance with applicable state and local “going out of
business” laws. In connection with such obligations, [Liquidation Consultant] will (i) advise
[Debtor] of the applicable waiting period under such laws, and/or (ii) prepare (in [Debtors’ name
and for [Debtors’ signature] all permitting paperwork as may be necessary under such laws,
deliver all such paperwork to [Debtor], and file, on behalf of Debtor, all such paperwork where
necessary, and/or (iii) advise where permitting paperwork and/or waiting periods do not apply;
(9) assist the [Debtor] with rebalancing and consolidation of inventory within and, if necessary,
across markets; (10) maintain confidentiality of all proprietary and non-public information
regarding the [Debtor]; and (11) provide such other related services in connection with the
[Closing Sale] as mutually agreed upon by the parties in writing.”
179

Id.

180

Such initiatives included but were not limited to: (1) omnichannel customer experience
program; (2) customer transition and retention program; (3) customer tailored rewards program;
(4) supplemental gift card promotional program; (5) Internet-based customer location
notification program; and (6) social media engagement and contest programs.
181

Id. at p. 15. The end date was to be on a per Store basis and could be terminated earlier or
later provided that Debtor gave a five days’ notice to Liquidation Consultant.
182

The process included, among other things, the following preparations: (1) Analyzing all
inventory across all stores to determine which inventory should be classified as “liquidation
inventory” and which inventory should be retained for ordinary course sales in going-forward
stores; (2) Reallocating and redistributing inventory across all stores with an eye toward
aggregating liquidation inventory across Closing Stores; (3) Relocating inventory by and among
various stores across the country in approximately 800 trucks that have been deployed to
transport such relocated inventory and most of which are either still in transit or have reached
their destinations; (4) Ordering customized specialty banners and signs announcing the Closing
Sales at the Closing Stores; (5) Informing and engaging with their employees at the Closing
Stores about the impending Closing Sales; and (6)Posting price markdowns throughout the
Closing Stores and marking inventory at the Closing Stores to reflect the price markdowns.
Id. at p. 6.
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time and effort put into the preparation and process of closing the stores. Once the Closing Store
Agreement was executed on February 23, 2016, the Liquidation Consultant began preparing to
officially launch the Closing Sales on March 4, 2016.183
Coulombe made the following three assertions: (1) the Store Closing Agreement would
provide the greatest return to the Debtors’ estates for the Store Assets;184 (2) The Liquidation
Consultants had adequate experience;185 (3) if the Court does not enforce the Store Closing
Agreement, then the Debtors would suffer significant and irreparable harm.186
Coulombe reasoned that the Store Closing Agreement would provide the greatest return
because it would eliminate many stores that were a significant drain on the liquidity.187 By
closing those stores, the Debtors would be allowed to vacate the premises of the Closing Stores
more quickly, reject the applicable leases and therefore avoid the accrual of unnecessary
administrative expenses.188 Coulombe understood the severity of the Debtors’ financial situation,
that if delayed, would cause significant and irreparable harm.189 Furthermore, he understood that
the sooner the Debtors’ could close the stores the better off the Debtors would be.190 However,
Coulombe also acknowledged that the only way the Store Closing Agreement could be carried
out in an efficient way would be with the cooperation of their employees and the services of the

183

Id. at p. 7.

The terms negotiated in good faith and a result of arm’s length bargaining were not only the
best terms available but and would also provide the best result possible for the Debtors.
184

The Liquidation Consultants were already familiar with the Debtors’ business, given the
preparations for the Closing Sales began well in advance to the Petition Date. Due to the
familiarization with the Debtors, Coulombe understood the Liquidation Consultant to have
enough competence to oversee and assist in the management and implementation of the Closing
Sales in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
185

186

Coulombe stated that if the Court did not assume the Store Closing Agreement, there would
be a ripple of harm that will be felt all the way down to the stakeholders. The Debtor’s estates
would lose the benefit of the Liquidation Consultant’s experience with the Debtors momentum
with, preparation for, and commencement of the Closing Sales.
187

Id. at p. 8.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id.
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Liquidation Consultant.191 Coulombe urged the court to allow the Debtors the ability to
implement a Bonus Program for non-insider personnel.192 Coulombe argued that the Bonus
Program sought by the Debtors would be the motivation needed to keep key personnel on board
during the Closing Sales.193 By providing such incentive, Coulombe argued that it would combat
loss prevention and keep the Debtors from using the few resources they had to search for
replacement employees.194 The Debtors needed the existing employees who are already familiar
with the business to execute well-organized Closing Sales.195 More importantly, Coulombe
argued that without such Bonus Program the Debtors would lose necessary personnel which
would cause an unnecessary delay and/or frustrate the Closing Sales.196 To curve the concern
that the Bonus Program is just a way to pay the front office, Coulombe stated that the Debtors
were seeking the authority to pay non-insiders at the conclusion of the Closing Sales pending
entry of a final order granting relief requested in the Motion.197
191

Id.

Id. at p. 9. “The Debtors request the authority to, at their discretion, provide additional
compensation in the form of bonuses to (a) three district managers calculated based on a
combination of sales revenues and retention of personnel (collectively, the “District Managers”);
(b) the store manager at each Closing Store, the assistant store manager at each Closing Store,
the two assistant sales managers at each Closing Store, and five team sales people (collectively,
the “Closing Store Management Team”), calculated based on a combination of sales revenues
and shrink control, provided, however, that each member of the Closing Store Management
Team is only eligible for a bonus if he or she remains employed by the Debtors through the
termination of the Closing Sale at the respective Closing Store and does not resign or is
terminated for cause; and (c) certain additional employees specifically charged with asset
protection (“AP Personnel”) to maximize loss prevention and minimize shrink levels
(collectively, all bonuses to the District Managers, the Closing Store Management Team, and the
AP Personnel, the “Closing Bonuses”).”
192

193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id.

196

Id.

Id. at 10. “On balance, [Coulombe argued] that the costs to the Debtors of the Closing
Bonuses are far outweighed by the benefits such Closing Bonuses are likely to produce in the
form of maximum productivity and cooperation during the Closing Sales, resulting in higher
revenues in a shorter timeframe.”
197
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Certain ABL Lenders and FILO Lenders jointly agreed to provide the Debtors with
postpetition financing which Coulombe argued that the Closing Sales would be included in their
financing budget.198 In order for the postpetition financing to run smoothly, the DIP Credit
Agreement laid out a timeline in while certain milestones were to be met. The Store Closing
Agreement crossed paths with the DIP Credit Agreement when it proposed that an interim order
granting relief sought by the Store Closing Agreement be entered by March 16, 2016.199
4. The Consignment Sales Motion
In the Debtors’ first day motion regarding continued selling of goods on consignment, the
Debtors asked the court to do three things. First, the Debtors sought court authorization to
continue to sell inventory delivered to the Debtors on consignment (the “Consigned Goods”) by
various vendors (the “Consignment Vendors”) in the ordinary course of business, free and clear
of all liens, claims and encumbrances.200 Second, the Debtors requested that the court grant
administrative expense priority under section 503(b) to Consignment Vendors for all undisputed
obligations arising from Consigned Goods delivered to the Debtors after the petition date.201
Third, the Debtors asked the court to grant replacement liens to Consignment Vendors who have
valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected liens on any Consigned Goods that are sold
and/or remit the value of agreed upon invoice price that the Debtors owe to the Consignment
Vendors on account of Consigned Goods (the “Consignment Sale Price”) to putative
Consignment Vendors with the consent of the Debtors’ secured lenders that might otherwise
have a lien on the Consigned Goods.202
Postpeition financing was proposed to be “in the form of a senior secured, super-priority asset
based revolving credit facility of up to $500 million (the “Revolving DIP Loan”) and a senior
secured, super-priority first in last out term loan credit facility of up to $95 million in aggregate
principal amount (the “FILO DIP Loan,” and together with the Revolving DIP Loan, the “DIP
Loans”) pursuant to that certain Senior Secured Super Priority Revolving Debtor in Possession
Credit Agreement (the “DIP Credit Agreement”). I understand that the financing provided by the
DIP Loans will serve primarily as a bridge to the Debtors’ proposed sale of their business
operations.
198

Id. at 11. The DIP Credit Agreement was “driven primarily by the risk of deteriorating asset
value attendant to any delays in the sale of the Debtors’ business, as well as other milestones in
the Debtors’ chapter 11 cases.”
199

200

The Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 1.

201

Id.

202

Id. at p. 2.
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As of the date of the petition, the Debtors estimated that they possessed approximately
8.5 million units of Consigned Goods with an invoice cost to the Debtors of approximately $84.8
million in the aggregate, which the Debtors store, maintain, and insure at the Debtors’ sole
expense.203 The Debtors did not venture to estimate the net value they expected to reap from the
sale of Consigned Goods, but their mention of storing, maintaining, and insuring the Consigned
Goods seemed to imply that disallowance of such sales would not only reduce revenue, but also
incur additional cost to the estate.
In support of their first request, the Debtors argued that, because a substantial portion of
the Debtors’ business involves the sale of Consigned Goods through their retail and online
stores, they had an immediate need to continue to sell the Consigned Goods in the ordinary
course of business in order to preserve the value of the Debtors’ going concern for the benefit of
the estate and all stakeholders.204
The Debtors supported their claim by invoking the court’s powers under sections 363(b)
and 105(a) which provide, respectively, that that a debtor may use, sell, or lease property of the
estate “other than in the ordinary course of business” after notice and a hearing205 and “[t]he
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.”206 They argued that this sort of relief has been authorized by courts
where the debtor demonstrated a sound business justification for such relief.207 Here, because
they believe that it is in the best interest of their estates to continue to sell Consigned Goods in
the ordinary course of business, and because it is, in their opinion, critical that they have access
to all proceeds from sales to maintain sufficient liquidity, the court should allow them to

203

The Debtors stated that during the fiscal year 2015, the sale of Consigned Goods resulted in
total revenues of approximately $244 million and generated approximately $128 million in gross
profits. Id. at p. 4.
The Debtors further stated that “Without the ability to sell Consigned Goods, the debtors
would experience significant loss in sales volume, disrupting the Debtors’ business and
jeopardizing their efforts to maximize value.” Id. at p. 5.
204

205

Id. at p. 8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)).

206

Id. at p. 8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).

207

Id. at p. 8 (citing Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The rule we adopt requires that a judge determining a § 363(b)
application expressly find from the evidence presented before him at the hearing a good business
reason to grant such an application.”) (other citations omitted)).
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continue to sell Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business.208 Such sales can be free
and clear of any liens or encumbrances if the Debtors meet any of the five conditions set forth in
section 363(f), one of them being consent of the lien holder, which the Debtors indicated the
expected to be able to obtain.209
Finally, the Debtors also proposed that any such liens, claims, or encumbrances be
transferred and attached to the proceeds of the Consigned Goods, up to the amount of the
relevant Consignment Sale Price, with the same priority and subject to the same rights, claims,
defenses, and objections.210 At first blush, it seems odd that the Debtors’ sought relief in this
motion under section 363(b)—use of property of the estate outside the ordinary course of
business after notice and hearing211—instead of section 363(a)—use of property of the estate in
the ordinary course of business.212 After all, their proposal was to sell the goods in the ordinary
course.213 The most likely explanation is a combination of the replacement lien requested and an
abundance of caution, i.e., even if their proposal could be authorized under section 363(a), they
likely sought specific authorization from the court to avoid questions as to the nature of
“ordinary course.”

208

Id. at p. 9-10. The Debtors also cited several cases where other similarly situated Chapter 11
debtors were allowed to continue to sell consigned goods in the ordinary course of business. Id.
at p. 10 (citing, e.g., In re Ultra Stores, Inc., Case No. 09-11854 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009)
(interim order), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (final order); In re Tweeter Opco, LLC, Case
No. 08-12646 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 26, 2008) (interim order), (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2008 (final
order); In re Friedman’s Inc., Case No. 08-10161 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 29, 2008) (interim order),
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2008) (final order); In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., Case No.
08-11261 (Bankr. D. Del. June 24, 2008) (interim order), (Bankr. D. Del. July 18, 2008) (final
order); In re Hancock Fabrics, Inc., Case No. 07-10353 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 13, 2007)).
Id. at p. 11; 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (allowing sales of property of the estate “free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate” if any one of the following conditions
is satisfied: “(1) applicable non-bankruptcy law permits the sale of such property free and clear
of such interests; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) such
interest is in a bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”).
209

210

Id. at p. 12.

211

11 U.S.C. § 363(b).

212

11 U.S.C. § 363(a).

213

The Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 9-10.

52

Further, in support of their second request, the Debtors argued that it was equally critical
that Consignment Vendors continue to deliver Consigned Goods to the Debtors upon request
during the postpetition period to replenish inventory, and therefore sought authorization to
negotiate acceptable terms with certain Consignment Vendors for such delivery in exchange for
court authorized administrative expense priority under section 503(b) for all undisputed
obligations arising from the delivery of Consigned Goods postpetition.214 Under section 503(b),
certain obligations that arise in connection with the postpetition delivery of goods and services,
including goods ordered prepetition, are entitled to treatment as administrative expense priority
because the benefit the estate post-petition.215 Therefore, the Debtors argued, granting
administrative expense priority to Consignment Vendors who deliver Consigned Goods postpetition does not disturb the priority scheme anyway.216
Lastly, in support of their third request, the Debtors argued that some Consignment
Vendors may have valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected security interests in the
Consigned Goods, while others may not. Therefore, the Debtors proposed to grant each
Consignment Vendor with a valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected security interest in
the Consigned Goods a replacement lien on the proceeds of the applicable Consigned Goods, up
to the amount of the applicable Consignment Sale Price. These replacement lien would have the
same validity and priority as the liens that existed and were held by the applicable Consignment
Vendor on such Consigned goods immediately prior to the sale of such Consigned Goods in the
Debtors’ stores, and would be subject to any claims and defenses the Debtors or other parties
may have with respect to such liens.217
In an effort to preserve the status quo, the Debtors further proposed to set aside, on a
weekly basis, their gross profits from consignment sales, or the difference between the amount
received from the sale of the Consigned Goods and the Consignment Sale Price (“Consignment
Proceeds”).218 Such Consignment Proceeds would be “cash collateral,” as the term is defined in
section 363, of the Debtor’s secured lenders that may have liens on Consigned Goods and
214

Id. at p. 5.

215

Id. at p. 10; 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).

216

Id. at p. 10. The Debtors also argued that similar relief has been granted to similarly situated
debtors. Id. at p. 10 (citing In re Northstar Aerospace (USA) Inc., Case No. 12-11817 (Bankr. D.
Del. June 15, 2012); In re Ultra Stores, Inc., Case No. 09-11854 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009)
(interim order), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (final order)).
217

Id. at p. 6.

218

Id.
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proceeds arising from the sale of such goods.219 Presuming the consent of the Secured Lenders
and conditioned upon the proper perfection of the Consignment Vendor’s security interest,220 the
Debtors sought authority to remit the Consignment Sales Price to the applicable Consignment
Vendor in the ordinary course.221 Such relief is appropriate, the Debtors argued, under section

Id. The Debtors identified their “Secured Lenders” as: “(a) Bank of America, N.A., as agent
under that certain Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, dated as of May 17, 2012
(as amended, amended and restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the
“ABL Credit Agreement”) by and among The Sports Authority, Inc. and TSA Stores, Inc., as
borrowers, Slap Shot Holdings Corp. and TSA Gift Card, Inc., as guarantors, Bank of America,
N.A., as administrative agent, and the lenders party thereto, which provides up to $650 million in
aggregate loans in the form of an asset-based revolving credit facility and matures on May 17,
2017; (b) Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as FILO Agent under that certain Second
Amendment to the ABL Credit Agreement by and among The Sports Authority, Inc. and TSA
Stores, Inc. as borrowers, Slap Shot Holdings Corp. and TSA Gift Card, Inc., as guarantors,
Bank of America, N.A. as administrative agent, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as
FILO agent (the “FILO Agent”), the lenders under the ABL Credit Agreement, and the
additional lenders party thereto, which provided for the addition to the ABL Credit Agreement of
a $95 million first-in, last-out term loan tranche; (c) Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as
agent under that certain Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, dated as of November 16,
2010, by and among The Sports Authority, Inc., as borrower, Slap Shot Holdings Corp., TSA
Stores, Inc., and TSA Gift Card, Inc. as guarantors, Bank of America, N.A., as administrative
agent, and the lenders named therein (the “Term Lenders”), whereby the Term Lenders extended
a term loan in the original principal amount of approximately $300 million; (d) Bank of America,
N.A. as Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent (in such capacity, the “DIP Agent”), and the
revolving lenders parties thereto (the “Revolving DIP Lenders”); and (e) Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association as FILO Agent (the “DIP FILO Agent”), and the FILO lenders parties
thereto (the “FILO DIP Lenders”).” Id. at p. 6, fn. 3.
219

220

If remittances were made and it was later discovered that the Consignment Vendor did not
have a valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected lien on any Consigned Goods, the
Debtors proposed that they would have the right to seek to have the payment recharacterized as
an improper postpetition transfer on account of a prepetition claim and seek to either (a) recover
such improper Postpetition transfer or (b) have the improper Postpetition transfer applied to any
outstanding postpetition balance relating to such Consignment Vendor. Id. at p. 7.
221

Id. at p. 7. The Debtors further stated that they would use their reasonable best efforts where
appropriate and practicable to condition such payments on the applicable Consignment Vendor’s
agreement to (a) accept such payment in satisfaction of all or a part of it prepetition claim against
the Debtors, and (b) continue to provide goods to the Debtors during the case on terms that are
no less favorable to the Debtors than those practices and programs in place during the one-year
period immediately preceding the petition date. Id.
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363(b) as a “use, sale or lease” of property of the estate222 where the debtor has a “good business
reason.”223 Further, the courts equitable powers under section 105(a) and the “necessity of
payment” doctrine have been used to allow the Debtors to pay certain prepetition claims to
ensure continued delivery of services or goods and therefore preservation of the going concern
value of the debtor.224 Because remittance of the Consignment Sales Price to the applicable
Consignment Vendors would be necessary to ensure continued delivery of goods, and because
continued delivery of goods would maximize the value of the estate, the Debtors argued that the
court should allow them to remit the proceeds to Consignment Vendors.225
5. The DIP Financing Motion
i. Introduction and Overview of the DIP Financing Motion
While the Debtors’ chapter 11 exit strategy was ultimately to sell their business, they still
needed cash to most effectively execute that strategy.226 Specifically, they stated that they needed
222

Id. at p. 12. See also, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (providing that, after a notice and hearing, a
debtor may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the
estate.”).
223

Id. at p. 12 (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Def. Co. v.
LTV Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a court
determining an application pursuant to section 363(b) must find from the evidence a good
business reason to grant such application); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 100 B.R. 670, 675
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (standard for determining a section 363(b) motion is whether the debtor
has a “good business reason” for the requested relief) (other citations omitted)).
224

Id. at p. 13 (citing In re Lehigh Co. & New England Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir.
1981) (“[T]he necessity of payment doctrine . . . [permits] immediate payment of claims of
creditors where those creditors will not supply services or material essential to the conduct of the
business until their pre-reorganization claims shall have been paid.” (citation omitted)).
225

Id. at p. 14. The Debtors also argued that (1) remittance of the Consignment Sales Price will
not harm any party because they will only remit such amounts if the secured lender consents and
the Consignment Vendor has a valid, enforceable, non-avoidable lien; and (2) courts in Delaware
have regularly granted similar relief. Id. at p. 14 (citing In re Hancock Fabrics, Inc., Case No. 1610296 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 3, 2016) (interim order); In re LodgeNet Interactive Corp., Case No.
13-10238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013) (interim order), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2013)
(final order); In re RoomStore, Inc., Case No. 11-37790 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2011)
(interim order), (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2012) (final order) (other citations omitted)).
Declaration of Bernard Douton in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders
(I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105,
362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders
226
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liquidity to make payments to vendors on a current basis post-petition, continue to pay
employees, pay ordinary operating expenses.227 If cash dried up, they argued, the entire estate
would become more illiquid and reduced access to merchandise would diminish the effectiveness
of going out of business sales.228
They sought the much-needed cash in the form of requests to use cash collateral and
obtain DIP financing.229 In late January 2015, the Debtors authorized Rothschild Inc.230
(“Rothschild”) to initiate the process of securing DIP financing.231 After a “robust marketing
process,” the Debtors and their advisors indicated that they were unable to find a DIP financier
who would lend on an unsecured basis, secured solely by a lien on unencumbered property, or
secured by liens junior to the company’s prepetition secured creditors.232 This is hardly
surprising considering the exist strategy was to ultimately sell the business and the Debtors were
already roughly $1.1 billion in the hole solely on account of prepetition secured and subordinated
debt.233 The Debtors ultimately decided to engage their prepetion secured lenders for roll-up DIP
financing.234 They stated that this decision was based on the fact that all other proposals either
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and
Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and 364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and Local Rule 4001-2 (the “Doutin Declaration”), Doc.
No. 21, at p. 2-3.
227

Id. at p. 3.

228

Id. at p. 3.

229

Id. at p. 3.

230

Rothschid Inc. is a boutique investment banking firm that provides financial advisory services
including “mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, divestitures, initial public offerings,
privatization, corporate restructuring, private placements, and financial planning advisory
services” as well as “due diligence, negotiation, execution, market research, and transaction
closing services.” Bloomberg Company Profile, available at perma.cc/UX76-9KH2 (last visited
April 20, 2017).
231

DIP Financing Motion, at p. 13.

232

Doutin Declaration, at p. 4-5. This is standard for securing senior secured debut under 11
U.S.C. 364.
233

DIP Financing Motion, at p. 6.

234

Doutin Declaration, at p. 5.
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(a) would require the Debtors’ to engage in a contested (i.e., costly) priming fight with the
Debtors’ prepetition lenders; (b) did not provide sufficient marginal utility compared to the
transaction costs;235 (c) contained materially worse indicative economic terms; and/or (d) were
uncertain to close given outstanding material terms and conditions.236 These reasons were in
essence, a way of saying, “because it was cheaper and easier.” Moreover, while the Debtors or
their advisors did not cite such a reason, it seems likely that the prepetition secured lenders saw
participation in roll-up financing as their best shot at full recovery of their prepetition claims
with the potential to possibly even make a little bit of extra profit.
ii. The Debtors’ Motion
a. Overview and Parties
In their initial motion seeking court approval of DIP financing, the Debtors proposed a
plan where they would: (1) receive two credit facilities; (2) secured by a lien in favor the lenders’
agent; (3) be granted authorization to use cash collateral; (4) grant adequate protection to the
prepetition secured lenders; and (5) vacate the automatic stay to the extent necessary to
effectuate the provisions of the proposed Senior Secured, Super-Priority Debtor-in-Possession
Credit Agreement (the “DIP Credit Agreement”).237
The first proposed credit facility was a senior secured, super-priority asset based
revolving credit facility (the “Revolving DIP Facility”) of up to $500 million ($275 million on an
interim basis) in aggregate principal amount.238 The second proposed facility was a senior
secured, super-priority first in last out term loan credit facility of up to $95,285,000 in aggregate
principal amount (the “FILO DIP Facility,” and together with the Revolving DIP Facility, the
“DIP Facility”).239 The lenders on the DIP Facility included BofA, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., SunTrust Bank, PNC Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank, N.A., Citizens Business
Capital, CIT Bank, Capital One Leverage Finance Corp., Royal Bank of Canada, TAO Talents,
LLC, and TPG Specialty Lending, Inc.240
Doutin Declaration at p. 5 (stating that the other proposals “did not, in the Debtors’ and
Rothschild’s opinion, ‘provide the Debtors with sufficient incremental liquidity to offset the
additional cost, time, risk and effort required to secure such financing.’”).
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236

Id.

237

DIP Financing Motion, at p. 2-4.

238

DIP Financing Motion, at p. 2.

239

Id.

240

Id. at p. 286-97.
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TSA and TSA Stores would serve as the borrowers (the “Borrowers”) while Sports
Authority Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”), Slap Shot Holdings Corp. (“Slap Shot”), TSA Gift Card,
Inc. (“Gift Card”), TSA Ponce, Inc. (“Ponce”) and TSA Caribe, Inc. (“Caribe” and together with
Holdings, Gift Card and Ponce, the “Guarantors”) would jointly and severally guarantee the
Borrowers’ obligations.241 BofA served as the Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent (the
“DIP Agent”) and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (“Wells Fargo”) served as the FILO
Agent (the “DIP FILO Agent”).242
b. Prepetition Capital Structure
The Debtors’ debt structure consisted of three major secured credit agreements, one
relatively minor secured credit agreement, two issuances of unsecured mezzanine promissory
notes, amounts owed on the Consigned Goods, and trade debt.243 Further, the three major secured
credit agreements divided up the Debtors’ collateral into “ABL Priority Collateral”244 and “Term
Priority Collateral,”245 with different facilities taking different priorities in each.
The Debtors’ three major secured loans, the relative rights of which were outlined in an
intercreditor agreement (the “Prepetition Intercreditor Agreement”) were the Prepetition
Revolving Loan, Prepetition First-in, Last-out term loan tranche (the “Prepetition FILO Loan”),
and the Prepetition Term Loan.246 The Prepetition Revolving Loan was an asset-based revolving
credit facility between TSA and TSA Stores as borrowers, Slap Shot and Gift Card as guarantors,
BofA as Administrative and Collateral Agent, and a group of revolving lenders.247 Scheduled to
mature on May 17, 2017, the Prepetition Revolving Loan was secured by a first-priority security
interest in and lien on the ABL Priority Collateral and by a second-priority interest in and lien on
the Term Priority Collateral.248 The Prepetition Revolving Loan carried a varying interest rate
241

Id. at p. 1-2.

242

Id. at p. 2.

243

Id. at p. 6-12 (discussing Debtors’ debt structure).

244

See id. at p. 6-12 (discussing Debtor’s debt structure).

245

See id. at p. 6-12 (discussing Debtor’s debt structure).

246

Id. at p. 6-10.

247

Id. at p. 6.

248

Id. at p. 6-7.
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based upon the excess availability under the loan, and ranged from LIBOR plus 1.50% to LIBOR
plus 2.00%, or from the prime rate plus 0.50% to the prime rate plus 1.00%.249 As of the Petition
Date, the aggregate outstanding obligations under the Prepetition Revolving Loan were a
principal amount of approximately $346 million, plus accrued and unpaid interest, costs,
expenses, fees, and other charges, as well as approximately $25.7 million in letters of credit
issued and outstanding under the agreement governing the Prepetition Revolving Loan (the
“Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement”).250
The Prepetition FILO Loan, part of an amendment to the Prepetition Revolving Loan,
was between TSA and TSA Stores as borrowers, Slap Shot and Gift Card as guarantors, BofA as
administrative and collateral agent, Wells Fargo as FILO agent, and the prepetition Revolving
Lenders and others as revolving lenders.251 Generally secured by a last-out first-priority security
interest in and lien on the ABL Priority Collateral and by a last-out second-priority security
interest in and lien on the Term Priority Collateral,252 the Prepetition FILO Loan carried an
interest rate of LIBOR plus 6.40% and a maturity date of June 14, 2017.253 The Debtors owed, as
of the Petition Date, approximately $95,285,000 on the Prepetition FILO Loan, plus interests,
costs, expenses, fees and other charges.254
The Prepetition Term Loan was between TSA as borrower, Slap Shot, TSA Stores, and
Gift Card as guarantors, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as successor administrative
Agent of BofA, and a syndicate of lenders (the “Prepetition Term Lenders”).255 The Prepetition
249

Id. at p. 6.

250

Id. at p. 7.

251

Id. at p. 7-8.

252

This statement is generally true, except that, as between the Prepeititon Revolving Loan and
the Prepetition FILO Loan, collateral proceeds were to be applied first to repay the Prepeptition
ABL Revolving Lenders and, only after the Prepeptition ABL Revolving Lenders have been
repaid in full, to repay the Prepetition FILO Lenders. Id. at p. 8.
253

Id. at p. 7-8. Further, the Prepetition FILO Lenders were entitled to a mandatory prepayment
fee of 2.00% upon the passage of the Termination Date (the “FILO Make-Whole”). Id. at p. 8.
On March 1, 2016, the Prepetition ABL Agent delivered the Termination Notice which declared
the passage of the Termination Date and informed the Debtors that the Prepetition FILO Lenders
had elected to add the FILO Make-Whole to the principal amount of the Prepetition FILO Loan.
Id.
254

Id. at p. 8.

255

Id. at p. 9.
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Term Loan was secured by a first priority security interest in and lien on the Term Priority
Collateral and a second priority interest in and lien on the ABL Priority collateral.256
As of the Petition Date, the Debtors owed a principal amount of approximately $276.7
million, plus accrued and unpaid interest, costs, expenses, fees and other charges on the
Prepetition Term Loan.257
The Debtors’ relatively minor secured credit agreement (the “Paramus Loan”) consists of
a loan between TSA and Commercial Net Lease Realty, Inc. (the “Paramus Lenders”), entered
into on February 2, 2005, under which TSA acquired a piece of real property in Paramus, New
Jersey and on account of which, as of the Petition Date, approximately $3.3 million remained
outstanding.258
In the first note issuance, pursuant to a certain Securities Purchase Agreement, dated as of
May 3, 2006, TSA issued 11.5% Senior Subordinated Notes due May 3, 2016 (the “Mezzanine
Notes”) in the amount of $350 million.259 On May 4, 2015, the maturity date for the Mezzanine
Notes was extended to February 19, 2018 and, in consideration for the extension, Sports
Authority Holdings, Inc. made the second issuance to the holders of Mezzanine Notes in the
form of promissory notes due February 19, 2018 (the “Reference Notes”) and warrants entitling
the holders of Mezzanine Notes to purchase shares of Sports Authority Holdings common
stock.260 The Mezzanine Notes are unsecured and guaranteed by Slap Shot, TSA Stores, and Gift
Card.261 As of the Petition Date, TSA owed approximately $365.7 million in principal plus
accrued and unpaid interest on the Mezzanine Notes, and $2.6 million in deferred remittance of
cash interest payments on account of the Reference Notes.262

256

Id. at p. 9-10.

257

Id. at p. 9.

258

Id. at p. 11.

259

Id. at p. 10.

260

Id. at p. 11.

261

Id. at p. 10.

262

Id. at p. 11.
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The Debtors’ possessed, as of the petition date, approximately 9.2 million units of
Consigned Goods with an invoice cost to the Debtors of approximately $90 million in the
aggregate.263
The Debtors’ trade debt, as of the Petition Date, consisted of approximately $211.6
million in obligations arising out of sourcing, ordering, and purchasing inventory from their
preferred suppliers on credit based on standard industry terms.264
c. Cash Collateral and Terms of the DIP Facility
The Debtors’ plan to finance the winding up and sale of their business relied on being
able to use cash collateral and receive DIP financing. Further, the consent of Prepetition Secured
Parties to use cash collateral was conditioned upon the establishment of the DIP Facility.265 This
supports the conjecture that, while the Debtors’ justified using Prepetition Secured Lenders as
DIP financiers on the basis of, essentially, “its cheaper and easier,” the Prepetition Secured
Lenders were using their position and the threat of sending the case into an immediate
liquidation as leverage.266
In general, the DIP Credit Agreement and DIP Facility contemplated a Revolving DIP
Facility and a FILO DIP Facility.267 Further, the DIP Credit Agreement was subject to
compliance with a budget created in accordance with the terms of the DIP Credit Agreement (the
“Approved Budget”) and a borrowing base formula set forth in the DIP Credit Agreement (the
“Borrowing Base”).268 Also, the DIP Credit Agreement was conditioned on a set of case
milestones (the “Case Milestones”), with the obligations arising under the agreement to mature
no later than June 30, 2016.269
263

Id. at p. 12.

264

Id.

265

Id. at p. 14.

266

See id. at p. 14 (stating the use of cash collateral was conditioned upon establishment of the
DIP Facility and that without the use of cash collateral the Debtors would be forced into an
immediate liquidation).
267

Id. at p. 15-16.

268

Id. at p. 15.

269

Id. at p. 20. The Approved Budget can be found as Exhibit 1 to the DIP Financing Motion and
is attached to this document as Exhibit 1: Debtors’ Proposed Approved Budget. Id. at p. 111-12.
The Case Milestones, which contemplated that the Debtors were currently in discussions to
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The FILO DIP Facility did not provide additional capital to the Debtors, but rather served
as a post-petition refinancing of the Prepetition FILO Loan.270 The proposed FILO DIP Facility
bore interest at LIBOR plus 7.90% per annum, with a LIBOR floor of 1% per annum.271 The
FILO DIP Facility would become available only upon entry of the Final Order, and its use was
restricted solely to the payment of the Prepetition FILO Loan (the “FILO Loan Roll-Up,” and
together with the Revolving Loan Roll-Up, the “Roll Up”).272
The Revolving DIP Facility proposed an asset based revolving credit facility providing
for up to $500 million aggregate principal amount of loans and other financial
accommodations.273 The Revolving DIP Facility proposed to bear interest at LIBOR plus 3.25%
obtain a potential $25 million junior DIP loan and expressly permitted such a loan, were as
follows:
1.
Petition Date: Debtors must file (i) a motion seeking approval of the
bidding procedures in connection with the Proposed Sale Transaction (the
“Bidding Procedures Motion”), (ii) a motion seeking authority to close and
liquidate up to 180 stores operated by the Debtors and to engage a liquidator in
respect thereof (the “Store Closing Motion”), and (iii) a motion seeking to extend
the time period to assume or reject leases to not less than 210 days from the
Petition Date (the “Lease Designation Extension Motion”).
2.
March 16, 2016: Debtors must have obtained an order approving the
Store Closing Motion on an interim basis;
3.
April 1, 2016: Debtors must have obtained an order approving the Lease
Designation Extension Motion;
4.
April 11, 2016: To the extent not previously delivered, the Debtors must
deliver bid packages to any potential bidders for the Debtors’ businesses or assets
that are identified by the DIP Agent (provided such potential bidders have entered
into confidentiality agreements reasonably acceptable to the Debtors);
5.
April 21, 2016: Deadline to receive/submit binding bids with respect to
the Proposed Sale Transaction;
6.
April 25, 2016: Auction (if necessary);
7.
April 27, 2016: Hearing for the Proposed Sale Transaction; and
8.
April 28, 2016: Deadline to close Proposed Sale Transaction.
Id. at p. 20.
270

Id. at p. 15-16.

271

Id. at p. 16.

272

Id. at p. 18. Payment of the Prepetition FILO Loan included payment of the FILO MakeWhole. Id.
273

Id. at p. 15-16. Other financial accommodations include the issuance of standby and
documentary letters of credit (each a “Letter of Credit,” and subject to a $100 million sublimit)
and the provision of swingline loans to made available by BofA on a same day basis. Id. at p. 15.
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per annum or, at the option of the Borrowers, the Base Rate plus 2.25% per annum.274 Other
notable proposed provisions include aggregate fees and expenses of at least $7,666,062.50275 and
certain events of default.276
The Debtors proposed that the DIP Facility be secured by liens (the “DIP Liens”) on
substantially all of the Debtors’ prepetition and post-petition assets (the “DIP Collateral),277 and
Letter of credit fees were to be payable on the maximum amount available to be drawn under
each Letter of Credit at a rate equal to 3.25% per annum with respect to standby letters of credit
and 1.625% per annum with respect to commercial letters of credit. Id. at p. 16.
Id. at p. 16. It is unclear from the documents what the parties intended by the “Base Rate,” but
upon information and belief, this was a rate above the LIBOR + 325 basis points rate that served
as a ceiling on the loan, providing borrower protection from rising interest rates.
274

275

Id. at p. 27 (providing for a Revolving Closing Fee of $6,250,000, a FILO Closing Fee of
41,191,062.50, a DIP Agent Fee of $150,000, and a DIP FILO Agent Fee of $75,000). This
figure does not include a commitment Fee of .0375% per annum on the actual daily unused
portions of the Revolving DIP Facility and Letter of Credit Fees discussed above. Id.
276

Listed events of default include failure to comply with the Approved Budget, failure to pay
the balance due, and Debtors’ failure to obtain entry of the Final Order on or before April 1,
2016.
277

The Debtors were informed that, subject to the terms and conditions of the Interim Order, the
Prepetition Secured Parties consented to the granting of the DIP Liens, including the DIP Liens
on any previously unencumbered assets of the Debtors. Id. at p. 17. Further, the Debtors
proposed that the DIP Liens have the following priorities:
(a) a first-priority senior priming lien on the ABL Priority Collateral;
(b) a first-priority senior lien on the Debtors’ unencumbered assets, including
(i) all assets of Holdings, Ponce, and Caribe (such assets the “New Loan Party
Assets”) (ii) the proceeds of the Debtors’ leasehold interests (“Lease Proceeds”)
and (iii) upon entry of the Final Order, Specified Bankruptcy Recoveries; but
excluding Avoidance Actions themselves, Bankruptcy Recoveries (defined below)
other than Specified Bankruptcy Recoveries, and the Debtors’ leasehold interests
themselves (the “Leases”); and
(c) a junior lien on the Term Priority Collateral, and all of the Debtors’ other
assets that are subject to (x) valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected liens
in existence on the Petition Date that, after giving effect to any intercreditor or
subordination agreement, are senior in priority to the liens of the Prepetition
Secured Parties, and (y) valid, enforceable and non-avoidable liens in existence
on the Petition Date that are perfected subsequent to the Petition Date as
permitted by section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and after giving effect to any
63

with each DIP Lien being subject to a carve out (the “Carve Out”).278 Further, subject to the
Carve Out, the Debtors proposed that the DIP Agent and DIP Lenders would also receive
intercreditor or subordination agreement, are senior in priority to the liens of the
Prepetition Secured Parties.
Id. at p. 16-17. The term “Specified Bankruptcy Recoveries” was defined to mean “(i) any
proceeds of causes of action arising under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code (“549 Actions”),
and (ii) any proceeds of causes of action arising under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code
(“Avoidance Actions”) other than 549 Actions, but solely to the extent necessary to reimburse
the DIP Lenders for the amount of the Carve Out, if any, used to finance the pursuit of such
Avoidance Actions.” Id. at p. 17.
278

Id. at p. 17. “Carve Out” was defined to mean a carve out in an amount equal to:
(a) allowed administrative expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) for fees
required to be paid to the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court and to the
Office of the United States Trustee, plus
(b) all accrued and unpaid fees, disbursements, costs and expenses, allowed by the
Court at any time and incurred by professionals or professional firms retained by
the Borrowers and Guarantors and of any Committee appointed in the Chapter 11
Cases (the “Case Professionals”), through the date of service of a Carve Out
Trigger Notice (as defined below), up to and as limited by the respective
Approved Budget amounts for each Case Professional or category of Case
Professional through the date of service of said Carve Out Trigger Notice
(including partial amounts for any Carve Out Trigger Notice given other than at
the end of a week, and after giving effect to all carryforwards and carrybacks
from prior or subsequent favorable budget variances), less the amount of
prepetition retainers received by such Case Professionals and not previously
applied to fees and expenses; plus
(c) all accrued and unpaid fees, disbursements, costs and expenses incurred by the
Case Professionals from and after the date of service of a Carve Out Trigger
Notice, to the extent allowed at any time, in an aggregate amount not to exceed
$3,000,000 (the “Carve Out Cap”) ($2,750,000 of which shall be allocable to the
Debtors’ Case Professionals, and $250,000 of which shall be allocable to any
Committee Case Professionals) less the amount of prepetition retainers received
by such Case Professionals and not applied to the fees, disbursements, costs and
expenses set forth in clause (b) above. The Carve Out Cap shall be reduced on a
dollar-for-dollar basis by any payments of fees or expenses of the Case
Professionals made after delivery of the Carve Out Trigger Notice in respect of
fees and expenses incurred after delivery of the Carve Out Trigger Notice. For
purposes of the foregoing, “Carve Out Trigger Notice” shall mean a written notice
delivered (i) by the DIP Agent to the Debtors and their counsel, counsel to the
Prepetition Term Loan Lenders, the United States Trustee, and lead counsel to
any Committee, which notice may be delivered at any time by the DIP Agent
64

superpriority administrative expense claims (the “DIP Superpriority Claims”) for any unpaid
obligations under the DIP Facility.279
The Debtors argued for court approval of the DIP Credit Agreement under sections
364(c) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code.280 Because the Debtors were unable to obtain unsecured
credit, the credit transaction was necessary to preserve the assets of the estate, and the terms of
the transaction were fair, reasonable and adequate given the circumstances, the Debtors argued
that the DIP Credit Agreement meets the requirements of section 364(c).281 Further, the Debtors
argued that they should be permitted to use cash collateral because, under section 363(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, the Court may authorize the Debtors to use cash collateral so long as the
applicable secured creditor consents or is adequately protected.282 In their situation, the Debtors
following the occurrence and continuance of any DIP Order Event of Default
(defined below) and shall specify that it is a “Carve Out Trigger Notice”, or (ii) by
the Prepetition Term Loan Agent to the Debtors and their counsel, the United
States Trustee, and lead counsel to any Committee, which notice may be delivered
at any time following the occurrence and continuance of a Cash Collateral
Termination Event (as defined in the Interim Order).
Id. at p. 28-29.
279

Id. at p. 17. Further, the Debtors proposed that such superpriority claims have recourse to all
prepetition and post-petition property of the Debtors’ estates, then owned or thereafter acquired,
provided, however, that the DIP Superpriority Claims would not have any recourse to any
Avoidance Actions or proceeds thereof, other than Specified Bankruptcy Recoveries (upon entry
of the Final Order). Id. at p. 17.
280

Id. at p. 37. See also, 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (providing that, if a DIP is unable to obtain
unsecured credit allowable under section 503(b)(1), the court may, after notice and hearing,
authorize the incurring of debt (1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses, (2)
secured by a lien on unencumbered property of the estate, or (3) secured by a junior lien on
encumbered property of the estate); 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (providing that a court, after notice
and a hearing, may authorize obtaining debt secured by a senior lien on already encumbered
property of the estate only if (A) the DIP is unable to obtain credit otherwise and (B) the holder
of the earlier lien is adequately protected).
Id. at p. 38 (for three-part test, citing In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 37-39
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re The Crouse Group, Inc., 71 B.R. 544, 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987)).
281

282

Id. at p. 41 (citing In re McCormick, 354 B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006) (to use the
cash collateral of a secured creditor, the debtor must have the consent of the secured creditor or
must establish to that the secured creditor’s interest in the cash collateral is adequately
protected); see also Matter of Pursuit Athletic Footwear, Inc., 193 B.R. 713, 721 (Bankr. D. Del.
1996) (holding that creditors were adequately protected and allowing debtor to use cash
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received the consent of their prepetition secured lenders, and any whose consent they did not
receive would be adequately protected.283 Therefore, they argued, they should be allowed to use
cash collateral.
The proposed DIP Credit Agreement provided that the cash available under the
Revolving DIP Facility be used by the Debtors, subject to the Approved Budget, for payment of
transaction expenses, payment of fees and expenses incurred by the Debtors during the pendency
of the chapter 11 cases, payments for adequate protection of the DIP Lenders (the “Adequate
Protection Payments”), and general working capital purposes.284 Further, the DIP Credit
Agreement required that available capital under the Revolving DIP Facility be used for payment
of the outstanding principal, interest, costs, expenses, fees and other charges arising under the
Prepetition Revolving Loan (the “Revolving Loan Roll-Up”).285 The Debtors proposed that the
Revolving Loan Roll-Up proceed by directly applying post-petition collections of DIP Collateral
(other than proceeds of Term Priority Collateral) to pay-down the Prepetition Revolving Loan
while contemporaneously increasing the availability under the Revolving DIP Facility by a
corresponding amount.286 Following the entry of the Final Order, availability under the
Revolving DIP Facility would be used to repay the entire outstanding balance under the
Prepetition Revolving Loan.287
In the broadest sense, the Debtors argued that the Roll-Up would leave the relative rights
of the Debtors’ creditors largely unchanged from their prepetition positions, serve as a “simple
replacement” for the Debtors’ capital structure, and, following the maturity and payment of the
DIP Facility, leave the Debtors with only two prepetition secured obligations—the Prepetition
Term Loan and the Paramus Loan.288 The Debtors further supported the proposed Roll-Up by
pointing out that the Roll-Up is a condition to the Revolving DIP facility, the most favorable
collateral); In re Atrium Corp., 2010 WL 2822131, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 17, 2010)
(authorizing debtor’s use of cash collateral and granting creditor adequate protection)).
283

Id. at p. 42.

284

Id. at p. 17.

285

Id. at p. 17-18.

286

Id. at p. 18. Further, the Debtors proposed that, upon entry of the Interim Order, all
outstanding Letters of Credit issued under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement be deemed
post-petition obligations issued under the DIP Credit Agreement. Id.
287

Id.

288

Id. at p. 19-21.
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financing available. Also, the Debtors stated that they argued that the value of the ABL Priority
Collateral exceeded the amount understanding under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement,289
which meant that, in the Debtors’ (and their professionals’) view, the Prepetition Secured
Lenders were oversecured by $80 million or more.290 Lastly, because the validity, enforceability
and priority of the Prepetition Secured Lenders’ liens are subject to challenge and potential clawback by third parties, no parties would be prejudiced by the Roll-Up.291
d. Adequate Protection
Because the liens that would secure the DIP Facility would prime the respective security
interests of the Prepetition Secured Parties, the Prepetition Secured Parties demanded, and the
Debtors agreed to provide, adequate protection of their interests in Prepetition Collateral to the
extent of any diminution in value of such collateral and subject to the Carve Out.292 The
proposed adequate protection was broken down into three classes of secured parties: Prepetition
ABL Agents and Lenders, Prepetition Term Loan Agent and Lenders, and all Prepetition
Secured Parties.293
The Debtors proposed that the Prepetition ABL Agents and Lenders receive adequate
protection liens (the “ABL Adequate Protection Liens”),294 adequate protection claims (the
“ABL Superpriority Claims”),295 adequate protection interest payments,296 reimbursement of
289

Id. at p. 46 (stating that there was approximately $447 million outstanding on the Prepetition
ABL Agreement).
290

Id. at p. 46-47.

291

Id. at p. 47.

292

Id. at p. 21.

293

Id. at p. 21-24.

294

Id. at p. 21 (providing for the granting of a valid, perfected replacement security interests in
and liens on all of the DIP collateral, junior and subordinate only to (in the following order) any
permitted prior liens, the Carve Out, and the DIP liens).
295

Id. at p. 22 (providing for the granting of superpriority claims under section 507(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code with recourse to all pre- and post-petition property of the Debtors’ estates,
junior and subordinate to (in the following order) the Carve Out, and the DIP Superpriority
Claims).
296

Id. (providing for payment of, on the last business day of each month, payment of all accrued
and unpaid interest (at the default rate) and reimbursement of any costs due under the Prepetition
ABL Credit Agreement, and ceasing upon the repayment in full pursuant to the Roll-Up).
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expenses,297 and a funded escrow account.298 As for the Prepetition Term Loan Agent and
Lenders, the Debtors proposed adequate protection liens,299 adequate protection claims,300 and
reimbursement of expenses.301 Lastly, the Debtors proposed that all Prepetition Secured Parties
receive adequate protection in the form of compliance with the proposed Store Closing Motion302
and that all Prepetition Secured Lenders be entitled to receive periodic and other financial reports
from the Debtors on an ongoing basis.303

297

Id. (providing for reimbursement, on a current basis, for all reasonable and documented outof-pocket costs and expenses of the financial advisors and outside attorneys engaged by such
parties to the extent permitted under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement).
298

Id. (providing that the Prepetition ABL Agents (for the benefit of the Prepetition ABL
Lenders) shall be the beneficiary of a $250,000 funded escrow account to secure the contingent
indemnification obligations due under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement, but shall not serve
as a cap on the amount of any such obligation).
299

Id. at p. 22-23 (providing for the granting of valid, perfected replacement security interests in
and liens on all of the DIP Collateral, junior and subordinate only to (in the following order) any
permitted prior liens, the Carve Out, DIP Liens, the liens of the Prepetition ABL Agent and
Lenders arising under the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement, and the ABL Adequate Protection
liens. Further providing that such liens on Term Priority Collateral shall be junior and
subordinate only to (in the following order) any permitted prior liens and the Carve Out).
300

Id. at p. 23 (providing for the granting of superpriority claims under section 507(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code with recourse to all pre- and post-petition property of the Debtors’ estates,
junior and subordinate to (in the following order) the Carve Out, and the DIP Superpriority
Claims, the ABL Superpriority Claims).
301

Id. (providing for providing for reimbursement, on a current basis, for all reasonable and
documented out-of-pocket costs and expenses of the financial advisors and outside attorneys
engaged by such parties to the extent permitted under the Prepetition Term Loan Credit
Agreement provided, however, that amounts paid from the proceeds of ABL Priority Collateral
be promptly reimbursed to the Prepetition ABL Agent and/or the DIP Agent, as applicable and
only to the extent necessary to pay the Prepetition ABL Debt and DIP Obligations in full in
cash).
302

Id. at p. 24 (providing that the process implemented pursuant to the Store Closing Motion not
be modified without prior written consent of the Prepetition Agents or the DIP Agent, the right to
credit bid pursuant to section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code not be abrogated, the proceeds of
the Store Closing Sales be sold free and clear of all liens with the liens of the DIP Agent and
Prepetition Agents attaching to the proceeds provided that the proceeds of the Store Closing
Sales (other than the proceeds of Term Priority Collateral) be promptly applied to the
outstanding obligations under the Prepetition ABL Credit agreement and DIP Credit Agreement).
303

Id.
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The Debtors supported their argument for the adequate protection by pointing to section
363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and arguing that without the DIP Facility and use of cash
collateral, their going concern value would be destroyed.304 Therefore, they argued that because
preservation of value generally constitutes the adequate protection needed to prime existing
liens, the court should approve the proposed terms of the Debtors’ use of prepetition collateral an
proposed forms of adequate protection.305
VI. THE SECOND WAVE—THE FIGHT HEATS UP AS THE UNSECURED
CREDITORS MOUNT A DEFENSE: INTERIM ORDERS AND OBJECTIONS
A. Second Wave on the Utilities Services Front
1. Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Institute the Store Closing Plan
On March 3, 2016, the day after the Debtors’ initial motion, the Bankruptcy Judge
entered Interim Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or
Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment
for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional
Adequate Assurance of Payment.306

304

Id. at p. 42-44.

305

Id. at p. 44-45 (citing Norton, et al., 2 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d. § 38:7, p.3817 (1994) (addressing the § 364(d) determination, “[f]actors influencing a court’s decision will
be the viability of the debtor’s business and the need to protect assets against a sharp decline in
value”); Snowshoe, 789 F.2d at 1087 (§ 364(d) order affirmed on appeal where “the trustee
reported that the resort [the collateral] would lose from 50% to 90% of its fair market value if it
ceased operations”); In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(funds from lender given “priming” lien used to improve collateral is transferred into value.
“This value will serve as adequate protection. . . .”); In re Hubbard Power & Light, 202 B.R. 680,
685 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Devlin, 185 B.R. 376, 378 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (chapter
11 debtor-motel operator authorized to incur debt with superpriority status to replace airconditioning unit, boiler, and hot water heaters because such expenses were necessary to
preserve value and maintain operations)).
306

Interim Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing
Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition
Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate
Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 130. Further, these orders stated that the Court found proper
jurisdiction of the matter; proper venue of the cases and Motion; this Matter a core proceeding;
proper notice, allowing the Court to enter a final order consistent with Article III of the United
States Constitution. Id.
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The Court ordered that: (1) The Motion is granted as set forth herein on an interim basis;
(2) The Debtors are authorized to pay on a timely basis, in accordance with their prepetition
practices, all undisputed invoices for Utility Services rendered by the Utility Providers to the
Debtors after the Petition Date; (3) The Debtors shall provide an Adequate Assurance Deposit
for all Utility Providers by depositing $2,000,000 which is equal to the estimated cost for two
weeks of Utility Services; (4) The Proposed Adequate Assurance comprises the Adequate
Assurance Deposit and the Debtors’ ability to pay for future utility services in the ordinary
course of business and constitutes sufficient adequate assurance of future payment to the Utility
Providers to satisfy the requirements of section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code; (5) Pending entry
of the Final Order, the Utility Providers are prohibited from (a) altering, refusing, or
discontinuing Utility Services to, or discriminating against, the Debtors on the basis of the
commencement of the Chapter 11 Cases or on account of any unpaid prepetition charges; (b)
drawing upon any existing security to secure future payment for utility services; or (c) requiring
additional adequate assurance of payment other than the Proposed Adequate Assurance, as
condition of the Debtors continuing to receive Utility Services; (6) The Adequate Assurance
Procedures were approved as requested; (7) Subsequent Modification of the Utility Providers
List was approved as requested; (8) Request for Final Hearing was set for March 29, 2016 at
1:00 p.m.; (9) All funds in the Adequate Assurance Deposit Account shall remain subject to the
prepetition liens in favor of (a) Bank of America, N.A., (b) Wilmington Savings Fund Society,
FSB and (c) Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, subject to the rights of the Utility
Providers to payments made (i) in compliance with the Adequate Assurance Procedures, (ii) by
mutual agreement of the Debtors and the applicable Utility Provider, or (iii) by further order of
the Court; (10) The Debtors shall administer the Adequate Assurance Deposit Account in
accordance with the terms of this Interim Order, pending a Final Order; (11) the order did not set
a conclusive list of Utility Providers; (12) the Debtors are authorized, but not directed, to honor
their obligations to Ecova; (13) within two (2) business days (a) serve a copy of the Interim
Order and the Motion on each Utility Provider Identified on the Utility Providers List; (14)
nothing therein should be construed as (a) an admission to validity; (b) a waiver of the Debtors’
right to dispute; (c) an approval or assumption of any agreement; (d) an admission of the priority
status of a claim; or (e) modification of the Debtors’ right to seek relief; (16) nothing authorizes
Debtor to pay prepetition claims without further order from the Court; (17) The requirements set
forth in Bankruptcy Rule 6003(b) are satisfied; (18) Notice of the Motion provided therein shall
be deemed good and sufficient; (19) Notwithstanding Bankruptcy Rule 6004(h), the terms and
conditions of this Interim Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable; (20) The
Debtors are authorized to take all actions necessary to effectuate the relief granted pursuant to
this Interim Order in accordance with the Motion and (21) the court shall retain jurisdiction.307

307

Id. at 2-8.
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2. Objections to Interim Order
In response, four main objections were filed: (1) Objection of Certain Utility Companies
to the Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Order;308 (2) Objection by Central Georgia EMC to
Debtor’s Proposed Adequate Assurance;309 (3) Request for Additional Assurance and Opposition
to Debtor's Motion Docket;310 and (4) Objection by Duke Energy Florida, LLC to the Debtors’
Motion for Interim and Final Order.311
a. Objection of Certain Utility Companies
Certain Utilities312 objected to the Debtors Motion for Interim and Final Orders (a)
Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (b) Approving
the Debtors’ Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (c)

Objection of Certain Utility Companies to the Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders
(a) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (b)
Approving the Debtors’ Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and
(c) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of
Payment, Doc. No. 544.
308

309

Objection of Central Georgia EMC to Debtor's Proposed Adequate Assurance, Doc. No. 735.

310

Request for Additional Assurance of Utility Payment and Opposition to Debtor's Motion for
Order Approving Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services, Doc. No.
741.
311

Objection of Duke Energy to Entry of a Final Order on the Debtors' Motion for Entry of
Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing, or
Discontinuing Services; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate, Doc. No. 669.
312

American Electric Power, CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a CenterPoint Energy
Minnesota Gas, CenterPoint Energy Texas Gas , Central Maine Power Company,
Commonwealth Edison Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, Consolidated
Edison Company of New York, Inc., Florida Power & Light Company, Georgia Power
Company, NStar Electric & Gas Corporation, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., PECO Energy
Company, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Public Service Electric and Gas
Company, Public Service Enterprise Group Long Island, Salt River Project, San Diego Gas &
Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Southern California Gas Company,
Tampa Electric Company, Tucson Electric Power Company, Virginia Electric and Power
Company d/b/a Dominion Virginia Power, Westar Energy, Inc., Yankee Gas Services Company,
Boston Gas Company, Brooklyn Union Gas Company d/b/a National Grid NY, Colonial Gas
Company, KeySpan Gas East Corporation, Massachusetts Electric Company, Narragansett
Electric Company and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (collectively, the “Utilities”)
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Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of
Payment.313
The Utilities argued that the Debtors had ignored the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and improperly sought to obtain injunctive relief via a motion and not via
an adversary proceeding.314 The Utilities requested that the Debtors sought such relief from an
adversary proceeding and upon proper notice to such Utility Providers.315 The Utilities asked the
Court to vacate the improper injunctive relief in the Interim Utility Motion per the Utilities and
deny the Utility Motion to the extent the Debtors seek such relief on a final basis.316
Furthermore, the Utilities claimed a lack of factual basis for the Court to enjoin draws
upon cash deposits or letters of credit.317 Per this claim, the Utilities requested the Court to (a)
vacate the injunctive Relief in the Interim Order that precludes the Utilities from exercising their
rights under Section 366(c)(4) to offset prepetition deposits against prepetition debts; (b) vacate
the Injunctive Relief in the Interim Order that precludes the Utilities from making demands upon
surety bonds or letters of credit; (c) deny the Utility Motion to the extent it seeks such relief on a
final basis as to cash deposits, surety bonds, and letters of credits; and (d) award Utilities costs
and expenses for having to respond to the improper Injunctive Relief sought and obtained by the
Debtors.318
In addition, the Utilities requested that the Court reject the Account as a form of adequate
assurance of payment for the Utilities because they argued the Account to be an insufficient form

Objection of Certain Utility Companies to the Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders
(a) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (b)
Approving the Debtors’ Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and
(c) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of
Payment.
313

314

Id. at 3.

315

Id.

316

Id.

317

Id. at 4.

318

Id.
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of adequate assurance of payment.319 Each Utilities sought cash deposits from the Debtors
argued to be authorized by their respective applicable state law.320
The Utilities argued that the proposed $2 million deposit would not meet the standard of
adequate assurance of future performance required by 11 U.S.C. §366. The Utilities claim that
even if the Court thought it acceptable to receive an injunctive relief without an adversary
proceeding the Debtor gave no reasoning in which the Court should ignore the requirement for
an adversary proceeding.321 The Utilities also argued against the post-petition financing plan as
proposed in the Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors To
Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing Pursuant To 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 263, and 364; (II)
Granting Liens and Superiority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364
and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to
Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay Pursuant 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362,
363, and 364, and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and
(C) and Local Rule 4001-2 (the “DIP Financing Motion”).322 Taking a closer look at the Debtor’s
budget through the week of July 2, 2016, the Utilities were unconvinced the Debtors had
allocated enough funds for the payment of their post-petition utility expenses.323
b. Objection by Central Georgia EMC
The second main objection was filed by Central Georgia EMC (“EMC”)324 in opposition
to the Debtors Proposed Adequate Assurance.325 They claimed that the proposed adequate
assurance violated their contract with the Debtors. At such time, Debtor was up to date on billing
payments.326 Under the contract between EMC and the Debtors, the Debtors were billed on a

319

Id. at p. 7.

320

Id.

321

Id.

322

Id. at p. 13.

323

Id. at p. 15. (citing the DIP Financing Motion as Exhibit “A”).

324

The electric provider for Debtors distribution facility located at 130 Greenwood Industrial
Parkway in McDonough, Georgia.
325

Objection of Central Georgia EMC to Debtor's Proposed Adequate Assurance.

326

Id. at p. 1.
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monthly basis, billing in the current month for the previous month’s usage.327 The contract also
included a policy that entitled EMC to a prepayment of up to ninety (90) days should a
commercial account desire to make prepayments toward bills.328 EMC objected to the proposed
adequate assurance on the grounds that (1) under the proposed adequate assurance EMC would
receive no cash deposit on the account and (2) the Debtors need only pay two weeks of electric
service.329
On assessment of the previous twelve month span, EMC found the Debtors to use an
average of 230, 930 kilowatt hours per month, resulting in an average monthly bill amount of
$16,838.44.330 Furthermore, EMC instituted a monthly billing cycle for its customers; the
proposed adequate assurance would allow the Debtors to instead pay an estimated cost for two
weeks worth of electric service.331 Being that EMC operates as a non-profit organization and the
vast amount of electricity used by Debtor, EMC argued that they would be significantly hindered
from providing their other customers with satisfactory electric services.332 Therefore, EMC
opposed the Debtor’s proposed adequate assurance and requested adequate assurance in the form
of a cash deposit equivalent to 90 days’ billing pursuant to its Commercial Prepayment policy.333
c. Objection by Chugach Electric Association, Inc.
The last main objection was filed by Chugach Electric Association, Inc. (“Chugach”).334
Chugach filed a Request for Additional Assurance of Utility Payment and Opposition to
Debtor’s Motion for Order Approving Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for
Postpetition Services.335
327

Id.

328

Id.

329

Id.

330

Id.

331

Id.

332

Id. at p. 2.

333

Id.

334

Request for Additional Assurance of Utility Payment and Opposition to Debtor's Motion for
Order Approving Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services, Doc. No.
741. Chugach was a creditor and utility provider of the Debtors.
335

Id. at p. 1.
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Chugach’s prime focus was that Debtor was already in arears with Chugach. At the time
the Debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition, Debtor already owed Chugach $18,295.41 for electric
services.336 Furthermore, Debtor had a history of problematic payments.337 Debtor was behind in
payments for the two preceding months and at the time of filing had not paid the late fee assessed
against the utility bill.338
In accordance with the proposed adequate assurance, Debtor would not be held liable for
the monies then-currently owed to Chugach.339 Instead the Debtors’ Adequate Assurance deposit
only obligated Debtor to pay an amount equal to the estimated cost for two weeks of Utility
Services which were to be assessed on the historical data from the previous year.340
Chugach argued that normally they would request two times the average monthly power
usage. Even more so, Chugach argued that section 366(b) of the Code entitled them to
adequate assurance of payment for post petition utility services.342 Keeping to their normal
policy, Chugach requested a deposit of 20,875.00 as adequate assurance of payment.343
341

d. Adequate Assurance Request
The final objection against the Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders
was filed by Duke Energy.344 Like the Utilities, Duke Energy had a problem with the Debtors’
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Id.

337

Id. at p. 3.

338

Id.

339

Id. at p. 2.

340

The Utilities Services Motion, at p. 6.

341

Request for Additional Assurance of Utility Payment and Opposition to Debtor's Motion for
Order Approving Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services. Chugach
was a creditor and utility provider of the Debtors at p. 2. Docket no. 741
342

Id. Pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 366(b).

343

Id.

344

Objection of Duke Energy to Entry of a Final Order on the Debtors' Motion for Entry of
Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing, or
Discontinuing Services; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment
75

modification of the amount and form of the adequate assurance of payment, the post-petition
deposits, and the relief sought.345
Debtor continued to operate their business after the commencement of the case, therefore,
Duke Energy continued to provide utility good and/or services to the Debtors under eight
accounts in the State of Florida.346 As of the commencement of the case, Duke Energy was owed
$69,307.90 for prepetition utility goods and/or services provided.347 Common to Utility Service
billing, Duke Energy utilizes a monthly billing cycle,348 generally giving its customers 20 to 30
to pay the applicable before instituting a late fee.349 If the Debtor did not pay within the specified
time period, Duke Energy would inform the Debtors that they must cure their arrears by a certain
date or such services would be disconnected.350 That being said, the Debtors could receive at
least two months of free goods and/or services before Duke Energy discontinued such goods
and/or services.351 If the Utilities Motion is approved, Duke Energy argued that they would not
receive adequate pre-petition payment for the goods and/or services provided to the Debtors.352
Duke Energy argued that they would not only receive an inadequate amount of
prepetition payments but the form in which the Debtors requested to hold the adequate assurance
was incorrect.353 Duke Energy argued that the Debtors were trying to avoid the requirements of
11 U.S.C. § 366.354 Much of their argument was similar to that of the Utilities; however, Duke
Energy called attention to the fact that the Debtors had failed to identify (1) the specific bank
for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional
Adequate Assurance of Payment.
345

Id. at p. 2-3.
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Id. at p. 3.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at p. 4.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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which would be holding the proposed adequate assurance, (2) how the deposit account would be
administered, (3) what amounts were earmarked for Duke Energy, and (4) how any utility would
gain access to such funds in the event of default.355 Duke Energy argued that they were in their
right mind requesting two-month deposit as opposed to the Debtors two week deposit
proposal.356 Furthermore, Duke Energy acknowledged a foreseeable issue that in the event of
default there would be further litigation between all utilities to sort out who is entitled to the
remaining money in the account.357
In addition to formal filings by the respective parties, the Debtors received informal
comments from (i) Direct Energy, (ii) Direct Energy Business Marketing, LLC, and/or (iii)
Direct Energy Business, LLC.358
B. Second Wave on the Store Closing Plan Front
1. Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Institute Store Closing Plan
On March 3, 2016, the Court entered an Interim Order.359 The Court found that the basis
for the Closing Store Agreement was for a sound business reason and was a reasonable practice

355

Id.

356

See In Re Stagecoach, 1 B.R. at 735-36 (holding that a two-month deposit is appropriate
where the debtor could receive sixty (60) days of service before termination of services because
of the utilities’ billing cycle); see also In re Robmac, Inc., 8 B.R. at 3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
357

Objection of Duke Energy to Entry of a Final Order on the Debtors' Motion for Entry of
Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing, or
Discontinuing Services; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment
for Post-petition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for
Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment.
358

Certification of Counsel Regarding Revised Final Order (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers
from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed
Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for
Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 916.
359

Interim Order (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B)
Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program
and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and
(E) Approving the Debtors' Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 156.
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of the Debtors’ business judgement.360 The Court agreed with and affirmed the contentions
argued by the Debtors and the Declaration of Coulombe.361
The Court granted an Interim Period from March 3, 2016 through the Final Hearing
scheduled for March 29, 2016 at 1:00 p.m.362 The Court granted unimpaired effectiveness of the
provisions included in the Closing Store Agreement.363 Although the failure to include a
particular provision in the Closing Store Agreement would not diminish the effectiveness, the
Court required that the Debtors seek consent from the Term Loan Agent in order to modify any
of the provisions therein.364 Following the conclusion and within thirty (30) days of all Closing
Sales, the Debtors were to file a summary report of such Closing Sales.365
360

Id. at 2. Additionally, the Closing Store Agreement negotiated, proposed and entered into by
the [Debtors] and the Liquidation Consultant without collusion, in good faith and from arm’s
length bargaining positions.”
361

Id. at 3.

362

Id. at p. 4.

Id. “The failure to specifically include any particular provision of the Closing Store
Agreement in this Interim Order shall not diminish or impair the effectiveness of such
provisions, payments, and transactions, be and hereby are authorized and approved as and to the
extent provided for in this Interim Order….[If there is a conflict between documents] the terms
of this Interim Order shall control over all other documents, and the Sale Guidelines shall control
over the Closing Store Agreement.”
363

364

Id.

365

Id. at p. 5. Summary Reports were to include: (1) the stores closed; (2) gross revenue from
Merchandise sold; and (3) gross revenue from FF&E sold, and also provide the U.S. Trustee, any
duly appointed official committee of unsecured creditors (the “Committee”), and the DIP
Lenders and the Term Loan Agent with (i) the calculation of and compensation paid to the
Liquidation Consultant and (ii) expenses reimbursed to the Liquidation Consultant; provided,
further, that only the U.S. Trustee, the Committee and the DIP Lenders and the Term Loan Agent
may, within twenty (20) days after such report is filed and information is provided, object to the
compensation paid or reimbursed to the Liquidation Consultant only as to and on the following
grounds: (i) that the calculation of the compensation paid to the Liquidation Consultant pursuant
to the compensation structure contemplated by the Closing Store Agreement as of the date of this
Interim Order was not performed correctly; (ii) the calculation and reasonableness of any
compensation paid to the Liquidation Consultant pursuant to a compensation structure other
than as reflected in the Closing Agreement as of the Date of this Interim Order; and (iii) the
reasonableness of any expenses reimbursed by the Debtors to the Liquidation Consultant that
were in excess of the expense budget(s) filed with the court prior to the final hearing ((i) through
(iii), collectively, the “Objection Rights”).
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On an exclusively interim basis pending the Final Hearing and in accordance with the
Interim Order, the Sales Guidelines, and the Closing Store Agreement, the Debtors were
authorized to conduct the Closing Sales at the Closing Stores.366 The Sale Guidelines, on an
interim basis, were approved in their entirety.367 The court also ordered any entity in possession
of some or all Merchandise or Offered FF&E to surrender possession to the Debtors or the
Liquidation Consultant.368
In the conduction of the Closing Sales at the Closing Stores, the Court ordered that all
newspapers and other advertising media accept the Interim Order as binding authority.369
Binding all newspapers and other advertising media allowed the Debtors and the Liquidation
Consultant to carry out the Closing Store Agreement without hindrance or difficulty. The court
authorized the Debtors and the Liquidation Consultant to utilize advertising materials as
necessary and appropriate.370 The court restricted both (a) validly-issues Gift Cards,
Complimentary Certificates, Rewards Certificates, and Award Certificates (each as defined in
the Customer Programs Motion371) and (b) accept returns of merchandise either issued or sold by
the Debtors before the Petition Date, provided the Debtors remained in compliance with
applicable policies and procedures.372 The court authorized that all sales of Merchandise and
FF&E be sold free and clear of any and all liens, claims, and encumbrances.373
366

Id. at p. 6. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a) and 363(b)(1).

367

Id.

368

Id. at p. 6-7.

369

Id. at p. 7.

Id. at p. 8. “Including but not limited to ‘store closing,’ ‘sale on everything,’ ‘everything must
go,’ ‘liquidation sale,’ ‘winter clearance out,’ or similar themed sale through the posting of signs
in accordance with the Sales Guidelines, notwithstanding any applicable non-bankruptcy laws
that restrict such sales and activities, and notwithstanding any provision in any lease, sublease,
license or other agreement related to occupancy, ‘going dark,’ or abandonment of assets (subject
to the entry of a final order), or other provisions that purport to prohibit, restrict, or otherwise
interfere with the Closing Sales.”
370

As used herein, the “Customer Programs Motion” refers to the Debtors’ motion for an
Authorizing Debtors to Honor and Continue Certain Customer Programs and Customer
Obligations in the Ordinary Course of Business.
371

372

Id.

373

Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(f); provided that, any liens, claims and
encumbrances shall attach to the proceeds of the sale of applicable Merchandise or Offered
79

The court granted the Debtors and the Liquidation Consultants the ability to transfer
Merchandise and other Store Assets among the Closing Stores as well as among the Debtors’
non-Closing Stores.374 It is not uncommon for sales to exponentially increase and then plateau
once the Merchandise has been picked over. The Debtors could utilize the ability to transfer
Merchandise and Store Assets among stores if a plateau set in. Instead of keeping two plateaued
stores open, transferability allowed the Debtor to fully close one of the stores, thus cutting down
on extra expenses associated with rent and utilities and employment. The continuation of this
process could more quickly aid in the closing of stores. As per the Offered FF&E, the
Liquidation Consultant was authorized to sell or abandon such items provided that “any
remaining items left at the Closing Store on the effective date of rejection of the underlying
lease, such Merchandise and Offered FF&E be deemed abandoned to the affected Landlord.”375
Along with the authorization to transfer or abandon, the Liquidation Consultant was authorized
to supplement Merchandise in the Closing Stores with goods of “like kind and quality as
customarily sold in the Stores (the “Additional Merchandise”).”376
Furthermore, the Court authorized the institution of the Bonus Program on an interim
basis; provided that it be implemented for certain non-insider employees only and the actual
payment of and Closing Bonuses would not be issued until the conclusion of the Closing Sales
and pending entry of the Final Order.377
2. Notice of Corrected List
The following day, the Debtors issued a Notice of corrected List of Designated Store

FF&E with the same validity and priority and the same extent and amount that any such lies
claims, and encumbrances had with respect to such Merchandise and/or FF&E, subject to any
claims and defenses that the Debtors may possess with respect thereto and subject to the
Liquidation Consultant’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Closing Store Agreement.
374

Id.

375

Id. at p. 10.

Id. at p. 10. Provided that Sales of Additional Merchandise be “run through the Debtors’ cash
register systems [and the Liquidation Consultant] mark the Additional Merchandise using either
a unique SKU or department number or in such manner so as to distinguish the sale of
Additional Merchandise for the sale of Merchandise.”
376

377

Id. at p. 13.
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Closing Locations.378
3. Objections to Interim Order
a. Levin Management Objection
On March 22, 2016, Levin Management Corporation as Agent for IKEA Properties, Inc,
(“LMC”) filed a Limited Objection to Interim Motion.379 The main objection to the Interim
Motion posited by LMC was against the Debtors ability to hang outdoor signage for the Closing
Sales; however, LMC had nine objections against the Sale Guidelines.380 A joinder was filed by
378

Notice of Corrected List of Designated Store Closing Locations, Doc. No. 93. The Corrected
List removed Store #127, located at 8055 West Bowles Avenue, Suite 2, Littleton, Colorado
80123 off the Store Closing List. All other locations remained on the Closing Store List.
Limited Objection to the above-captioned debtors’ (the "Debtors") Emergency Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement,
(B) Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program
and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and
(E) Approving the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 625.
379

380

(1) Sale Duration: There should be a finite period of time within which the Debtors may
conduct the GOB Sales. The Motion sets for an approximate end-date. This date should be firm;
(2) Hours of Operation: The GOB Sale should be conducted within the normal operating hours
of the mall or shopping center. Here, while the Motion contemplates store operation during
normal mall hours, the Motion contemplates removal of fixtures and related items, outsider of
normal hours. This should not be permitted; (3) Mall/Center Regulations: The GOB Sale should
comply with the mall or shopping center regulations or guidelines concerning security,
maintenance, trash removal or any other pertinent guidelines; (4) Compliance with the Law: The
GOB Sale should comply with state and local consumer laws, including "Blue Laws" and laws
that limit activities on Sundays; (5) Signage and Advertising Reasonable restrictions should be
placed on: (a) the language and wording used in the signs or advertising; (b) the number of signs
or advertisements the Debtors will use; (c) the placement of any signs; (d) the color of the signs;
(e) the use of amplified sound to advertise the GOB sale; and (f) the use of sign-walkers and
handbills. While the Motion addresses certain of these concerns, it does not address sign walkers
or handbills, nor does it address the installation issues set forth above; (6) Merchandise: The
Debtors should not be permitted to augment the inventory with new merchandise or merchandise
from another of its stores. Landlord is particularly concerned with augmentation of the inventory
with different categories of products, which may violate exclusivity provisions of other mall
tenants; (7) Rent and Lease Obligations: The Debtors should pay all post-petition administrative
81

Parker Place Group, LLC.381
b. Carousel Center Company Objection
Carousel Center Company, L.P., Holyoke Mall Company, L.P., KRG Portofino, LLC,
KRG Port St. Lucie Landing, LLC, and KRG Fort Myers Colonial Square, LLC (each, a
“Limited Objection Landlord” and collectively, the “Limited Objection Landlords”) also filed a
Limited Objection directed toward (1) the Debtors failure to pay rent for the period of March 2,
2016 through March 31, 2016 to any of the Limited Objection Landlords for use and occupancy
of the premises and the lack of adequate protection for the Limited Objection Landlords from the
Store Closing procedures.382
The Limited Objection Landlords claim that the Debtors had failed to pay rent from
March 2, 2016 through March 31, 2016 (“Stub Rent”). The Limited Objection Landlords argued

rent and otherwise comply with the lease obligations. The Debtors should be responsible for
maintaining insurance; (8) Abandonment of Property: The Debtors should not be permitted to
abandon property within the leased premises after the GOB Sale, as currently contemplated by
the Motion. If abandoned, the Debtors should pay the cost of removing that property as an
administrative expense. Landlord should also be absolved of all responsibility to the Debtors or
third parties for property left behind; (9) Maintenance of Premises: During the GOB Sale, the
Debtors should be responsible for keeping the leased premises clean and maintained.
Joinder to Objections to Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Order (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B) Authorizing and
Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (C)
Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program and Payments to NonInsiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and (E) Approving the
Debtors’ Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 627. Parker Place is a landlord to the Debtors pursuant to
a lease dated January 18, 2005, for non-residential real property in Redding, California. The
Debtors designated the Parker Place as a Closing Store. Parker Place joined in its entirety with
reservation of a right to supplement its joinder and make additional objections.
381

Limited Objection to the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B) Authorizing and
Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of all Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (C)
Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program and Payments to NonInsiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and (E) Approving the
Debtors’ Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 629.
382
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that this Stub Rent was an administrative expense.383 If the Stub Rent was considered an
administrative expense the Court would then allowed to determine when the expense should be
paid.384 Although there is evidence that an administrative expense “must await the debtors’
decision on whether to assume or reject the leases,385” the Limited Objection Landlords argued
that the case at hand is largely distinguishable from the facts that led the Court to rule in such a
way.386 Here, the Debtors were trying to hide behind the DIP Motion in order to avoid paying
rent previously owed.387 The Limited Objection Landlords argued that the Debtors were trying to
conduct Store Closing Sales on the premises of the Landlords without paying rent,388 i.e., by
using the premises for their Store Closing Sales, the Debtors were deferring the payment of Stub
Rent and subsequent rent until the Store Closing Sales were finished.389 The Limited Objection
Landlords argued that the Debtors were seeking self-benefit rather than to benefit their
creditors.390 Meaning that the Debtors were only proposing such Motion in order to benefit
383

Id. See In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 818 (3d Cir 2010).

384

Id. See also In re Garden Ridge Corp., 323 B.R. 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (Holding that the
three factors a court should consider when determining time of payment are as follows: (1)
prejudice to the Debtor, (2) hardship to the claimant, and (3) the potential detriment to other
creditors.
385

In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 282 B.R. 169, 174-175 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that
any decision on the amount and payment of stub rent must await the debtors’ decision on
whether to assume or reject the leases).
Limited Objection to the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement, (B) Authorizing and
Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of all Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (C)
Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program and Payments to NonInsiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and (E) Approving the
Debtors’ Store Closing Plan, at p. 5.
386

387

Id.

388

Id.

389

Id.

Id. “The Debtors’ cases cannot be conducted solely to benefit the secured creditors, in
contradiction of one of the fundamental principles of the Bankruptcy Code, ‘the orderly and
equitable distribution of the estate to creditors ....’ Zazzali v. 1031n Exch. Group (In re DBSI,
Inc.), 478 B.R. 192, 199 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); see also In re Mortgage Lenders Network USA,
Inc., Hearing Transcript (Docket No. 346) at 20-21, Case No. 07-10146 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 20, 2007) (recognizing that 506(c) waivers require creditor consent); see also In re NEC
390
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themselves and their administrative officers rather than benefiting the creditors. The Limited
Objection Landlords argued that the Debtors were aware that they were in the wrong but the
Debtors’ only focus was to get money back in their own pockets rather than the pockets of the
creditors.
Like other landlords the Limited Objection Landlords argued that the Store Closing
Procedures would not provide adequate protection.391 The Limited Objection Landlords argued
the that Court should “balance Debtors interest in liquidating their assets and the Landlord’s
interest in maintaining a certain level of decorum and standard of appearance at the shopping
center where the Premises are located.”392
Based upon the combination of the unpaid Stub Rent and lack of adequate protection, the
Limited Objection Landlords requested that the Court deny the Sale Motion or condition
approval of the Sale Motion consistent with their objection and grant relief as the Court deem
just and proper.393
c. ASICS Objection
ASICS America Corporation (“ASICS”) filed an objection to the GOB Motion, among
others. ASICS argued that when ASICS terminated the Consignment Agreement, on or about
February 10, 2016, the Debtors refused to return ASICS property, and continued to hold and sell
the ASICS Property without ASICS consent.395 ASICS argued that the Debtors would be liable
394

Holdings Corp., Case No 10-11890 (PJW Hearing Transcript (Docket No. 224) at 100 (Bankr. D.
Del. July 13, 2010 (Court required secured creditors to ensure an administratively solvent
estate).”
391

Id. at 6.

392

Id. at 7.

393

Id. at 7.

394

Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final
Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 644. See
also the Store Closing Plan Motion.
395

Id. After Debtors commenced their Chapter 11, ASICS sent a second notice, dated March 11,
2016, to the Debtors re-confirming its prepetition Termination and demand to immediately stop
selling and segregate the ASCS Property.
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for conversion if they did not seek consent from ASICS prior to the sale of ASICS Property.396
ASICS argued that the express provisions of the consignment agreement between ASICS
and the Debtors should govern.397 The Debtors acknowledged the title and interest in goods
would remain with ASICS when they drafted the Vendor Guide which both parties consented
to.398 ASICS argued that from the beginning both parties understood and agreed that title to
ASICS’ Property remained vested with ASICS.399 The Debtors argued in their complaint that
title was transferred pursuant UCC § 2-401(1).400 In direct opposition to the Debtors’ contentions
that the UCC governed the relationship, ASICS argued that the UCC does not apply to consigned
goods, therefore, title never transferred and remained with ASICS.401 In fact, in light of the
Id. at p. 3. “Use or impairment of the ASICS Property without ASICS’ consent is an unlawful
conversion of such property.”
396

Id. at p. 4. The Consignment Agreement states: “[ASICS] shall retain title to all goods subject
to this agreement until the date of sale at which time title shall pass from [ASICS] to the
purchaser of such goods."
397

Id. The Vendor Guide states: “For consignment (pay by scan) Orders, risk of loss shall remain
with [ASICS] until the Merchandise is sold to a customer; title to the Merchandise shall transfer
through Sports Authority to the customer upon a sale to such customer.”
398

399

Id. at p. 10.

400

Id. Debtors selectively quote the second sentence of section 2-401(1) to argue that they have
title to the ASICS Property, contrary to the express terms of the Agreement.
401

Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final
Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion and (3) DIP Motion. See also the Store
Closing Plan Motion, at p. 10.
“Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification to the contract
(Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their identification
a special property as limited by this Act. Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest."
UCC § 2-401(1)
ASICS continued by arguing that an agreement cannot wear two hats. It must be a consignment
or a contract for sale. See e.g., Consol. Accessories Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 161 Cal. App.
(1984); Abraham & Co. v. Mansour Rahmanan & Co., No. 14-96-01120-CV (NL), 1998 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1352, at *6 (Tex App. Mar. 5, 1998). In determining whether an agreement is a
consignment or a contract for sale, the intent of the parties is controlling. N. Ctys. Bank v. Earl
Himovitz & Sons Livestock Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 849, 859 (1963).
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Debtors Consignment Agreement and Vendor Guide, the negotiations of such can be seen as to
prevent any transfer of title.402 In addition, ASICS argued that Consignor-Consignee
Relationships are not affected by UCC Article 9.403 Therefore, any reliance on UCC § 2-401(1)
or Article 9 of the UCC would be invalid.404 The “other law” referred to in UCC §9-109 cmt 6.,
ASICS argued, is bailment law.405
A “contract for sale” is defined under the UCC to include both a present sale of goods and a
contract to sell goods at a future time. UCC § 2-106(1) (emphasis added).
A “sale” is the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. Id.
A consignment is not a “sale” because there is no exchange of title for a price. See Martini E
Ricci Iamino S.P.A. - Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fruit Sales Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 954,
968 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (because consignment does not pass title, it does not fit within definition of
“sale”); UCC § 9-109 cmt. 6 (distinguishing between an Article 2 “sale or return” transaction
versus a consignment – a “sale or return” involves a buyer who becomes the owner of the
goods); 8A Am Jur 2d Bailments, § 51.
402

Id. at p. 11. See also Consol. Accessories Corp., 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1040 (only if the parties
intended to pass title will the transaction be a contract for sale rather than a bailment).
403

Id. at p. 19.

Article 9 applies only to consignments that, pursuant to section 9-109(4), fall within the
definition of section 9-102(a)(20). As for consignments falling within this definition, Article 9’s
scope is limited to determining the rights and interests of third-party creditors of, and purchasers
of goods from, a consignee. See UCC § 9-109 cmt. 6; see also UCC § 9-319. Article 9 does not
address the rights between consignor and consignee; the Comments to Section 9-109 UCC
explain, “[t]he relationship between the consignor and consignee is left to other law.” UCC § 9109 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, “the UCC did not (and does not today) prescribe rules for determining the legal
relationship between the consignor and the consignee.” United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp.
2d 287, 297 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing that comments to revised Article 9 state explicitly
that it does not apply to the relationship between a consignor and consignee); see also Messer v.
Peykar Int’l Co. (In re Fine Diamonds, LLC), 501 B.R. 159, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same);
French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey Creations, LLC), 414
B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (Under Article 9, a consignment is a security interest only
for the purpose of protecting the consignee’s creditors. “It does not otherwise alter the
contractual relationship between the consignor and consignee.”)
404

Id. at p. 20.

405

Id. at p. 20. ASICS argues that Courts consistently turn to common law when UCC does not
apply. See e.g., Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 297-99; In re Haley & Steele, Inc., 2005 Mass.
Super. LEXIS at *10-11; Rahanian v. Ahdout, 258 A.D.2d 156, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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When ASICS sent the Termination, both the Agreement and the parties’ consignment
relationship ended, without consent or acknowledgement from the Debtors.406 Upon Termination
the Debtors were obligated to return ASICS Property to ASICS.407 A failure to deliver the
ASICS Property to ASICS is in direct violation of the Agreement, Vendor Guide, and general
principles of bailment law.408
ASICS did not object to the Store Closing Plan as a whole; only as it pertained to ASICS’

Moreover, ASICS argued that common law in turn meant bailment law.
Similarly, the Court in In re Haley & Steele, Inc. found that if the UCC did not apply, the
consignment relationship would again be governed by common law – “essentially the law of
bailments.” In re Haley & Steele, Inc., 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS at *10-11; see also Martini E
Ricci Iamino S.P.A. - Consortile Societa Agricola, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“To the extent they are
not ‘displaced by any particular provision of the’ UCC, true consignments are ‘governed by the
principles of agency.’”)
A consignment is a type of bailment. See Nelson v. Sotheby’s Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
406

Id. at p. 21.

“The plain language and meaning of the Agreement and Vendor Guide is clear: the parties
reserved the right at all times to either amend or terminate the Agreement. The Agreement
provided for an Effective Period and the incorporated Vendor Guide left it to the parties whether
and when to amend or terminate their relationship. For ASICS, it chose to terminate the
Agreement and on February 10, 2016, it sent the Termination to the Debtors.” See Termination
(noting immediate termination of the Agreement and demand for return of consigned goods).”
407

Id. at p. 23-24.

“In a consignment relationship, a consignee only has the rights of a bailee and title to bailed
property remains with the consignor/bailor. 8A Am Jur 2d Bailments, § 51; see also Agreement,
at p. 2. Indeed, the defining characteristic of a bailment is that the bailed property is delivered to
and held by a bailee in trust. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Ontario Grape Growers’Mktg. Bd., 67 F.3d
470, 475 (3d Cir. 1995); Union Stone Co. v. Wilmington Transfer Co., 28 Del. 59, 63 (1914);
Insurance & Fin. Servs. v. B & F Paving, Inc., No. 93-04-027 (AJS), 1994 Del. C.P. LEXIS 1, at
*2 (Del. C.P. April 27, 1994). Therefore, a bailee can only hold bailed property until it is
requested to be returned by the bailor. Payberg v. Harris, 931 P.2d 544, 545 (Colo. App. 1996)
(“a bailment also entails an underlying contract that the subject property will be returned or
accounted for when the bailor reclaims it.”)”
408

Id. at p. 24.
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Property.409 ASICS requests that the Store Closing Plan not include ASICS’ Property, but
instead, such property be returned to ASICS.410 ASICS was upset that the Debtors were trying to
sell their products at a discounted price when the agreement, drafted by the Debtors, specifically
required the Debtors to return to products to ASICS.411 Twenty-four retailers subsequently filed
joinders in agreement with the legal and factual arguments made by ASICS.412

409

Id. at p. 8.

410

Id. at p. 8.

411

Id. at p. 20.

412

The twenty-four retailers were as follows:

(1) Joinder by Casio America Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion,
(2) GOB Motion and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 646;
(2) Joinder of THORLO, Inc. to the Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 654;
(3) Joinder of Sport Write, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 661;
(4) Castlewood Apparel Corp.’s (I) Joinder to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America
Corporation to Debtors’ Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion;
and (3) DIP Motion; and (II) Additional, Limited Objection to GOB Motion, Doc. No. 662:
(5) Joinder of SGS Sports, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 663;
(6) Joinder of SP Images, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to Debtors'
Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP Motion, Doc.
No. 664;
(7) Joinder of Gordini USA, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 666;
(8) Joinder Limited Omnibus Objection of Shock Doctor, Inc., d/b/a United Sports Brands (USB)
to Debtors Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP
Motion, Joinder by USB in Omnibus Objection of Asics America Corporation, and Reservation
of Rights by USB, Doc. No. 671;
(9) Objection of Impuls footcare Consignment Motion, Limited Objection to GOB Motion, and
Joinder to Other Objections, Doc. No. 673;
(10) Joinder of Boyt Harness to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to Debtors'
Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion and (3) DIP
Motion, Doc. No. 680;
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(11) Objection of Bravo Sports and Joinder to Objection of Asics America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP
Motion, Doc. No. 681;
(12) Limited Objection of Goal Zero LLC to Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to (I) Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of
Business Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative
Expense Priority to Consignment Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B)
Grant Replacement Liens to Consignment Vendors with Perfected Security Interests in
Consigned Goods and/or Remit the Consignment Sale Price Arising from Sale of Consigned
Goods to Putative Consignment Vendors, and Joinder in Objection, Responses, and Joinders of
Agron, Inc., Gordini USA, Inc., SGS Sports, Inc., Castlewood Apparel Corp., and Wigwam
Mills, Inc. , Doc. No. 684;
(13) Joinder of Altus Brands, LLC to the Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 687;
(14) Objection of Agron, Inc. and Joinder to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation
to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 691;
(15) Joinder of Filmar USA, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 693;
(16) Joinder of Performance Apparel Corp. to the Omnibus Objection of ASICS America
Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2)
GOB Motion and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 698;
(17) Limited Objection and Joinder of J.J's Mae, Inc. d/b/a Rainbeau to Objection of Asics
America Corporation to Debtors': (A) Motion for Interim and Final orders re Consigned Goods
and Consignment Vendors, and (B) Proposed Bid Procedures Order and Notice of Auction and
Sale Hearing, and Reservation of Rights, Doc. No. 700;
(18) Joinder by Mission Product Holdings, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America
Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) Gob Motion;
and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 707;
(19) Joinder of O2COOL, LLC to Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to
Debtors' Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion and (3) DIP
Motion, Doc. No. 713;
(20) Limited Omnibus Objection of Trends International, LLC ("Trends") to Debtors' Motions
for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP Motion, Joinder by
Trends in Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation, and Reservation of Rights by
Trends, Doc. No. 753;
(21) Joinder by Hi-Tec Sports USA, Inc. to Omnibus Objection of Asics America Corporation to
Debtors’ Motions for Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) Gob Motion; and (3) DIP
Motion, Doc. No. 853;
(22) Joinder of Ogio International, Inc. to the Omnibus Objections of Asics America
Corporation, and Other Consignors, to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1)
Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 888;
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d. Ameriform Objection
goods at a discounted price. In the Consignment Agreement between Ameriform and TSA, the
parties expressly agreed that all right, title, and interest in and to any consigned goods would
remain with Ameriform.413 Ameriform was not objecting to the sale of their goods; however,
they were objecting to the distribution of the proceeds of their goods.414 Since Ameriform
understood the “rights, title and interest” to still be vested with themselves they wanted the Final
Order to reflect as much.415 Ameriform wanted the Court to acknowledge them as senior to all
other secured creditors and asset purchasers as to the Ameriform Property and that Ameriform,
not the Debtors, owned the Ameriform Property.416 Ameriform objected to the Debtors desire to

(23) Joinder of Midland Radio Corporation to the Omnibus Objection of ASICS America
Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2)
GOB Motion and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 1022;
(24) Objection Joinder of XS Commerce to the Omnibus Objection of ASICS America
Corporation to Debtors' Motions for Entry of Final Orders On (1) Consignment Motion; (2)
GOB Motion; and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 1399;
Id. at p. 3. “[Ameriform] shall retain title to all goods subject to the agreement until the date f
sale at which time title shall pass from [Ameriform] to the purchaser of such goods.”
413

414

Id. at p. 4.

415

Id.

416

Id. at p. 4-5. Ameriform argued that UCC § 9-109(4) gives authority to apply Article 9 of the
UCC to consignments that fall within § 9-102(a)(20). UCC §§ 9-109 and 9-319 define the scope
or article 9 as limited to determining the rights and interests of third-party creditors of, and
purchasers of goods from a consignee. Therefore, in regard to Ameriform and third-party
creditors or purchasers of Debtors, Ameriform is properly perfected under UCC § 9-319 and
takes priority over any competing interest. Furthermore, Ameriform uses the express language in
the Consignment Agreement to argue that they own the Ameriform Property. Ameriform argues
that they did not transfer the right to the goods to TSA. Rather, instead of an out right sale of
such goods, Ameriform consigned the goods to TSA. Ameriform argued the consignment
relationship between themselves and debtors meant:
[a] type of bailment where the consignor delivers possession of personal property
to the consignee for the purpose of reselling the property. Consistent with the
express language of this consignment agreement, title and ownership of the
consigned property remain vested in the consignor. The consignee is the agent
and bailee of the consignor of the full amount of the proceeds from any resale.
Absent a provision to the contrary in the agreement, the consignor can demand
return of its property at any time.
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sell Ameriform property at a discounted rate for fear of damaged reputation. Furthermore,
approval of the GOB Motion would “deprive Ameriform of the bargained-for proceeds from the
Ameriform Property.”417 Therefore, Ameriform request the GOB be denied.
C. Second Wave on the Consignment Sales Front: Initial Objections to the Consignment
Sales Motion, the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods, and
the Adversary Proceedings
1. Introduction and Overview
In response to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, creditors of the Debtors raised
numerous objections, four of which are worth discussing in turn. The objections differed in two
important ways: timing and breadth. Furthermore, the objections come at varying points with
regard to the court’s interim order on the issue and a slew of adversary proceedings. For the sake
of clarity, as well as to flesh out the relationship between the objections and other events, this
section addresses the documents sequentially.
First, as to timing, Agron, Inc. (“Agron”),418 and those that joined Agron,419 were the
only parties to object prior to the court’s interim order (the “Interim Order Authorizing Debtors
to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods”) authorizing the Debtors to continue selling Consigned
SportChassis, LLC v. Broward Motorsports of Palm Beach, LLC 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130183, *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2011).
417

Id. at p. 7.

Limited Objection to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the
Debtors to (I) Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of Business Free and
Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative Expense Priority to
Consignment Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B) Grant Replacement
Liens to Consignment Vendors With Perfected Security Interests in Consigned Goods and/or
Remit the Consignment Sales Price Arising From Sale of Consigned Goods to Putative
Consignment Vendors, Doc. No. 102 (the “Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales
Motion”).
418

See also, Joinder of Gordini USA, Inc. and SGS Sports, Inc. to Agron, Inc.’s Limited
Objection to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to (I)
Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of Business Free and Clear of All
Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative Expense Priority to Consignment
Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B) Grant Replacement Liens to
Consignment Vendors With Perfected Security Interests in Consigned Goods and/or Remit the
Consignment Sales Price Arising From Sale of Consigned Goods to Putative Consignment
Vendors, Doc. No. 110.
419
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Goods received before the Petition Date (“Prepetition Consigned Goods”) from the Consignment
Vendors, with all liens, claims and interests in the Prepetition Consigned Goods, if any, to attach
to the applicable proceeds of the sale,420 and before the slew of adversary proceedings seeking to
recharacterize the Consignment Vendors’ interest in the Consigned Goods as an unperfected
security interest rather than as a true consignment (the “Adversary Proceedings Regarding
Consignment Vendors’ Interests”).421 On the other hand, Wigwam Mills, Inc. (“Wigwam”),422
Ameriform Acquisition Company, LLC (“Ameriform”),423 and ASICS America Corporation
(“ASICS”)424 all filed their respective objections after the Interim Order Authorizing the Debtors
to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods425 and after the Adversary Proceedings Regarding
Consignment Vendors’ Interests.426
See Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion; Interim Order (A) Authorizing
the Debtors to (I) Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of Business Free
and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative Expense
Priority to Consignment Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B) Grant
Replacement Liens to Consignment Vendors With Perfected Security Interests in Consigned
Goods and/or Remit the Consignment Sales Price Arising From Sale of Consigned Goods to
Putative Consignment Vendors, Doc. No. 278 (the “Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to
Continue to Sell Consigned Goods”).
420

See Doc. Nos. 344-505 for 161 adversary proceedings brought by the Debtors’ seeking
recharacterization of Consignment Vendors’ interest in Consigned Goods; Section (VI)(D)(4),
discussing the adversary proceedings.
421

Objection of Wigwam Mills, Inc. to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to (I) Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in the Ordinary Course of
Business Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II) Grant Administrative
Expense Priority to Consignment Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered Postpetition; and (B)
Grant Replacement Liens to Consignment Vendors With Perfected Security Interests in
Consigned Goods and/or Remit the Consignment Sales Price Arising From Sale of Consigned
Goods to Putative Consignment Vendors, Doc. No. 608 (the “Wigwam Objection to Debtors’
Consignment Sales Motion”).
422

423

Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions.

Omnibus Objection of ASICS America Corporation to Debtors’ Motions for Entry of Final
Orders on the (1) Consignment Motion; (2) GOB Motion; and (3) DIP Motion, Doc. No. 644
(“ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions”).
424

425

See Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods.

See Doc. Nos. 344-505 for 161 adversary proceedings brought by the Debtors’ seeking
recharacterization of Consignment Vendors’ interest in Consigned Goods; Section (VI)(D)(4),
discussing the adversary proceedings.
426
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Second, as to breadth, both Agron427 and Wigwam428 filed objections specific to the
Consignment Sales Motion, while Ameriform429 and ASICS430 filed omnibus objections that
objected, on various grounds, to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion,431 the Store Closing
Plan Motion (referred to as the Going Out of Business or “GOB” motion),432 and the DIP
Financing Motion (referred to as the “DIP Motion”).433
2. Agron’s Objection to the Consignment Sales Motion
The first objection, in a temporal sense, came from Agron, a supplier of goods434 on a
consignment basis to the Debtors.435 The fact that the Agron Objection to the Debtors
Consignment Sales Motion came much earlier than the other three objections discussed gains
significance because it was the only one to come before the court’s Interim Order Authorizing
the Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods (discussed in Subsection 4) and before the
slew of adversary proceedings (discussed below in Subsection 5) filed by the Debtors’ seeking to
recharacterize the Consignment Vendors interest in the Consigned Goods as unperfected security
interests rather than goods held for consignment as defined in Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) section 9-102.436
427

See Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion.

428

See Wigwam Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion.

429

See Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions.

430

See ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions.

431

See the Consignment Sales Motion.

432

See the Store Closing Plan Motion.

433

See the DIP Financing Motion.

Consigned Goods supplied by Agron to the Debtors included Adidas branded “[d]uffel bags
and sackpacks, men's and women's underwear, small accessories such as compression sleeves
and head and wristbands, soccer and team socks (which differ from athletic multi-packs), caps
and knit hats” and “[s]occer and team socks which are used for team related sports (such as
soccer, football, baseball and basketball).” Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Motion, at
p. 2.
434

435

Id. at p. 1.

See Doc. Nos. 344-505 for 161 adversary proceedings brought by the Debtors’ seeking
recharacterization of Consignment Vendors’ interest in Consigned Goods; Section (VI)(D)(4),
discussing the adversary proceedings.
436
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In their limited objection, Agron argued that the Consignment Motion does not
adequately protect Agron’s ownership interest in the Consigned Goods and, in addition to the
relief requested in the Consignment Motion, asked the court to: i) eliminate the risk that remitted
proceeds be clawed back based on a dispute over the validity, enforceability, or non-avoidability
of Agron’s liens;437 ii) grant Agron an unavoidable, valid, perfected replacement lien; iii) grant
Agron administrative priority under section 507(b); and iv) treat Agron as a critical vendor as
contemplated in the Critical Vendor Motion which would allow for at least some payment of its
prepetition unsecured claim.438
Perhaps anticipating the slew of adversary proceedings to be filed by the Debtors, or
possibly even inviting the adversary proceedings, the crux of Agron’s argument in its objection
rested on the assertion that the Consigned Goods are not property of the estate because, in a
consignment relationship, title to the Consigned Goods remains with Agron.439 Citing a similar

The “clawback risk” stems from the Debtors’ request in paragraph 12 of the Consignment
Sales Motion where the Debtors stipulated that:
437

In the event that a Consignment Vendor accepts payment pursuant to the Interim
Order or the Final Order and it is later determined that such Consignment Vendor
did not have a valid, enforceable, non-avoidable and perfected lien on any
Consigned Goods, then the Debtors reserve the right to seek to have the payment
recharacterized as an improper postpetition transfer on account of a prepetition
claim and to seek either to (a) recover such improper Postpetition transfer or (b)
have the improper Postpetition transfer applied to any outstanding postpetition
balance relating to such Consignment Vendor.
Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 7.
Agron Objection to Consignment Motion, at p. 3. See also, Debtors’ Motion for Interim and
Final Orders Authorizing Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims of Critical Vendors, Doc.
No. 19 (the “Critical Vendor Motion”) (seeking, among other things, authority, within the sole
discretion of the Debtors, to pay prepetition claims held by certain Critical Vendors in an amount
up to $15 million on an interim basis and $30 million on a final basis, pursuant to section
363(b)(1)).
438

Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 4-5 (citing In re Whitehall
Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 28, 2008)). See also, id. at
p. 2-3, paragraph 5 (quoting portions of TSA’s “2015 Vendor Deal Sheet Summary Pay by
Scan” executed by TSA and Agron as providing that “this agreement shall be a consignment as
defined in Section 9-102 of the Colorado and Delaware [UCC]. Vendor shall retain title to all
goods subject to this agreement until the date of sale at which time title shall pass from Vendor
to the purchaser of such goods,” and “Vendor shall be entitled to file UCC-1 Financing
Statements to reflect this Consignment.”); id. at p. 3, paragraph 6 (stating that “Agron has filed
UCC-1 Financing Statements with respect to the Consignment Property”).
439
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case with a similar consignment agreement in Whitehall Jewelers, Agron first argued that the
bankruptcy court could not approve a sale of consigned property without first determining
whether that property is property of the estate, and further that a bankruptcy court could not
make such a determination through a contested matter such as a sale motion under section 363.440
Agron argued that because section 363 permits a debtor to use or sell only property of the
estate,441 and because the debtor bears the burden of proof in establishing whether property
proposed to be used or sold is indeed property of the estate,442 to the extent the Debtors dispute
that the Consigned Goods are Agron’s property, the Debtors must commence an adversary
proceeding to determine title.443 Absent the consent of Agron or adequate protection of Agron’s
interest in the consigned goods,444 Agron argued that the Debtors could not proceed with the sale
of Consigned Goods.445

440

Id. at p. 4-5 (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *9-10 (stating that
A bankruptcy court may not allow the sale of property as "property of the estate" without first
determining whether the property is property of the estate. (also citing Moldo v. Clark (In re
Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he property that can be sold free and clear
under section 363(f) is defined by subsections (b) and (c) of section 363 as 'property of the
estate.'"); Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 266 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (even
before one gets to Section 363(f), Section 363(b), as interpreted by Rodeo, requires that the
estate demonstrate 'that the property it proposes to sell is "property of the estate."); Anderson v.
Conine (In re Robertson), 203 F.3d 855, 863 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that section 363(f) does not
permit a trustee to sell the property of a non-debtor spouse because such property was not
"property of the estate"); In re Coburn, 250 R.R. 401, 403 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (finding it
necessary to determine whether an asset is property of the estate in order to decide whether the
trustee is entitled to sell the asset pursuant to section 363(f)); Whitehall Jewelers at *15-16
(stating that "[i]t is clear after SLW Capital that the law in this Circuit requires strict application
of Rule 7001(2) in circumstances where, as here, a debtor seeks to invalidate a creditor's
interest.") (citing SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F. 3d 230
(3d. Cir. 2008)). See also, In re Whitehall Jewelers, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *17-18
(stating that "[t]he Court recognizes the burden this decision places upon Debtors to initiate over
120 adversary proceedings, particularly given the short time available before the sale.
Nonetheless, the law has clearly established that adversary proceedings are mandated and each
Consignment Vendor is entitled to the protections of the law.").
441

Agron Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 5 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363).

442

Id. (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120; In re Summit
Global Logistics, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 896 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2008)).
443

Id. (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120 at *15-16).

444

Id. at p. 6 (citing In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
(“For example, a right to redeem under a pledge or a right to recover property under a
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3. Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods
In response to the Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion and after Agron’s Objection to
Debtors Consignment Sale Motion and a hearing on the Consignment Sale Motion,446 the court
issued an interim order through which it essentially sustained Agron’s objection regarding the
necessity of an adversary proceeding to determine title to the goods. Specifically, the court’s
order first authorized the Debtors to continue to sell Prepetition Consigned Goods, “with all
liens, claims and interests in the Prepetition Consigned Goods” attaching to the applicable
proceeds of the sale “with the same legal, right, title and/or ownership or other interest and/or the
same validity, priority, enforceability and effect as existed as of the Petition Date with respect to
such Prepetition Consigned Goods.”447 In so ordering, the court correctly avoided the question of
title and “left the parties where they stood” with respect to the Prepetition Consigned Goods and
their respective agreements.
Second, the court ordered that all proceeds from the sale of Consigned Goods be
deposited in a separate escrow account and remain segregated until the earlier of: (a) an
agreement between the Debtors, all pre- and post-petition secured lenders and/or their agents,
and the Consignment Vendors; or (b) further order of the court that directs the Debtors where
and when to disburse the proceeds in escrow.448 This part of the order seems to be a necessary
compromise on the part of the court because priority in the proceeds was far from clear at this
consignment are both interests that are entitled to protection. This classification is important
because adequate protection depends upon the interest and property involved.”)).
445

Id. (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120 at *18-19 ("[t]he
Debtors may, of course, continue with the sale of the Asset Goods [non- consigned property].
They may not, absent adequate protection to or consent from the Consignment Vendors, proceed
with the sale of Consigned Goods.”)).
446

See Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods, at p. 2 (stating
that a hearing on the Consignment Sale Motion was held on March 3, 2016 at which various
Consignment Vendors of the Debtors, including (without limitation) Agron, Gordini, SGS
Sports, Castlewood Apparel Corp., Implus Footcare, LLC, and ASICS objected orally).
447

Id. at p. 3.

448

Id. at p. 3-4. Other instructive orders required the Debtors to maintain records of all
Consigned Goods sold, provide Consignment Vendors with reports regarding sales of their
respective Consigned Goods and the amount of proceeds in the escrow account, and provide that
any time on or after March 10, 2016 a Consignment Vendor may provide the Debtors with a
notice to stop selling such Prepetition Consigned Goods upon which the Debtors must cease
selling and segregate such goods. Id.
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point. By seeking authorization to use and sell the goods under § 363, the Debtor may or may not
have been implicitly challenging the Consignment Vendors’ interest as a true consignment.449
Whether or not the Debtors had such an intent, Agron’s objection clearly raised the issue.450
Further, the Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion recognized that any dispersal of the sales
proceeds would require the consent of any secured parties who may have an interest in such
proceeds of their collateral.451 Therefore, the court had little choice but give the parties the option
to work out a mutually agreeable solution on their own, or wait for further case developments
before allowing any proceeds to be distributed.
Third, the court ordered that, to the extent the Debtors wished to challenge the validity,
perfection, unavoidability, or seniority of a lien on or ownership right or interest in the
Prepetition Consigned Goods, then the Debtor must file an adversary proceeding on or before
March 23, 2016 or be forever barred from bringing such an action.452 Further, the court granted
the Debtors’ pre-petition secured lenders standing to assert any similar challenge to the extent
that the Debtors informed them and the respective Consignment Vendor, on or before March 16,
2016, that the Debtors do not intend to bring such a challenge.453 The court also gave instructions
on how the Debtors were to handle the Consigned Goods in the event of such a challenge,454 and
how to handle any settlement of such a challenge.455 This portion of the order seems to have been
aimed at a speedy resolution of any doubts as to the respective parties’ interests — “challenge
now or forever hold your peace.”
Lastly, the court authorized the Debtors to order and receive Consigned Goods from
Consignment Vendors and, in exchange for postpetition delivery of such Consigned Goods
(“Postpetition Consigned Goods”), granted the applicable Consignment Vendor (i) a first priority

449

See Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion, at p. 7.

450

See Agron’s Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion.

451

See Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion, at p. 7.

452

Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods, at p. 4-5.

453

Id. at p. 5.

Id. (stating that upon the filing of a challenge to the Consignment Vendors’ interest in
Consigned Goods, the Debtors shall immediately cease selling the Prepetition Consigned Goods,
segregate and account to the Consignment Vendor all remaining Consigned Goods).
454

455

Id. (stating that the Debtors shall not settle or otherwise resolve a challenge without first
consulting with each secured lender asserting an interest in the Prepetition Consigned Goods).
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purchase money security interest in such Postpetition Consigned Goods;456 (ii) a superpriority
administrative expense claim, under section 507(b), to the extent of any diminution in the value
of the Consignment Vendor’s postpetition secured claim;457 and (iii) an allowed administrative
expense claim under section 503(b).458 Further, the court ordered the Debtor to remit the
Consignment Sale Price to the applicable Consignment Vendors on account of the sale of their
respective Postpetition Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business.459 This portion of
the order seemed to be aimed purely at maximizing the value of the estate, and not allowing any
potential dispute over interests in Prepetition Consigned Goods to prevent the Debtor from
maximizing the value of its going out of business sales which included sales of Consigned Goods
that were ordered and delivered postpetition.
4. The Adversary Proceedings Regarding Consignment Vendors’ Interests in the
Consigned Goods
On March 15, 2015, the Debtors filed approximately 160 adversary actions against
Consignment Vendors, all of which were virtually identical.460 In a somewhat self-serving
manner, the Debtors’ alleged that the Debtors’ own written agreements, executed between three
of the Debtors461 and various Consignment Vendors, did not effectively create a consignment,
but rather, created a security interest which, because the applicable vendor did not file a UCC-1
Financing Statement, was unperfected.462

456

Id. at 6 (the court also ordered that the perfection of the postpetition security interest in
Postpetition Consigned Goods and proceeds thereof will be deemed effective without the need to
file any financing statement or further notice to any party in interest, including the secured
lenders).
Id. (the court also ordered that the Consignment Vendor’s section 507(b) superpriority claim
will be treated pari passu with any other superpriority claim granted in the case).
457

458

Id.

459

Id.

460

See Doc. Nos. 344-505.

461

The three Debtors that were named plaintiffs in the adversary proceedings were TSA Stores,
Inc., TSA Ponce, Inc., and TSA Caribe, Inc. See, e.g., Complaint, Doc. No. 344 (the “Example
Adversary Action Regarding Consignment”); Complaint, Doc. No. 345; Complaint, Doc. No.
346; Complaint, Doc. No. 505.
462

See Example Adversary Action Regarding Consignment, at p. 5-6.
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The relevant agreement (the “Consignment Agreement”) stated, in part, that:
TSA and Vendor agree that the arrangement contemplated by this agreement shall
be a consignment as defined in Section 9-102 of the Colorado and Delaware
Uniform Commercial Codes. Vendor shall retain title to all goods subject to this
agreement until the date of sale at which time title shall pass from Vendor to the
purchaser of such goods. Vendor shall be entitled to file UCC-1 Financing
Statements to reflect this consignment.463
Further, the Consignment Agreement states that it is effective from on or about the date it was
executed and is to remain in effect until a new agreement is signed between the parties.464
The Debtors argument that the Consignment Agreement created an unperfected security
interest rather than a consignment rested on UCC § 2-401(1), which provides that “Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is
limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.”465 Because the Consignment Vendors
shipped the Consigned Goods to the Debtors, the Debtors argued that, by operation of law, the
attempt to retain title converted the arrangement into a reservation of a security interest.466 The
Debtors further argued that UCC § 2-401(1) prevents parties from contracting around such a
conversion, quoting the statute as saying “Subject to these provisions and to the provisions of the
Article on Secured Transaction (Article 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in
any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.”467 Also in support of their
argument, the Debtors cited to the definition of “security interest” which provides, in relevant
part, that “The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or
delivery to the buyer under § 2-401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a ‘security interest.’”468
Because “a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests”469 in the
“location” of the debtor’s organization (here, the location of its incorporation),470 and because
463

Id. at p. 4-5 (citing p. 2 of Exhibit A).

464

Id. at p. 5 (citing p. 2 of Exhibit A).

465

Id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit 6, § 2-401).

466

Id.

467

Id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit 6, § 2-401(1)) (emphasis in original).

468

Id. at p. 5-6 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1-201(35)) (emphasis in original).

469

Id. at p. 6 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-310(a)) (emphasis removed).
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the Debtors alleged that, upon information and belief based upon an investigation, the relevant
Consignment Vendor did not at any time file a UCC-1 financing statement in the name of any of
the Debtors, the Debtors argued that the relevant Consignment Vendor’s security interest in the
goods and the resulting proceeds was unperfected.471 Moreover, the Debtors argued that because
a judicial lien creditor (such as a debtor in possession) has rights superior to a holder of an
unperfected security interest,472 to the extent that there are secured parties with perfected security
interests,473 they each have priority to the goods supplied and/or delivered by the relevant
Consignment Vendor under the Consignment Agreement, as well as all proceeds from sales of
such goods.474 Therefore, in this regard, the Debtors stated that the goods shipped and/or
delivered to the Debtors by the relevant Consignment Vendor prepetition are subject to claims by
the buyer’s creditors while in the buyer’s possession as “sale or return” goods delivered for
resale.475
Based on their conclusion that the relevant Consignment Vendor possessed an
unperfected security interest, the Debtors went on to argue that they possessed the right to avoid
any liens or interests that are junior to a hypothetical lien creditor as of the Petition Date476 and
because all legal and equitable interests of the Debtors in property became property of the
bankruptcy estate pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,477 the Debtors, as debtors in
possession, may exercise the trustee’s avoidance powers to declare the relevant Consignment
Vendor to be without a perfected secured interest in the Consigned Goods and continue to sell
the Consigned Goods in the regular course of the Debtors’ business under section 363(c).478

470

Id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 9-301(1) and 9-307(e)).

471

Id. at p. 6-7.

472

Id. at p. 7 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-317(a)).

473

The Debtors stated, in reference to parties with a superior interest in the goods and proceeds,
that “This includes Debtors or lenders that have perfected interests in all of the Debtors’
inventory—such as Bank of America, N.A. and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.” Id.
474

Id.

475

Id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2-326(1)-(2)).

476

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a) and 1107(a)).

477

Id. at p. 7-8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541).

478

Id. at p. 8; 11 U.S.C. § 363(c). The Debtors also went on to argue that they were able to sell
the Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing and free and
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The complaints concluded by (somewhat dramatically) stating that refusing to allow the
Debtors to sell the Consigned Goods would have a serious detrimental effect on the Debtors that
would “force [the] Debtors to shutter their more than 425 stores, terminate the employment of
more than 8,000 individuals, and force the Debtors out of business, thereby precluding any and
all potential options for reorganization or external investment. It also would have a devastating
impact on all creditors.”479
5. March 16, 2016 Emergency Hearing Regarding the Interim Order Authorizing
the Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods & Term Lenders’ Intervention
On March 16, 2016, the day after the adversary actions were filed, the court held an
emergency hearing to consider implementation of the Interim Order Authorizing the Debtors to
Continue to Sell Consigned Goods,480 and Bank of America, N.A. (“BofA”) filed a notice of
intent to seek to intervene in the adversary actions.481 Based on parties’ statements in separate
clear of any interest in the Consigned Goods of an entity other than the estate under section
363(f). Id. at 8; 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (providing that a debtor may sell goods free and clear of such
interests if any one of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits the sale of such property free and clear of such interest; or (2) such interest is in bona
fide dispute; or (3) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest). The Debtors argued that, while only one of the three
conditions under § 363(f) is necessary to permit Debtors to sell the goods as proposed, there
existed separate and independent bases for each of the three conditions. Id. at p. 8-9. First,
nonbankruptcy law permitted such a sale because, pursuant to UCC § 9-319(a), while the goods
are in the possession of the Debtors in their capacity as consignee, the Debtors are “deemed to
have the rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had power to
transfer.” Id. at p. 8 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-319(a)) (emphasis in original). Second, the
facts and applicable law demonstrate that a bona fide dispute exists concerning the interests in
the Consigned Goods as reflected in the applicable adversary action, pursuant to the court’s
ruling in In Re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) and its progeny. Id. And, third,
because of the unperfected nature of the relevant Consignment Vendor’s security interest in the
Consigned Goods shipped and/or delivered to the Debtors prepetition, the applicable
Consignment Vendor could be compelled to accept a monetary satisfaction on account of such
interest. Id.
479

Id. at p. 9. Also, some of the complaints stated a specific dollar amount for the Consigned
Goods in question, but it appears that most did not.
480

Supplemental Interim Order Authorizing the Debtors to Continue to Sell Certain Prepetition
Consigned Goods, Doc. No. 1044 (the “Supplemental Interim Consignment Order”), at p. 2.
Notice of Bank of America, N.A.’s Intent to Seek to Intervene, Doc. No. 506 (“BofA
Consignment Intervention”).
481
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filings, at the hearing the court authorized the Debtors to continue to sell prepetition Consigned
Goods only so long as the Debtors’ complied with their prepetition agreements and turned the
proceeds of such sales over to the applicable Consignment Vendor.482 This seems like a bit of
punt or compromise by the court where it signaled to the parties that it wanted to preserve the
status quo for the time being, keep the GOB sales rolling, and the parties can fight over a pile of
money later. Further, the court also may have been signaling that it was unimpressed with the
adversary actions.
6. Wigwam’s Objection to the Consignment Sales Motion
Wigwam483 also filed an objection to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion,484 coming
after Agron’s objection, the court’s Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell
Consigned Goods,485 the roughly 160 adversary proceedings,486 the March 16th emergency
hearing,487 but slightly before Ameriform and ASICS’ omnibus objections488 as well as the
Supplemental Interim Consignment Order.489
Wigwam stated that they filed their objection (a) to ensure that the additional protections
provided to consignment vendors in the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell

482

Wigwam’s Objection to the Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 5.

483

Wigwam stated that they had in the past delivered and may in the future deliver certain goods
consisting of “socks and various other apparel.” Wigwam’s Objection to Debtors’ Consignment
Sale Motion, at p. 2.
484

See id.

485

See the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods.

See Doc. Nos. 344-505 for 161 adversary proceedings brought by the Debtors’ seeking
recharacterization of Consignment Vendors’ interest in Consigned Goods; Section (VI)(D)(4),
discussing the adversary proceedings.
486

487

See Supplemental Interim Consignment Order, at p. 2.

See Wigwam Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion; Ameriform Omnibus
Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions; ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day
Motions.
488

489

See Supplemental Interim Consignment Order.
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Consigned Goods490 would also be contained in any final order entered on the Debtors’
Consignment Sale Motion;491 and (b) to request that those additional protections be clarified in
any such final order.492 Of particular concern to Wigwam were paragraphs 3,493 4,494 6,495 and
7496 of the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods.497
Essentially, Wigwam wanted to make it abundantly clear that their interest in the Consigned
Goods and proceeds of such goods, both those delivered pre- and postpetition, was first in line

490

See Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods; Section
(VI)(D)(3) discussing the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned
Goods.
491

See Debtors’ Consignment Sale Motion.

492

Wigwam’s Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, at p. 5-6.

493

See id. at p. 3-4 (quoting the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell
Consigned Goods as ordering that the Debtors are authorized to sell Prepetition Consigned
Goods, “with all liens, claims and interests in the Prepetition Consigned Goods, if any, to attach
to the applicable proceeds of sale of the Prepetition Consigned Goods (the "Consignment Sale
Proceeds") in each case with the same legal, [sic] right, title and/or ownership or other interests
and/or the same validity, priority, enforceability and effect as existed as of the Petition Date with
respect to such Prepetition Consigned Goods.").
494

See id. at p. 4 (quoting the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned
Goods as ordering that (1) all proceeds to be held in escrow until either an order of the court or
an agreement is reached between the Debtors, Consignment Vendors, and secured lenders; and
(2) the Debtors maintain records of all sales of Consigned Goods and provide such records to
Consignment Vendors regularly).
495

See id. (quoting the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods
as ordering that, upon filing a challenge to the Consignment Vendors, and absent the consent of
the Consignment Vendor, the Debtors shall cease selling and segregate the Consigned Goods).
496

See id. at p. 4-5 (quoting portions of the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to
Sell Consigned Goods regarding protections to Consignment Vendors for postpetition deliveries,
namely: (1) a first priority purchase money security interest in such goods that is deemed
perfected without any further filing or notice, including to the Secured Lender Agents; (2)
superpriority administrative expense claim under section 507(b) to be treated pari passu with any
other superpriority claim granted in the case; and (3) an allowed administrative expense claim
under section 503(b)).
497

See Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned Goods; Section
(VI)(D)(3), discussing the Interim Order Authorizing Debtors to Continue to Sell Consigned
Goods.
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and adequately protected.498 Moreover, aside from seeking to tighten the reins on the Debtors’
by requesting that reports on the Consigned Goods be delivered weekly, and that those reports
track Consigned Goods delivered pre- and postpetition separately,499 Wigwam seemed most
worried about being subordinated in any way to the DIP financier, presumably being afraid of
the adequate assurance liens.500
7. ASICS’ Omnibus Objection as it Relates to the Consignment Sales Motion
Shortly after Ameriform’s omnibus objection, ASICS501 also filed an omnibus objection
to the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan Motion, Consignment Sales Motion, and DIP Financing
Motion.502 ASICS, joined by roughly 28 other parties (primarily Consignment Vendors),503 took

498

Wigwam’s Objection to Debtors’ Consignment Motion, at p. 6-7.

499

Id. at p. 8-9.

Id. at p. 6-7 (asking the court, in its final order on the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, to
clarify that, with regard to their purchase money security interest, “any liens granted to secure
debtor-in-possession financing are subordinate to the first-priority purchase money security
interests of consignment vendors in Postpetition Consigned Goods as well as security interests of
consignment vendors in Prepetition Consigned Goods that were perfected pre-petition,”; with
regard to their superpriority administrative expense claims under section 507(b), requesting that
the court add language clarifying that “such Consignment Vendor 507(b) Claim will be treated
pari passu with all other superpriority administrative expense claims, including but not limited to
any superpriority administrative expense claims granted in connection with debtor-in-possession
financing.”) (emphasis in original).
500

ASICS provided ASICS’ clothing apparel, including socks and accessories. ASICS Omnibus
Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, at p. 3.
501

502

See id.

503

See Doc. Nos.: 646 (Casio America, Inc.); 648 (M.J. Soffe, LLC); 654 (THORLO, Inc.); 657
(E & B Giftware, LLC); 661 (Sport Write, Inc.); 662 (Castlewood Apparel Corp.); 663 (SGS
Sports, Inc.); 664 (SP Images, Inc.); 666 (Gordini USA, Inc.); 671 (Shock Doctor, Inc.); 673
(Implus Footcare, LLC); 676 (Easton); 680 (Boyt Harness); 681 (Bravo Sports); 684 (Goal Zero
LLC); 687 (Altus Brands, LLC); 691 (Agron); 693 (Filmar USA, Inc.); 698 (Performance
Apparel Corp.); 700 (J.J’s Mae, Inc.); 707 (Mission Product Holdings, Inc.); 713 (O2COOL,
LLC); 753 (Trends International, LLC); 853 (Hi-Tec Sports USA, Inc.); 888 (Ogio International,
Inc.); 899 (Levin Management Corporation as Agent for Ikea Properties, Inc.); 1022 (Midland
Radio Corporation); and 1399 (XS Commerce) (joining, to various degrees, ASICS Omnibus
Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions). See also, Notice of Filing of Chart Summarizing
Objections to Debtors’ Consigned Goods Motion and Store Closing Motion, Respectively, and
Debtors’ Responses Thereto, Doc. No. 999 (providing a table of objections to the Debtors’
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a fairly different approach than Ameriform by generally objecting to any attempt by the Debtors
to sell or grant a security interest in or lien on ASICS property without ASICS’ consent.504
ASICS argued that each of the motions they objected to sought to irreparably harm and impair
ASICS’ rights in its property by either seeking authority to sell ASICS’ property, potentially at
substantially discounted prices at going out of business sales (“GOB Sales”),505 or to grant a
security interest in or lien on property that was not property of the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate.506
The crux of ASICS’ argument rests on the assertions that (1) pursuant to the various
consignment vendor agreements and vendor relationship guides,507 at all times during their
consignment relationship, the parties acknowledged and agreed that all right, title, and interest in
and to any consigned ASICS goods, remained with ASICS and never transferred to TSA;508 and

Consignment Sales Motion, Debtors’ Store Closing Plan Motion, and Debtors’ Responses to
those objections, up to Doc. No. 888 and through April 4, 2016).
504

ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, at p. 2.

ASICS stated that the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan Motion (referred to as the “GOB Motion”)
sought to immediately liquidate inventory in over 200 of the Debtors’ 464 stores, free and clear
of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests (the “Encumbrances”). Id. Further, ASICS
argued that the GOB Motion suggests that the proceeds from such liquidation sales will be paid
to the Secured Lenders or Secured Lender Agents with all Encumbrances to attach to the sale
proceeds. Id. at p. 3.
505

506

Id. at p. 2.

507

ASICS cited to two consignment vendor agreements—a consignment vendor agreement from
2010 between ASICS and TSA (not provided by ASICS) and the 2015 Vendor Deal Sheet
Summary (Pay By Scan) agreement between ASICS and TSA (the “ASICS Consignment Vendor
Agreement”) (provided as Exhibit A to ASICS’ objection)—and a vendor relationship guide
titled 2015 Sports Authority Vendor Relationship Guide (the “Vendor Guide”) (ASICS did not
supply the Vendor Guide because they believed it contained certain confidential information,
but, to the extent appropriate for determination of their objection, indicated that they may seek to
submit the entire Vendor Guide to the court under seal for in-camera review, and any reference
in the objection was to non-confidential portions only). Id. at p. 3-4, n.3, Exhibit A.
508

Id. at p. 4 (citing to language in the ASICS Consignment Vendor Agreement at p. 2 stating,
“[ASICS] shall retain title to all goods subject to this agreement until the date of sale at which
time title shall pass from [ASICS] to the purchaser of such goods,” and also citing to language in
the Vendor Guide, at p. 8-2, that states “For consignment (pay by scan) Orders, risk of loss shall
remain with [ASICS] until the Merchandise is sold to a customer; title to the Merchandise shall
transfer through Sports Authority to the customer upon a sale to such customer.”) (emphasis in
original).
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(2) ASICS terminated the consignment relationship on February 10, 2016, at the latest.509
Therefore, ASICS argued that, pursuant to bailment law (not the UCC), the Debtors hold no
right, title, or interest in ASICS’ property and the Debtors must cease all sales and return to
ASICS their property.510
Implicit in ASICS’ argument that they properly and effectively terminated the
consignment relationship is the assertion that bailment law governed the terminated relationship,
not the UCC. After arguing, based on language from the pertinent agreements, that the
relationship was expressly intended to be one of consignment, ASICS supported of their
assertion that bailment law, rather than the UCC, governed the prepetition relationship between
the parties by attacking the Debtors’ reliance on UCC § 2-401,511 and did not mince words in
509

ASICS pointed out that the ASICS Consignment Vendor Agreement provided for an effective
period of February 1, 2015 to January 20, 2016. Id. at p. 4 (citing the ASICS Consignment
Vendor Agreement at p. 1). Although they recognized that there was language in the ASICS
Consignment Vendor Agreement that suggested the relationship would continue indefinitely
until the parties signed a new agreement, ASICS argued that the more detailed Vendor Guide
stated that any vendor agreement would continue until amended or terminated. Id. at p. 4-5
(citing the Vendor Guide, at p. 8-1). Because ASICS sent a termination notice to TSA and made
demand for the immediate return of all ASICS property on or about February 10, 2016, and
despite the Debtors’ alleged ignoring of that demand, refusal to return ASICS’ property, and
continued holding and selling of ASICS’ property without ASICS’ consent, ASICS argued that
the consignment relationship was properly terminated. Id. at p. 4-5 (citing the termination notice
sent to TSA on or about February 10, 2016, provided as Exhibit B to ASICS’ objection). Further,
ASICS also pointed out that, after the Interim Consignment Order Authorizing Debtors’ to
Continue to Sell Consigned Property, and pursuant to paragraph 4 of that order authorizing
consignors to direct a notice to the Debtors to cease future sales of any of their consigned
property, ASICS sent such a notice to Debtors on March 11, 2016 to avoid any arguable
ambiguity that ASICS may be consenting to any sale of their property and to re-confirm its
prepetition termination and demand to immediately stop selling and segregate ASICS’ property.
Id. at p. 6. Even further, ASICS pointed to the transcript of the March 16, 2016 Emergency
Hearing where ASICS counsel again informed the court that ASICS had terminated the ASICS
Consignment Vendor Agreement before the March 2, 2016 petition date, to which the court
responded that, absent express consent of the affected party, the Debtors must comply with the
law with respect to any terminated agreement. Id. at p. 7 (citing the March 16, 2016 Hearing
Transcript at p. 58:15-20, 59:23-25, provided as Exhibit C to ASICS’ objection).
510

Id. at p. 7.

511

Id. at p. 10. Earlier in the objection, ASICS had also pointed out (for a second time) that the
court acknowledged at the March 16, 2016 Hearing that the Debtors are required to comply with
controlling law regarding any consignment agreements terminated prepetition, and argued that,
under Delaware law and bailment law, as of the petition date, the Debtors were in unlawful
possession of ASICS’ property. Id. at p. 9-10 (citing March 16, 2016 Hearing Transcript, at p.
59:4-5, 11-13, 23-25; In re Valley Media, Inc. 279 B.R. 105, 142-143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)
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doing so.512 Characterizing the adversary action brought against them by Debtors as an
“unpersuasive[] attempt to side-step ASICS’ express reservation of title,” ASICS argued that,
upon a reading of the full text of UCC § 2-401 (of which the Debtors’ only quoted the second
sentence), it is clear that UCC § 2-401 only applies to “contracts for sale,” something
fundamentally different than consignment.513 Further, ASICS went on to argue that an agreement
can be either a consignment or a contract for sale, but not both,514 and in that determination, the
parties intent is controlling.515 Therefore, because the parties intent was clearly contained in the
agreement, and further because ASICS’ reservation of title puts the arrangement outside the
definition of “contract for sale,”516 UCC § 2-401 and UCC Article 2 as a whole are
inapplicable.517
(debtors have no rights in nor authority to sell inventory consigned under terminated
agreements)).
One of ASICS’ more biting commentaries of the Debtors’ argument stated: “In their
Complaint, the Debtors selectively quote the second sentence of section 2-401(1) to argue that
they have title to the ASICS Property, contrary to the express terms of the Agreement. Whether
an inadvertent mistake or creative lawyering, the Debtors’ argument is a clear misstatement of
black letter law.” Id. (citing Complaint by TSA Stores, Inc., TSA Ponce, Inc., TSA Caribe, Inc.
Against Asics America Corporation, Doc. No. 482, at p. 5).
512

513

Id. ASICS quoted UCC § 2-401 as follows:
Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identification to
the contract (Section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer
acquires by their identification a special property as limited by this Act. Any
retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.
UCC § 2-401(1).

Id. (emphasis in original).
514

Id. at p. 10-11 (citing Consol. Accessories Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 161 Cal. App. 3d
1036, 1040 (1984); Abraham & Co. v. Mansour Rahmanan & Co., No. 14-96-01120-CV (NL),
1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 1352, at *6 (Tex App. Mar. 5, 1998)).
515

Id. at p. 11 (citing N. Ctys. Bank v. Earl Himovitz & Sons Livestock Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d
849, 859 (1963)).
Id. (stating that a “contract for sale” under UCC § 2-106(1) “include[s] both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time” where “sale” is defined as “the passing of
title from the seller to the buyer for a price.”) (emphasis in original).
516

517

ASICS argued that a consignment is not a sale because there is no exchange of title for a
price. Id. (citing Martini E Ricci Iamino S.P.A. - Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fruit
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With respect to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, ASICS argued that the motion
must be denied on the grounds that it violates the Bankruptcy Code and controlling Third Circuit
law because it seeks to strip ASICS of its ownership rights in their property through ordinary
course and GOB Sales without first determining that the Debtors have an interest in ASICS’
property.518 Specifically, the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion violates the Bankruptcy Code
because sales under section 363 are expressly limited to sale of property of the estate.519 Because
ASICS terminated their consignment relationship with Debtors, the Debtors have no interest in
ASICS’ property and therefore neither does the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate.520 Further, ASICS
argued that the Debtors’ proposition to sell ASICS’ property violated Third Circuit law because,
while the Debtors had filed an adversary action regarding interest in the applicable property, a
debtor may not sell property until the debtor determines that the property is property of the
debtor’s estate under section 541.521 Further, that determination must be made in an adversary
proceeding, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2),522 where, if the debtor is unable to satisfy its

Sales Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 954, 968 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (because consignment does not pass title, it
does not fit within definition of “sale”); UCC § 9-109 cmt. 6 (distinguishing between an Article
2 “sale or return” transaction versus a consignment – a “sale or return” involves a buyer who
becomes the owner of the goods); 8A Am Jur 2d Bailments, § 51). Therefore, because the
agreement was a consignment and not a contract for sale, UCC § 2-401 (and UCC Article 2) is
inapplicable. Id. at p. 12 (citing In re Ide Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. 969, 976 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding section 2-401 does not apply to true consignments, explaining that “a true consignment
does not effect a sale and thus those provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C. relating to “buyers”
and “sellers” do not apply to true consignments.”).
Id. (citing to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion at paragraph 8 (“[T]he Debtors request
authorization to continue to sell Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business and in
accordance with the Debtors’ prepetition practices and procedures, as modified herein.”);
paragraph 13 (“The Debtors seek entry of the Interim Order and the Final Order (a) authorizing
the Debtors to (i) continue to sell Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business, free and
clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances. . . .”); and paragraph 22 (“The Debtors request
approval to continue to sell Consigned Goods free and clear of any liens, claims and
encumbrances in accordance with section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.”)).
518

519

Id. at p. 20-21 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and (c)).

520

Id. at p. 21.

521

Id. at p. 21 (citing SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d
230, 237 (3d Cir. 2008)).
522

Id. at p. 22 (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers, No. 08-11261 (KG), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at
*15-16 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008)).
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heavy burden of proof, the court is prohibited from authorizing the sale of consigned property
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.523
Taking a step back, one can appreciate the subtlety and efficiency of ASICS’ argument—
if it could convince a court that the Debtors’ estate had no interest in the Consigned Goods, all
the Consignment Vendors have to do is withhold their consent and the Debtors are powerless to
sell or lien-up a substantial amount of their inventory. ASICS also seemed to have some fairly
favorable facts. ASICS was not only able to argue on the merits of a consignment relationship
alone, they also had evidence that they terminated that consignment relationship. Also, it likely
did not help the Debtors’ case that they were seeking to recharacterize the arrangement arising
out of their own form. If the saying holds true that, “when the facts are against you, argue the
law, and when the law is against you, argue the facts,” then, with both the facts and the law are
against them, it seems like the Debtors had no choice but to throw themselves at the equitable
feet of the court with cries of “job losses” and “maximizing the value of the estate.”524
However clever ASICS’ argument may appear, there were several points meriting
challenge, which the Term Loan Agent certainly did as discussed below.
8. Ameriform’s Omnibus Objection as it Relates to the Consignment Sales Motion
Slightly after Wigwam’s objection, Ameriform525 filed an omnibus objection to the
Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, Store Closing Plan Motion, and DIP Financing Motion.526
In their objection, Ameriform stated that they did not object to the continued sale of its
523

Id. (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers, No. 08-11261 (KG), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *11
(Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008); In re Interiors of Yesterday, LLC, No. 02-30563 (LMW), 2007
Bankr. LEXIS 449, at *23-24 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2007) (holding that a trustee may not sell
consigned inventory as it was not property of the estate unless and until the trustee recovered the
consigned inventory pursuant to a bankruptcy avoidance power)).
524

See, e.g., Example Adversary Action Regarding Consignment, at p. 9 (stating that refusing to
allow the Debtors to sell the Consigned Goods would have a serious detrimental effect on
Debtors that would “force [the] Debtors to shutter their more than 425 stores, terminate the
employment of more than 8,000 individuals, and force Debtors out of business, thereby
precluding any and all potential options for reorganization or external investment. It also would
have a devastating impact on all creditors.”).
525

Ameriform was a Consignment Vendor of the Debtors who provided goods such as kayaks
and canoes to the Debtors. Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, at p.
2.
526

See id.
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consigned goods so long as the proceeds from the sale are paid to them pursuant to its prepetition
agreements with the Debtors.527 However, Ameriform did object to all three of the Debtors’
motions to the extent that the Debtors seek to: (i) sell Ameriform’s Consigned Goods and hold
the proceeds in escrow or otherwise not remit the proceeds to Ameriform in compliance with the
prepetition agreements between the parties; (ii) sell Ameriform’s Consigned Goods at discounted
prices; and/or (iii) grant any security interest or lien in Ameriform’s Consigned Goods.528
Generally, Ameriform’s argument went that, because Ameriform’s interest in the Consigned
Goods and their proceeds was perfected,529 their rights in such goods were superior to any other
competing interest530 and, as the holder of title to the Consigned Goods, Ameriform’s Consigned
Goods are not property of the Debtors’ bankruptcy estates.531 Therefore, Ameriform objected to
the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion to the extent that it allowed anything short of full
remittance of all proceeds from sales of Consigned Goods.532
D. Second Wave on the DIP Financing Front
1. Interim Order Authorizing DIP Financing
In the court’s Interim Order Authorizing DIP Financing, it approved, almost verbatim,
the Debtors’ proposed interim order, set the deadline for objections at March 22, 2016, and set
the date of the final hearing on the DIP Financing Motion at March 29, 2016.533
2. Objections to the DIP Financing Motion and Intervening Events
i. Overview of Objections and Intervening Events

527

Id.

528

Id.

529

Ameriform filed a UCC-1 financing statement on March 6, 2015, which was attached to their
motion as Exhibit 2. Id. at p. 3-4, Exhibit 2.
530

Id. at 4-5 (citing UCC § 9-319).

531

Id. at 5 (also stating that, under such an arrangement, Ameriform could demand return of their
Consigned Goods at any time).
532

Id. at 6.

533

See Interim Order Approving DIP Financing, at p. 53-54. See also, DIP Financing Motion, at
p. 56-109 (Debtors’ proposed Interim Order Approving DIP Financing).
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Objections to the DIP Financing Motion generally534 came from three sources: landlords
of the Debtors (the “Landlord DIP Financing Objections”), Consignment Vendors (the
“Consignment Vendor Objections”), and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the
“Committee”).535 Generally, the Landlord DIP Financing Objections argued that the proposed
DIP Financing Agreement was improper because it did not provide for payment of stub rent.536
The Consignment Vendor Objections generally took issue with many of the main problems
arising from the Consignment Sales Motion and the fight that ensued—the Consignment
Vendors objected to the Debtors’ requests to grant any sort of lien on the Consigned Goods.
Here a general timeline is helpful, which was as follows:
1. The Interim Order Approving DIP Financing is issued, setting a March 22, 2016
deadline for objections;537
2. A day before the filing deadline for DIP Financing Motion objections, Wigwam files
the first of the Consignment Vendor Objections;538
534

There was at least one other objection that does not fit within this description. See Travis
County’s Objection to Debtors’ Motion to Obtain Postpetition Secured Financing and Grant
Liens and Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders, Doc. No. 653 (regarding a state law tax
lien).
See Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to: (I) Debtors’ DIP
Financing Motion; and (II) Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion, Doc. No. 924 (the “Committee’s
DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection”).
535

536

See, supra, Section (VI)(E)(2)(ii): Landlord Objections.

537

Id. at p. 54.

See Limited Objection of Wigwam Mills, Inc. to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final
Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and
Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and 364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 609 (the “Wigwam First
DIP Financing Objection”); Limited Objection of Wigwam Mills, Inc. to Debtors’ Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to
Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash
Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the
Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and 364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final
Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 637
(the “Wigwam Second DIP Financing Objection”).
538
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3. Shortly thereafter and on the day of the deadline, the first Landlord DIP Financing
Objection is filed by a group of Landlords, with numerous other objections and joinders to
objections being filed up until approximately April 4, 2016;539
4. Also on the day of the filing deadline, ASICS540 and Ameriform541 file omnibus
objections to the Debtors’ Store Closing Plan Motion, Consignment Goods Sales Motion, and
DIP Financing Motion;
5. Also on the day of the filing deadline, the Committee filed an emergency motion to
continue the hearing date with respect to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion;542
6. The Debtors filed the first of three notices of amendment to the DIP Credit
Agreement;543
7. And lastly the Committee files their objection to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion
and Bid Procedures Motion544 shortly before the Debtors file their reply in support of the DIP
Financing Motion545 and the court issues the Supplemental Interim Consignment Order.546

539

See, e.g., Joinder of Simon Property Group, Inc. to the Objection of the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors to: (I) Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion; and (II) Debtors’ Bid Procedures
Motion, Doc. No. 993 (filed on April 4, 2016).
540

See ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions (filed on March 22, 2016).

541

See Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions (filed on March 22, 2016).

542

See Emergency Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (I) To Continue
Hearing Date With Respect to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion and Bid Procedures Motion
and (II) For a Protective Order and Order Quashing Notices of Deposition, Doc. No. 714 (the
“Committee’s Emergency Continuance Motion”) (filed on March 22, 2016).
See Notice of Filing of Amendment to DIP Credit Agreement, Doc. No. 826 (the “Second
Amendment to DIP Credit Agreement”) (filed on March 25, 2016) (changing the required date
for issuance of a final order regarding the DIP Financing Motion from March 29, 2016 to April
5, 2016). The “First Amendment” to the DIP Credit Agreement was entered into on March 22,
2016, but “did not constitute a material amendment pursuant to the terms of the DIP Credit
Agreement.” Id. at p. 1 (providing the “First Amendment” as attached Exhibit A). See also,
Notice of Filing of Third Amendment to DIP Credit Agreement, Doc. No. 1480 (the “Third
Amendment to DIP Credit Agreement”); Notice of Filing of (I) Fourth Amendment to DIP
Credit Agreement and (II) Amended DIP Budget, Doc. No. 2126 (the “Fourth Amendment to
DIP Credit Agreement”); Order Approving and Authorizing Debtors’ Entry Into Fourth
Amendment to the DIP Credit Agreement, Doc. No. 2197.
543

544

See Committee’s DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection (filed on March 31, 2016).

See Debtors’ Reply in Support of Motion for Post-Petition Financing and Use of Cash
Collateral, Doc. No. 980 (the “Debtors DIP Financing Reply”) (filed on April 4, 2016).
545
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ii. Landlord Objections
A number of landlords (the “Landlords”) filed objections or joinders to objections
regarding the DIP Financing Motion that generally took the position of, “we shouldn’t have to
pay for your secured lender’s going-out-of business sales.” Specific issues that frequently came
up in the various motions were:
•
•
•
•

546

delinquencies on pre- and post-petition stub rent;547
the failure of the Approved Budget to provide for stub rent;548
adequate protection in connection with their respective leases;549
the Debtors’ waiver of rights under section 506(c) and 552(b);550

See the Supplemental Interim Consignment Order (filed on April 6, 2016).

Joinder and Objection of Kimco Realty Corporation to Objections to Debtors’ Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to
Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash
Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the
Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and 364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final
Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 640
(the “Kimco DIP Financing Objection”), at p. 3.
547

548

Limited Objection of Carousel Center Company, L.P., Holyoke Mall Company, L.P., KRG
Portofino, LLC, KRG Port St. Lucie Landing, LLC, and KRG Fort Myers Colonial Square, LLC
to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition
Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and
Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; (III)
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition
Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and
364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C) and
Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 621 (the “Carousel et al DIP Financing Objection”), at p. 2.
549

Kimco DIP Financing Objection, at p. 3.

550

Limited Objection of Brixmor Property Group, Inc., Federal Realty Investment Trust, Rice
Lake Square LP, Rite Aid Corporation, Sweetbriar Authority LLC, UBS Realty Investors, LLC
and WMJK, LTD. to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to
Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II)
Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364
and 507; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection to
Prepetition Secured Parties and Modifying the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361,
113

•

that the rights of the DIP Lenders in the actual leases be the same in any final
order as they were in the interim order (reserved to a lien on proceeds from the
lease but not the actual lease).551

In their objections related to adequate protection, the lenders essentially asked for
immediate cash payment for post-petition use of their respective premises.552 They argued that,
where an estate may be administratively insolvent, the court may provide Landlords with
adequate protection under section 363(e).553 Therefore, because the Landlords argued that their
was a high likelihood of administrative insolvency, cash payments were the only way to
adequately protect the Landlords’ as an administrative expense claim would not suffice.554
In their objections related to section 506(c) and 552(b), the objecting Landlords argued
that the Debtors should not be able to waive their rights under those sections (as they did in the
proposed DIP Credit Agreement) unless they provided for the payment of stub rent.555 Section
552(b) provides that a debtor, creditors’ committee or other party-in-interest may exclude postpetition proceeds from the pre-petition collateral on equitable grounds to prevent secured
creditors from receiving windfalls.556 Further, under section 506, a debtor is allowed to charge
the costs of preserving or disposing of a secured lender’s collateral to the collateral itself,
ensuring that the costs of liquidation are not born solely by the unsecured creditors.557 Therefore,
362, 363, and 364; and (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B)
and (C) and Local Rule 4001-2, Doc. No. 642 (the “Brixmor DIP Financing Objection”), at p. 3.
551

Limited Objection and Joinder to Other Landlord Objections of Levin Management
Corporation as Agent for Ikea Properties, Inc. to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders
Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing, Doc. No. 899, (the “Levin DIP
Financing Objection”), at p. 7.
552

Brixmor DIP Financing Objection, at p. 7.

553

Id. (citing In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 819 (3d Cir. 2010)).

554

Id.

555

Id. at p. 7.

556

Levin DIP Financing Objection, at p. 5.

557

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. 506(c); Precision Steel Shearing v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual
Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[S]ection 506(c) is designed to prevent a windfall
to the secured creditor”); Kivitz v. CIT Group/Sales Fin., Inc., 272 B.R. 332, 334 (D. Md. 2000)
(stating that “the reason for [section 506(c)] is that unsecured creditors should not be required to
bear the cost of protecting property that is not theirs”)).
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the Landlords asked that, because the post-petition use of the Landlord’s applicable premises was
necessary and beneficial to the secured lenders, the court should require payment of stub rent
under section 506(c).558
While the majority of the Landlord objections pertaining to DIP Lenders’ rights in the
respective leases were limited to ensuring that the DIP Lenders’ liens were limited to the
proceeds of the leases,559 at least one Landlord also sought restrictions on the DIP Lenders’
physical access to the leased premises such as notice and limitation to collecting and removing
lenders’ collateral.560
iii. Consignment Vendor Objections
The three major Consignment Vendor Objections came from Wigwam,561 ASICS,562 and
Ameriform.563 All three Consignment Vendor Objections argued substantially similar points,
558

Id. (citing In re Evanston Beauty Supply Inc., 136 B.R. 171, 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
“Ample case authority exists which permits lessors to recover under Section 506(c) provided that
the standards for recovery are met.” In re World Wines, Ltd., 77 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr.
N.D.Ill.1987)).
559

See, e.g., Levin Objection to DIP Financing Motion, at p. 7.

Id. at p. 5 (providing a list of requested limitations on DIP Lenders’ access to leased premises
as follows:
560

•
•
•
•

•
•
561

Only after ten (10) days written notice to the LandLords;
For the limited purpose of collecting and removing lenders’ collateral (and with no ability
to conduct any sale, auction or fire sale at the Premises or the Centers);
Pursuant to a written agreement on terms acceptable to the Landlords an in accordance
with the Leases; Lenders are responsible for the charges coming due under the Leases,
monthly in advance, for any period of occupancy;
Lenders, their agents, or any entering party must provide Landlords with a certificate of
insurance with respect to such entry, which certificate shall list the Landlords as an
additional insured, and which insurance covers both personal injury and property
damage;
Lenders are subject to any provision of the Leases regarding re-imbursement and/or
indemnification of the Landlords; and
Access to the Premises shall be limited to a period not to exceed thirty (30) days.

See Wigwam First DIP Financing Objection.

See ASICS’ Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions. Roughly 28 parties joined
ASICS’ Omnibus Objection to varying degrees. See Doc. Nos.: 646 (Casio America, Inc.); 648
(M.J. Soffe, LLC); 654 (THORLO, Inc.); 657 (E & B Giftware, LLC); 661 (Sport Write, Inc.);
562
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namely, that they objected to the granting of any DIP Liens on Prepetition Consigned Goods, and
that the prepetition relationship between the Consignment Vendors and the Debtors was
governed by bailment law rather than the UCC.
a. Wigwam’s Objection
In their first objection, Wigwam took issue with what they perceived as an inconsistency
between the Interim Consignment Order and the Interim DIP Financing Order.564 Specifically,
Wigwam sought to ensure three things: (1) that the DIP Liens would be subordinate to any
Consignment Vendor’s prepetition, properly perfected security interest in Consigned Goods and
the proceeds of such Consigned Goods; (2) that, for any Consigned Goods received by the
Debtors post-petition pursuant to their prepetition agreements, Consignment Vendors would be
deemed to have first-priority, properly-perfected PMSIs in the Consigned Goods they deliver and
the proceeds thereof, which would take priority over the DIP Liens; and (3) that any
superpriority administrative expense claims granted to Consignment Vendors pursuant to the
Interim Consignment Order or any other order would be treated pari passu with the superpriority
administrative expense claims granted to the DIP Facility lenders.565
Wigwam supported their argument by pointing to paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Interim
Consignment Order that provided, respectively, for Consignment Vendors’ retention of first-

662 (Castlewood Apparel Corp.); 663 (SGS Sports, Inc.); 664 (SP Images, Inc.); 666 (Gordini
USA, Inc.); 671 (Shock Doctor, Inc.); 673 (Implus Footcare, LLC); 676 (Easton); 680 (Boyt
Harness); 681 (Bravo Sports); 684 (Goal Zero LLC); 687 (Altus Brands, LLC); 691 (Agron);
693 (Filmar USA, Inc.); 698 (Performance Apparel Corp.); 700 (J.J’s Mae, Inc.); 707 (Mission
Product Holdings, Inc.); 713 (O2COOL, LLC); 753 (Trends International, LLC); 853 (Hi-Tec
Sports USA, Inc.); 888 (Ogio International, Inc.); 899 (Levin Management Corporation as Agent
for Ikea Properties, Inc.); 1022 (Midland Radio Corporation); and 1399 (XS Commerce)
(joining, to various degrees, ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions). See
also, Notice of Filing of Chart Summarizing Objections to Debtors’ Consigned Goods Motion
and Store Closing Motion, Respectively, and Debtors’ Responses Thereto, Doc. No. 999
(providing a table of objections to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion, Debtors’ Store
Closing Plan Motion, and Debtors’ Responses to those objections, up to Doc. No. 888 and
through April 4, 2016).
563

See Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions.

564

Wigwam First DIP Financing Objection, at p. 5.

565

Id. at p. 5-6.
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priority liens in prepetition Consigned Goods and granting of first-priority, automatically
perfected PMSIs in postpetition Consigned Goods.566 However, Wigwam was concerned that the
DIP Financing Motion could be read to request authorization to grant first- or second-priority
DIP Liens in both pre- and post-petition Consigned Goods, and objected to the DIP Financing
Motion to the extent that it requested such authorization.567 Further, and again pointing to
paragraph 7 of the Interim Consignment Order, Wigwam argued that they were granted
superpriority administrative expense claims under section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to the
extent of any diminution in the value of their postpetition secured claim, to be treated pari passu
with any other superpriority administrative expense claims granted in the case.568 Therefore,
because the DIP Financing Motion and DIP Financing Order provide that the superpriority
administrative expense claims granted to the DIP Facility lenders would have priority over all
other administrative expense claims in the case, Wigwam objected to the DIP Financing Motion
to the extent it requested such relief or anything less than pari passu treatment for Consignment
Vendors.569 Lastly, they requested that any final order approving the DIP Financing Motion be
modified to reflect their objections.570
In their second, substantially similar, objection, Wigwam made an additional argument in
regard to the treatment of Prepetition Consigned Goods.571 Specifically, while it was not clear, as
far as the DIP Financing Motion requested that DIP Liens encumber Prepetition Consigned
Goods, they presumed that it was referring to Consigned Goods that are subject to consignments
that fall within the definition of UCC section 9-102(a)(20) with Article 9 of the UCC governing
the rights and interests of third-party creditors of, and purchasers (“UCC Consignments”).572
However, Wigwam argued that their consignment was not a UCC Consignment, but rather a
“True Consignment” governed by bailment law.573 Accordingly, Wigwam argued that the
566

Id. at p. 6.

567

Id.

568

Id. at p. 7.

569

Id.

570

Id.

571

Wigwam Second DIP Financing Objection, at p. 5-6.

572

Id. at p. 5.

573

Id. at p. 6 (stating that UCC Article 9 does not apply to consignments that are not UCC
Consignments and defined such arrangements as “True Consignments”) (citing In re Music City
RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806 (Tenn. 2010)).
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Debtors cannot grant a lien on Prepetition Consigned Goods subject to True Consignments and
therefore they objected to the DIP Financing Motion to the extent that it requested to grant DIP
Liens on Prepetition Consigned Goods subject to True Consignments.574 Further, because
Wigwam argued that language in the DIP Financing Motion and Interim DIP Financing Order
conflicted with language in the Interim Consignment Order with respect to properly-perfected
security interests of Consignment Vendors in Prepetition Consigned Goods subject to UCC
Consignments, they requested that any final DIP financing order clearly state that DIP Liens
would be subordinate to any Consignment Vendor’s prepetition, properly-perfected security
interest in UCC Consigned Goods.575
b. ASICS’ Omnibus Objection as it Relates to the DIP Financing
Motion
In ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, they objected to the DIP
Financing Motion on the grounds that it seeks to grant a first priority security interest in and lien
on all of the Debtors’ assets. ASICS argued that, as discussed above, because the Debtors may
only grant an interest in property of their estates, and because ASICS argued that the Debtors had
no interest in ASICS’ Consigned Goods, the Debtors could not, therefore, grant a security
interest in or lien on ASICS’ Consigned Goods.576 Therefore, they asked that, unless the Debtors
prove that ASICS’ Consigned Goods are property of the Debtors’ estates, the court modify the
DIP Financing Motion to disallow the Debtors from using ASICS’ property without ASICS’
consent.577
c. Ameriform’s Omnibus Objection as it Relates to the DIP
Financing Motion
In their omnibus objection to three of the Debtors’ first day motions, Ameriform, much
like Wigwam and ASICS, objected to the DIP Financing Motion as far as it sought to grant a
first priority security interest in all of the Debtors’ assets to the DIP Lenders.578 They argued that,
because the Debtors may only grant an interest in property of the estate, and because Ameriform
574

Id.

575

Id.

ASICS Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, at p. 9. See also, Section
(VI)(D)(8): ASICS Omnibus Objection (Discussing ASICS’ argument that the Debtors’ estates
had no interest in ASICS’ Consigned Goods).
576

577

Id. at p. 24-25.

578

Ameriform Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day Motions, at p. 7.
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retains title to the Consigned Goods and has perfected their interest,579 The Debtors’ have no
interest to grant to a DIP Lender.580
iv. The Committee’s Emergency Motion to Continue Hearing Date and the
Committee’s Objection
On March 22, 2016—the deadline for filing objections to the DIP Financing Motion—the
Committee filed the Committee’s Emergency Continuance Motion seeking, among other things,
to move the hearing on the DIP Motion—set for March 29, 2016—back by approximately one
week.581 At the time of filing the emergency motion, the committee had only participated in the
case for approximately eight business days, and therefore they asked the court for additional time
to prepare a response.582 Although the Committee’s motions were lightly opposed by the
Debtors,583 the Debtors, DIP Lenders, and the Committee agreed to adjourn and continue the
final hearing on the DIP Financing Motion to April 5, 2016584 and the Committee was able to
later file its objection on March 31, 2016.585
Id.; Section (VI)(D)(7), discussing Ameriform’s Omnibus Objection to Debtors’ First Day
Motions in general and as it relates to the Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion.
579

580

Id.

Committee’s Emergency Continuance Motion, at p. 2. See also, Motion to Shorten Period for
Notice of, and Scheduling Hearing On, Emergency Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors (I) To Continue Hearing Date With Respect to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion and
Bid Procedures Motion and (II) For a Protective Order and Order Quashing Notices of
Deposition, Doc. No. 715 (filed March 22, 2016); Order Shortening Period for Notice of, and
Scheduling Hearing On, Emergency Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (I)
To Continue Hearing Date With Respect to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion and Bid
Procedures Motion and (II) For a Protective Order and Order Quashing Notices of Deposition,
Doc. No. 739 (filed March 23, 2016).
581

582

Committee’s Emergency Continuance Motion, at p. 7.

See Debtor’s Response to (A) Emergency Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors (I) To Continue Hearing Date With Respect to the Debtors’ DIP Financing Motion and
Bid Procedures Motion and (II) For a Protective Order and Order Quashing Notices of
Deposition, and (B) The Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Shorten
Notice, Doc. No. 754 (filed on March 23, 2016).
583

584

See First Amendment to DIP Credit Agreement, at p. 1 (stating that, by agreement of the
Debtors, the DIP Lenders and the Committee, the final DIP hearing was adjourned and continued
to April 5, 2016).
585

See Committee’s DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection (filed on March 31, 2016).
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The Committee began their objection by characterizing the proposed DIP Credit
Agreement as “a lopsided deal” that “provides a litany of benefits and protections to [the
Prepetition Secured Creditors] while shortchanging the estate, relegating administrative creditors
who are left out of the budget to non-payment, and impairing the Debtors’ prospects for
reorganization or a going concern sale of their assets that maximizes recoveries of all
creditors.”586 After they expressed this overall “theory of the objection,” the Committee listed
eight primary objections to the DIP Financing Motion.587
In general support of their objections, the Committee argued that a court should approve
proposed DIP financing only if such financing “is in the best interest of the general creditor
body,”588 and that such financing must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”589 Further, DIP
financing should not be authorized “if its primary purpose is to benefit or improve the position of
a particular secured lender.”590 Given those general restrictions, the Committee then argued that
the DIP Loan was obviously the product of the Debtors’ lack of leverage in the negotiations, a
fact they argued was long acknowledged by the law,591 and that “[a] financing proposal this

586

Id. at p. 2.

Id. Other minor objections included: (1) The provisions pertaining to how the Debtors’ can
use cash are too strict and may inadvertently trigger an Event of Default; (2) the Committee is
not granted consent rights on new budgets and not provided financial reporting; and (3) the
Carveout for the Committee’s professionals is inadequate. Id. at p. 30-31.
587

588

Id. at p. 15 (quoting and citing In re Roblin Industries, Inc., 52 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Tenney Village Co., Inc., 104 B.R. 562, 569 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (“The debtor’s
prevailing obligation is to the bankruptcy estate and, derivatively, to the creditors who are its
principal beneficiaries”)).
589

Id. (quoting In re Crouse Group, Inc., 71 B.R. 544, 546 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).

Id. (citing, e.g., In re Aqua Assocs., 123 B.R. 192, 195-98 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (“[C]redit
should not be approved when it is sought for the primary benefit of a party other than the
debtor.”); In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[A] proposed
financing will not be approved where it is apparent that the purpose of the financing is to benefit
a creditor rather than the estate.”); Tenney Village, 104 B.R. at 568 (debtor in possession
financing terms must not “pervert the reorganizational process from one designed to
accommodate all classes of creditors and equity interests to one specially crafted for the benefit
of the secured creditor”)).
590

Id. at p. 16 (citing, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 54 B.R. 833, 838 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (“[T]he
court should not ignore the basic injustice of an agreement in which the debtor, acting out of
desperation, has compromised the rights of unsecured creditors.”)).
591
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lopsided is tantamount to a delegation or compromise of the [Debtors’] fiduciary
responsibilities.592
In their first objection the Committee argued that, as a threshold matter, the Debtors had
failed to establish that they even needed DIP financing, and opined that the Debtors’ projected
cash flows would be sufficient for the Debtors to operate solely on cash collateral use.593 To
support this objection, the Committee pointed to the Approved Budget, under which the Debtors
were projected to enjoy positive cash flow in each of the nine weeks of the budget period,
cumulatively totaling $66 million.594 Therefore, the Debtors argued that the Debtors should move
forward in their cases without DIP financing and the attendant “exorbitant” DIP fees,
professional fees, paydowns of prepetition secured debts, milestones, and the cramdownproofing of hundreds of millions of dollars of prepetition secured debt “mandated by the useless
DIP Facility.”595
Second, the Committee argued that the DIP Credit Agreement was essentially a handout
to the Prepetition Secured Lenders that provided next to no benefit to the estate.596 To support
this objection, the Committee pointed to the over $26 million in fees, interest, principal
paydowns, and other expenses to obtain financing “that [was] essentially illusory,” and argued
that the payment of these fees was inappropriate use of estate resources and therefore the DIP
Motion should be denied, especially given the administrative insolvency posed by the exclusion
of March rent and 504(b)(9) claims and other items from the Approved Budget.597 Notably
infuriating to the Committee (and their professionals writing the motion) were the nearly $7

592

Id. (citing Tenney Village, 104 B.R. at 569 (denying approval of proposed debtor-inpossession financing that was so onerous as to violate the debtors’ fiduciary obligations to the
estate); Roblin, 52 B.R. at 243 (denying approval of proposed debtor-in-possession financing
where, as a condition to extending the loan, the debtors were required to waive avoidance actions
against the lenders in violation of their fiduciary duties); In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 233 B.R.
726, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998) (agreements requiring a debtor to breach its fiduciary duties
are illegal under the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law)).
593

Id.

594

Id. at p. 17.

595

Id.

596

Id. at p. 3-4.

597

Id. at p. 17-18. For an itemized list of the proposed fees under the DIP Facility, see Exhibit 2:
Itemized Table of Expenses Proposed in the DIP Financing Motion.
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million of proposed fees paid to the Prepetition Lenders’ professionals598 versus the roughly $16
million of professional fees left out of the Approved Budget, with $2,525,000 of contemplated
payments to Committee professionals, only $1,525,000 was actually allocated in the budget with
the remainder “deferred.”599 When the $16 million of professional fees were combined with the
$28 million in unpaid March rent and nearly $50 million of section 503(b)(9) claims, a total of
approximately $94 million of administrative expense claims were left out of the Approved
Budget, and therefore the Committee argued that the estate would be administratively insolvent
for the duration of the cases if the DIP Motion were approved without modification.600
In their third and fourth objections, the Committee argued that the superpriority and
adequate protection liens granted to DIP Lenders were inappropriate, “wholly unwarranted,”601
“vastly overgenerous,” and prejudicial to the estate and unsecured creditors.602 Therefore, the
Committee requested that the court refuse to grant DIP liens or adequate protection liens on
unencumbered assets of the Debtors’ estates, leaving them unencumbered for the benefit of the
estates.603 In support of their position, the Committee preliminarily identified at least six valuable
“buckets” of unencumbered assets, all of which the Debtors proposed to lien-up.604 The
Committee argued that the proposed liens were not necessary for two reasons. First, the ABL
Lenders stated that they were already oversecured by as much as $70-100 million, and therefore
did not need any additional inducement or collateral for the proposed DIP Facility.605 Second,

598

Id. at p. 13. The Committee provided the proposed fees, listed by tranche of lender, to
Prepetition Secured Lenders’ Professionals as follows: “ABL: $1,010,000 to Reimer Brownstein
and local counsel; FILO: $1,040,000 to Choate Hall, Schulte Roth & Zabel and local counsel;
and Term: $4,655,000 to Brown Rudnick and PJT Partners.” Id. at p. 13.
599

Id. at p. 13-14.

600

Id. at p. 14.

601

Id. at p. 4.

602

Id. at p. 5.

603

Id. at p. 19.

Id. The six “buckets” of valuable unencumbered assets were as follows: “(i) the assets of the
New Loan Parties, Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., TSA Ponce, Inc. and TSA Caribe, Inc.; (iii)
lease proceeds on account of 464 store locations as of the Petition Date; (iv) avoidance actions
arising under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code; (v) store-level cash that was not in bank
accounts at the time of the Petition Date; and (vi) commercial tort claims, among other items.”
604

605

Id. at p. 20 (citing Mar. 3, 2016 Hearing Tr. at 79:22-25). The Committee recognized that,
while the DIP Lenders may be oversecured based on the book value of Debtors’ inventory, there
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there was no reason to subordinate unsecured creditors to DIP Lenders deficiency claims by
granting the DIP Lenders liens on tens of millions in unencumbered assets that were otherwise
available to the unsecured creditors because the estates would not be receiving any financing
from the FILO or Term Loan Lenders.606
In particular, the Committee argued that the avoidance action proceeds should remain
free of any liens because the intent behind avoidance powers was to allow the DIP to recover for
the benefit of all unsecured creditors.607 Because allowing the liens on avoidance actions would
“turn[] bankruptcy law on its head,”608 the Committee argued that the court should not permit
DIP liens and adequate protection liens to cut into what could have been one of the only sources
of meaningful recovery for unsecured creditors.609
In support of their third and fourth objections, the Committee began by outlining the
requirements of section 361, under which debtors are required to provide a secured creditor with
adequate protection the extent that the value of the secured lender’s interest is diminished by the
automatic stay, use of cash collateral, or a priming lien.610 Further, where the lender’s collateral
is not diminishing in value as a result of the Debtors’ use, nothing is required for adequate
protection.611 Therefore, the Committee argued that in this case, because the Prepetition Secured
was no way to determine how much value would actually be realized on the liquidation of the
inventory. Id.
606

Id.

Id. (citing Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship.
IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Sweetwater, 55 B.R. 724, 735 (D. Utah 1985)
(avoiding powers are meant to benefit creditors generally and promote equitable distribution
among all creditors)). The Committee recognized that the proposed lien on avoidance action
proceeds was to refund professional fees incurred in generating avoidance action recoveries, but
did not treat it as material to its point. Id.
607

608

Id. at p. 21 (citing Tenney Village, 104 B.R. at 568 (debtor in possession financing terms
must not “pervert the reorganizational process from one designed to accommodate all classes of
creditors and equity interests to one specially crafted for the benefit” of the secured creditor)).
609

Id. at p. 21.

610

Id. at p. 26 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 361(1)).

611

Id. (citing In re Pursuit Athletic Footwear, Inc., 193 B.R. 716 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996)
(approving use of cash collateral where debtor agreed to grant creditor replacement lien and there
had been no diminution in the value of the collateral); In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. at 194; In re
Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R. at 394-95.).
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Lenders’ collateral was not diminishing in value they are not entitled to adequate protection.612
This conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the Committee did not dispute that the Prepetition
Secured Lenders had a statutory right under section 507(b) to assert a claim if they could show
that use of their cash collateral has resulted in a diminution in value.613
Fifth, the Committee objected to the “gargantuan” amount of fees, interest, principal
paydowns and other expenses, totaling $22.3 million, under the proposed DIP financing
arrangement, especially given the fact that the Debtors were to receive no additional access to
borrowing or incremental availability.614 In support of their conclusion that the DIP Motion
should be denied on this basis, the Committee provided a helpful table of the fees associated with
the Prepetition ABL Credit Agreement as compared to the DIP facility, and is reproduced as
Exhibit 3: Proposed DIP Financing Lender and Agent Fees. The Committee also focused
specifically on the FILO loan and characterized it as “excessive” and “indefensible” while
continuing to hammer home the fact that the Debtors would be required to pay over $9.4 million
in fees and other costs for no access to funding over the life of the FILO DIP Loan.615
Sixth, the Committee lodged a general objection to the DIP Financing Motion on the
grounds that it contemplates that the case be run on an administratively insolvent basis “for the
exclusive benefit of the secured creditors on the backs of landlords, vendors and other disfavored
administrative creditors . . . .”616 The Committee argued that the Approved Budget provided no
payment for the administrative expense claims of Landlords—totaling roughly $28 million for
March rent—and section 503(b)(9) claims owed to vendors on account of goods sold and
delivered to the Debtors in the twenty days prior to bankruptcy—totaling roughly $50 million.617
Therefore, given the proposed liening up of all unencumbered assets of the Debtors, from the
Committee’s point of view, it appeared as if these claims would never be paid.618

612

Id.

613

Id. at p. 27.

614

Id. at p. 5.

615

Id. at p. 24.

616

Id. at p. 6.

617

Id.

618

Id.
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Seventh, much like the Landlords in their objections, the Committee objected to and
suggested striking from the final order the provisions of the proposed DIP Credit Agreement that
waived section 506(c) surcharges on the DIP Lenders’ collateral and section 552 “equities of the
case” claims because of the failure of the Approved Budget to provide for payment of
approximately $93 million of administrative expenses.619 The proposal to waive section 506(c)
surcharges seemed even worse given that two of the three tranches of Prepetition Secured
Lenders would not be extending any financing.620
In support of their seventh objection, the Committee argued that section 506(c) waivers
are particularly inappropriate in cases where the Debtors’ strategy is to sell the bulk if their assets
on an expedited basis and the proceeds are to be used to pay off prepetition secured debt in full
because it leaves out any strategy to satisfy the estates’ remaining obligations.621 The Committee
argued that if these waivers were granted, the Debtors would be able to operate in chapter 11 on
an administratively insolvent basis at the behest of the DIP Lenders, and the administrative
claims would effectively not be “deferred” at all, but rather denied on a permanent basis.622 As a
result and based on the deficiencies in the budget and proposal to leave no assets unencumbered,
the current proposal would all but guarantee that the Landlords, section 503(b)(9) vendors, and
other unsecured creditors would solely bear the costs of the Debtors reorganization such as
maintaining and disposing of unsold remaining collateral (which is pledged to the Prepetition
Secured Creditors) or otherwise administering the case.623 The Committee argued that such a
plan contravenes “the essential purpose of section 506(c).”624 In further support, the Committee
argued that other bankruptcy courts have recognized that DIP financing containing an inadequate
619

Id. at p. 7.

620

The FILO and the Term Lenders. Id. at p. 7.

621

Id. at p. 20-21.

622

Id. at p. 7.

623

Id. at p. 21-22.

624

Id. at p. 22 (citing Precision Steel Shearing v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual Indus.), 57
F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[S]ection 506(c) is designed to prevent a windfall to the secured
creditor . . . The rule understandably shifts to the secured party . . . the costs of preserving or
disposing of the secured party’s collateral, which costs might otherwise be paid from the
unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate . . .”) (internal citation omitted); In re Codesco,
Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The underlying rationale for charging a
lienholder with the costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of the secured collateral is that
the general estate and unsecured creditors should not be required to bear the cost of protecting
what is not theirs.”)).
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budget coupled with a surcharge waiver should not be approved unless modified to provide for
payment of administrative claims and other administration costs.625
Eighth and finally, the Committee took issue with the sale milestones contained in the
DIP Financing Motion on the basis that they served as strict conditions on “essentially
nonexistent yet expensive financing,” they dictated an “unreasonably expedited sale” despite the
fact that the Committee argued the prepetition marketing process was not “robust,” and that the
Debtors filed the Bid Procedures Motion without a stalking horse bidder in place.626 The
Committee argued that the practical effect of the optimistic milestones was to set the Debtors up
to default on the DIP Credit Agreement and thereby allowing the DIP Lenders to foreclose
should the Debtors not be able to, within five weeks time, conduct a “fast-track fire sale of their
assets” while also generating bids, conducting an auction sale and close on that sale.627
To support their argument in the eighth objection that the milestone covenants were
objectionable, the Committee provided a table of such covenants from Section 6.24 of the DIP
Credit Agreement along with suggested new dates,628 characterizing the proposed milestones as
placing the Debtors “on a break-neck course to sell their assets with no meaningful sales process
having been conducted and no stalking horse bidder in place.”629 Therefore, on those bases the
Committee objected to both the Bid Procedures Motion and the DIP Financing Motion to the

625

Id. at p. 23 (citing NEC Holdings Corp., Case No. 10-11890 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. Jul 13,
2010) [Docket No. 223] and Hearing Tr. at 108:1-5 [Docket No. 224] (“I need some evidence
that there’s a probability that admin claims are going to be paid in full, including 503(b)(9)
claims or I won’t approve the financing.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nw. Bank Minn. (In re
Lockwood Corp.), 223 B.R. 170, 176 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) (holding that provision in financing
order purporting to immunize the postpetition lender from section 506(c) surcharge was
unenforceable); In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 224 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to
approve postpetition financing agreement to the extent that the agreement purported to modify
statutory rights and obligations created by the Bankruptcy Code by prohibiting any surcharge of
collateral under section 506(c))).
626

Id. at p. 7.

627

Id. at p. 7. Further, the Committee noted that, under the DIP Credit Agreement, the Debtors
would be forced to conduct a sale of all their assets and repay the rolled-up prepetition debt well
in advance of the stated June 30, 2016 maturity date of the DIP loans. Id. at p. 8.
628

A table of the milestone covenants, as provided by the Committee, is available as Exhibit 4:
Table of Proposed DIP Financing Milestone Covenants.
629

Id. at p. 19.
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extent that it “locks the Debtors into a truncated timeline for a mandated sale process, benefitting
the DIP Lenders and no one else.”630
VII. THE THIRD WAVE—THE DEBTORS (AND THE SECURED LENDERS)
ATTEMPT TO HOLD THE LINE: REPLIES, AN (ATTEMPTED) SETTLEMENT,
FINAL ORDERS, AND APPEALS
A. Third Wave on the Utilities Services Front
1. Resolution to Objections, Joinders and Informal Comments
As a result of insider discussions between the Debtor and the Responding Parties, The
Debtors were able to resolve the Objections, the Joinders, and the informal comments from
Direct Energy. Duke Energy filed a Notice of Withdrawal of objection on March 23, 2016.631
Five days later, Certain Utilities followed suit and filed a Notice of Withdrawal in the same
fashion as Direct Energy.632 Due to the Withdrawal of Objection by Certain Utilities, Orlando
Utilities Commission filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Joinder.633 Furthermore, the Debtors were
able reach a settlement with Chugach resulting in the withdrawal of their objection as well.634
630

Id. at p. 8.

631

Notice of Withdrawal of Objection of Duke Energy to Entry of a Final Order on the Debtors'
Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering,
Refusing, or Discontinuing Services; (B) Approving the Debtors Proposed Adequate Assurance
of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests
for Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment; to be Held on March 29, 2016 at 1:00 p.m, Doc.
No. 756.
632

Notice of Withdrawal of Objection of Certain Utility Companies to the Debtors' Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing or
Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment
for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional
Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 843.
633

Notice of Withdrawal of Joinder of Orlando Utilities Commission to the Objection of Certain
Utility Companies to the Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility
Providers from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors'
Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing
Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 846.
634

Certification of Counsel Regarding Revised Final Order (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers
from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed
Adequate Assurance of Payment for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for
Resolving Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 916.
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2. Final Order
On March 31, 2016, the Court entered a Final Order a) Prohibiting Utility Providers from
Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Service; (b) Approving the Debtors’ Proposed Adequate
Assurance of Payment for Post-petition Services; and (c) Establishing Procedures for Resolving
Requests for Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment.635
The Court generally accepted the orders entered into in the Interim Order.636 The Final
Order contradicts itself when in provision 12 the Court states that “Nothing contained herein
constitutes a finding that any entity is or is not a Utility Provider hereunder or under section
366…” but in provision 14 it states that “(a) Direct Energy, (b) Direct Energy Business
Marketing, LLC, and/or (c) Direct Energy Business, LLC shall not be considered a “Utility
Provider” for purposes of this Final Order.”637 Being that Direct Energy made informal
comments regarding the Utilities Motion, it seems that Direct Energy was unsure as to whether
they would be a Utility Provider and through discussions with the Debtors came to the
conclusion that they were not. However, the Final Order gave Direct Energy the ability to
provide the Debtors with at least 60-calendar days prior to written notice before termination any
commodities contract, forward contract, swap agreement and/or master netting agreement with
one or more of the Debtors.638 Furthermore, the Final Order authorized the Utility Providers to
(a) offset prepetition cash deposits against prepetition debts pursuant section 366(c)(4) and/or (b)
make a demand upon or receive payment on surety bonds or lets of credit for unpaid prepetition
charges.639
In resolution of the issue for prohibiting Utility Providers from altering, refusing, or
discontinuing service, (B) approving the Debtors’ proposed adequate assurance of payment for
post-petition services; and (C) establishing procedures for resolving requests for additional

635

Id.

636

Id. at 3-7; See also Interim Orders (A) Prohibiting Utility Providers from Altering, Refusing
or Discontinuing Service; (B) Approving the Debtors' Proposed Adequate Assurance of Payment
for Postpetition Services; and (C) Establishing Procedures for Resolving Requests for Additional
Adequate Assurance of Payment, Doc. No. 130.
637

Id. at 8-9.

638

Id.

639

Id. at 9.
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adequate assurance of payment, Debtors filed a Notice of Filing Supplement to Utility Providers
List.640 Therein, gave notice to the original filing on March 2, 2016; the interim approval of such
Motion on March 3, 2016; the final approval on April 1, 2016641; and the inclusion of a
supplement to the Utility Providers List.642 The Utility Providers List included listed one
provider: Rubicon Global Holdings, LLC denoted as Waste Management.643
B. Third Wave on the Store Closing Plan Front
1. The Debtors’ Omnibus Reply as it Relates to the Store Closing Plan
The Debtors filed a reply to the objections to the GOB Motion.644 The reply to the Court
discussed how the Debtors have resolved nearly all the objections from landlords through the
execution of agreements with the affected landlords that replace the Sale Guidelines with respect
to specified store locations (the “Side Letters”).645
In addition to those landlords identified in the Store Closing Motion, those that were not
identified also filed objections to request the Court to require the Debtors to give notice and an

640

Notice of Filing Supplement to Utility Providers List, Doc. No. 1055 .

641

The final is actually dated March 31, 2016 but is referenced as April 1, 2016 in this Notice of
Filing.
642

Notice of Filing Supplement to Utility Providers List, Doc. No. 1055, at Exhibit A.

643

Id. at 4.

644

Debtors' Omnibus Reply in Support of Entry of Final Orders on (I) Debtors' Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to (I) Continue to Sell Consigned Goods in
the Ordinary Course of Business Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances and (II)
Grant Administrative Expense Priority to Consignment Vendors for Consigned Goods Delivered
Postpetition; and (B) Grant Replacement Liens to Consignment Vendors with Perfected Security
Interests in Consigned Goods and/or Remit the Consignment Sale Price Arising from Sale of
Consigned Goods to Putative Consignment Vendors and (II) Debtors' Emergency Motion for
Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement,
(B) Authorizing and Approving Store Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances, (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program
and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder, (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures, and
(E) Approving the Debtors' Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 991.
645

Id. at 37. As it stood at the time of filing only two objections remained but the Debtors were
hopeful that they would soon be resolved.
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opportunity to object should the Debtors desire to add their stores to the Store Closing Motion.646
In order to, preempt a fight in the future, the Debtors agreed to accommodate their request by
amending the Store Closing Order.647 The Debtors would give the affected landlords a ten day
notice to object to the Store Closing Order.648
The Debtor’s also argued that the Landlords’ request for adequate protection in the form
of immediate payment of Stub Rent should be denied because: (1) landlords are adequately
protected by Sections 265(d)(3)649 and 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Sales Guidelines and
the Side Letters650; (2) immediate payment is not warranted by statute; and (3) Payment of Stub
Rent should be addressed in connection with the Stub Rent Motions.651 Additionally a chart
summarizing objections to Debtor’s consignment goods motion and Store Closing Motion,
respectively, and Debtors’ responses was filed.652
2. Final Order

646

Id.

647

Id.

648

Id. at 37-38.

649

Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides landlords with statutorily- mandated
adequate protection in the form of current payment of lease obligations when those obligations
come due. Established Third Circuit precedent, the Debtors’ obligations to pay March rent came
due on March 1, 2016 and therefore the Debtors are not required by section 365(d)(3) to make
immediate payment of March rent.
Id. at 40. “trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and
after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property . . . .” 11
U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 208-212 (3d Cir.
2001); see also HQ Global Holdings, 282 B.R. at 172-73.
650

651

Various landlords filed separate motions to compel immediate payment of stub rent. See
Docket Nos. 709, 789, 797 and 939 (together, the “Stub Rent Motions”). The Stub Rent Motions
were scheduled to be heard on April 26, 2016. The Debtors believed that the stub rent issue
could and should be decided in connection with the Stub Rent Motions.
652

Notice of Filing of Chart Summarizing Objections to Debtors' Consigned Goods Motion and
Store Closing Motion, Respectively, and Debtors' Responses Thereto. Doc. No. 999.
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The Court entered a Final Order on May 3, 2015.653 The Court realized that the Debtors
were not out to weasel around the rules but in fact were sincerely concerned about getting the
most out of the Store Assets allowing for a greater payout to the estates and creditors. The Court
agreed that Debtors’ used their advanced sound business judgment when they drafted the Closing
Store Agreement.654 Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Debtors that the Sale Guidelines
were reasonable and would maximize the returns of the Store Assets, which in turn would greater
benefit the Debtors’ creditors and estates.655 The Court also agreed that the institution of the
Closing Sales and Bonus Program would allow the Debtors to quickly and effectively dispose of
the Store Assets.656 Additionally, the Court allowed the Debtors to go forward with the Store
closings.657 Since the Store Closing Agreements were made prior to the commencement of the
Bankruptcy both the Debtors and Landlords were relieved when the Court allowed them to
engage in Side Letters.658
C. Third Wave on the Consignment Sales Front
1. Term Loan Agent’s Reply in Support of Debtors’ Consignment Sales Motion
On March 31, 2016, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as successor administrative
and collateral agent (the “Term Loan Agent”) to BofA and other prepetition secured lenders (the
“Term Loan Lenders”),659 under the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated November
653

Final Order (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume the Closing Store Agreement; (B)
Authorizing and Approving Closing Sales Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances; (C) Authorizing the Implementation of Customary Employee Bonus Program
and Payments to Non-Insiders Thereunder; (D) Approving Dispute Resolution Procedures; and
(E) Approving the Debtors' Store Closing Plan, Doc. No. 1700 .
654

Id. at 4-5.

655

Id. at 6.

656

Id. at 16.

657

Id. at 9.

658

Id. at 14.

Term Loan Agent’s Consignment Reply. at p. 2, n.5 (providing excerpts from and information
about a document referred to as Security Agreement, dated as of May 3, 2006, as follows: the
Security agreement was “by and among (a) The Sports Authority, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
as borrower, (b) each of the guarantors listed on Schedule I thereto, and (c) Wilmington Savings
Fund Society, FSB, as successor collateral agent to Bank of America, N.A. ‘Inventory’ is defined
in the Security Agreement to have the meaning given that term in the UCC, and shall also
include, without limitation, all: ‘Goods which are held by a Person for sale . . . .’ Security
659
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16, 2010 (the “Term Loan Credit Agreement”), submitted a reply in support of the Debtors’
Consignment Sales Motion and other first day motions and to the Consignment Vendor
objections to the Debtors’ motions.660 Other than BofA filing a notice of intention to intervene in
the adversary proceedings,661 this seems to be the first time that prepetition secured lenders get
involved in the fight over the Consigned Goods. In the first part of their motion, the Term Loan
Agent argued generally that the Debtors have a sufficient interest in the prepetition consigned
goods such that they are property of the estates, which the Debtors may sell free and clear of any
interests under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.662 In the second, heavily redacted, section of
their motion, the Term Loan Agent appears to have made an argument for adequate protection.663
Before getting into the arguments, a bit of background on the Debtors’ debt structure is
helpful. In their reply, the Term Loan Agent states that, as of the Petition Date the Debtors owe
approximately $276.7 million in principal under the Term Loan Credit Agreement, plus accrued
and unpaid interest, fees, and other obligations.664 While the amount owed to the Term Lenders
certainly dwarfs the estimated $84.8 million value of the Consigned Goods,665 both those
amounts seem relatively minor in comparison to the Debtors’ approximately $1.1 billion in
Prepetition Secured Debt Obligations and Prepetition Subordinated Debt (which includes the
amounts owed to the Term Lenders).666
The Term Loan Agent made a five-part argument to support their assertion that the
Debtors have a sufficient interest in the Prepetition Consigned Goods such that they are property
Agreement at §102. The UCC also defines ‘Inventory’ to include ‘goods held by a person for
sale . . . .’ UCC 9-102(a)(48)(B). The relative lien priority rights of the Term Loan Agent and the
Term Loan Lenders, on the one hand, and the ABL Agent and the ABL Lenders, on the other
hand, are governed by that certain Intercreditor Agreement, dated as of May 3, 2006 (as may be
amended, modified, restated, extended, renewed, replaced or supplemented in accordance with
its terms).”).
660

661

Id. at p. 1-2.
See BofA Consignment Intervention.

Term Loan Agent’s Consignment Reply, at p. 8. See also, Section (V)(C)(5)(ii): The Debtors’
Motion, for a discussion of the Debtors’ debt structure.
662

663

See id. at p. 20-24.

664

Id. at p. 4.

665

Id. at p. 4 (citing Aguilar Declaration at paragraph 97).

666

DIP Financing Motion, at p. 6.
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of the estate, which they may sell free and clear of any interests under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code.667
First, the Term Loan Agent attacked the Consignment Vendor’s argument that the
Consigned Goods were not property of the estate by (somewhat hyperbolically) characterizing
the Consignment Vendors’ argument as based on “the meritless assertion that as consignors, the
Vendors, and the Vendors alone, have a property interest in the Prepetition Consigned Goods, to
the exclusion of the Debtors’ estates.”668 In arguing that the Prepetition Consigned Goods were,
in fact, property of the Debtors’ estates, the Term Loan Agent pointed out that the definition of
“property of the estate” includes “‘all legal or equitable interest of [the Debtors] in property as of
the commencement of the case,’” not merely legal “title.”669 The Debtors, they argued, had
extensive contractual rights to the Prepetition Consigned Goods, such as: the right to sell them at
locations in its discretion and in some cases at a price solely within the Debtors’ discretion;670
rights of indemnity received from the Consignment Vendors, in relation to the Prepetition
Consigned Goods, for “‘any act or omission by Vendor;’”671 and rights arising from
representations and warranties made by Consignment Vendors in favor of the Debtors.672 The
Term Loan Agent stated that all of these contractual rights became property of the estates as of
the Petition Date,673 and furthermore, because the Vendors agreed that its arrangement with the
Debtors is an Article 9 consignment,674 the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate also includes rights
667

See Term Loan Agent’s Consignment Reply, at p. 8-20.

668

Id. at p. 9.

669

Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541) (emphasis added by Term Loan Agent).

670

Id.

671

Id. (quoting the Vendor Relations Guide, at paragraph 23).

672

Id. (stating that representations and warranties made by Consignment Vendors in favor of
Debtors were with regards to the absence of defects, compliance with safety standards and noninfringement of intellectual property) (citing the Vendor Relations Guide, at paragraph 20).
673

Id. at p. 9-10 (citing In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 139 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)
(holding that rights to distribute, rights to set the sale price, rights to indemnification, and other
rights of the consignee with regard to consigned property, became “property of the estate” as of
the petition date and, that as a consequence, such rights could continue to be exercised by the
debtor in possession without the need to assume the related agreements)).
674

Id. at p. 10. The Term Loan Agent also made the argument, in a footnote, that, because of the
agreement that the arrangement was an Article 9 consignment, the each Consignment Vendor
was estopped from disputing that characterization in litigation involving the Debtors. Id. at n. 10
(citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 57, 84-85 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
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conferred by the UCC.675 Chief among the rights conferred by the UCC are those listed in UCC §
9-319(a), providing that “while the goods are in the possession of the consignee, the consignee is
deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consigner had or had power to
transfer.”676 Therefore, the Term Loan Agent concluded, “while the debtor remains in possession
of consigned goods, and notwithstanding that ‘title’ remains with the consignor, the debtor may
transfer to any creditor a ‘security interest’ in such consigned goods.”677
Second, the Term Loan Agent argued that, because the adversary actions constituted, at a
minimum, a bona fide dispute as to the Consignment Vendors claims to the Consigned Goods,
the Debtors were allowed to sell the Prepetition Consigned Goods free and clear of any interests
pursuant to section 363(f)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.678 Further, they argued that even if the
Debtors’ rights in the Consigned Goods under the relevant agreements did not satisfy the
“property of the estate” requirements of subsections (b) and (c) of section 363, the Prepetition
Consigned Goods may still be sold free and clear because the claimed interest of the Vendors are

(party who entered into agreement with a clause characterizing it as a contract to provide
services estopped from arguing that the contract was for the sale of goods); Albertson v. Winner
Automotive, No. Civ.A. 01-116 KAJ, 2004 WL 2435290, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 27, 2004) (party
estopped from asserting “a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which
he accepted a benefit”)).
675

Id. at p. 10.

676

Id. at p. 11 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-319(a)) (emphasis supplied by Term Loan
Agent).
677

Id. (emphasis in original). The Term Loan Agent also went on to argue that the power of a
debtor to confer on a creditor a security interest in property in its possession is an “interest in
property” under Section 541. Id. (citing Larry Liebzeit v. FVTS Acquisition Company, Inc. (In
re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co. of Sherwood Michigan, 465 B.R. 808, 820 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
2012) (holding that, where consignor did not prove superior interest in consigned goods, debtor
had interest as “deemed” owner of consigned goods under UCC 9-319, and rights as “deemed”
owner pass to debtor in possession as property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code Section
541); In re Tristar Automotive Group, Inc., 141 B.R. 41, 43-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding
that consigned goods were property of the estate notwithstanding consignors’ retention of title)).
Further, it was undisputed that the Debtors did transfer such interest to the Term Loan Agent for
the benefit of the Term Loan Lenders, satisfying the “interest of the debtor” requirement of UCC
§ 9-203. Id.
678

Id. at p. 15.
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subject to challenge under state law and avoidable pursuant to section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code.679

Id. at p. 12-13. The Term Loan Agent’s § 544 argument asserted that, with respect to other
creditors of a consignee, the UCC provides that the interest of a consignor in goods is a
purchase-money security interest (“PMSI”) in inventory. Id. at p. 13 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§ 9-103(d) (“The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment is
a purchase-money security interest in inventory.”); In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506
B.R. 600, 607 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 2014 WL 7389901 (Nov. 25,
2014) (Briccetti, J.) (“In contrast, the consignor—in this case Kraken, the “owner” of the
Botticelli—is deemed to hold only a purchase-money security interest in the consigned goods as
against creditors of the consignee.”); Marcoly v. National Bank of the Commonwealth (In re
Marcoly), 32 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1983)). Further, because under § 362(p)(2) the
Consignment Vendors bear the burden of proving their alleged interest in the Prepetition
Consigned Goods, the Consignment Vendors must prove that they timely and properly perfected
their PMSIs in the applicable Prepetition Consigned Goods by properly filing a UCC financing
statement and sending the requisite authenticated notification to the Term Loan Agent prior to
delivering the Prepetition Consigned Goods to the Debtors. Id. at p. 13-14 (citing 11 U.S.C. §
363(p)(2) (“In any hearing under this section . . . the entity asserting an interest in property has
the burden of proof on the issue of the validity, priority, or extent of such interest.”); Morris v.
Kasparek (In re Kasparek), 426 B.R. 332, 342 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010) (party asserting equitable
title in property “shoulder[s] the burden to prove the extent of his interest”); VanCura v.
Hanrahan (In re Meill), 441, B.R. 610, 613-14 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (alleged lienholder who
objected to Section 363 sale has burden to prove interest in property); Kiser v. Russell Cty., Va.
(In re Kiser), 344 B.R. 432, 439 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2004); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 9-322,
324(b); In re Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 123; Chequers Inc. Assocs. v. Hotel Sierra Vista Ltd.
P’ship (In re Hotel Sierra Vista Ltd. P’ship), 112 F.3d 429, 434 (9th Cir. 1997)). Therefore,
because all of the applicable Consignment Vendors either simply did not file a financing
statement, improperly filed a financing statement (rendering it invalid), or filed a financing
statement within the 90-day preference period, those Consignment Vendors’ interest in the
Prepetition Consigned Goods were relegated to that of a mere unsecured creditor and thus
subordinated to the interests of the debtors (as hypothetical lien creditors under § 544) and the
Term Loan Agent (as a properly secured lender). Id. at p. 14 (citing In re Niblett, 441 B.R. 490,
492-93 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (“The trustee’s rights are superior to those of the consignor. The
trustee has the right to sell property consigned to a debtor and use the proceeds to pay creditors
who file proofs of claims.”); Marcoly v. National Bank of the Commonwealth (In re Marcoly),
32 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (“Section 544 gives the Debtor in Possession a
perfected interest in the goods superior to that of [consignor]. Although the Court is convinced
that this transaction was intended to be a consignment, [consignor] did not protect its interest by
... filing a financing statement.”); In re Tristar Automotive Group, Inc., 141 B.R. at 44 (holding
that consignor that did not prove that it had a perfected security interest in consigned goods had
interest inferior to Debtors’ Section 544 power and, thus, could not obtain relief from the
automatic stay to retrieve its goods)).
679
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Third, the Term Loan Agent specifically attacked ASICS’ contention that its situation
was different because they terminated its applicable agreement prior to the Petition Date by
arguing that ASICS failed to point out any specific provision in the applicable agreement
granting such a termination right, and even if such a right exists, the applicable agreement does
not require TSA to stop selling and return the Consigned Goods upon such termination.680 Again
pointing to section 363(p)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Term Loan Agent argued that ASICS
bears the burden of proving its purported superior interest in the Prepetition Consigned Goods,
and concluded that, at a minimum, a bona fide dispute existed and therefore the Debtors are
permitted to sell such goods free and clear of any interests of ASICS under section 363(f)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Code.681
Fourth, the Term Loan Agent attacked the Consignment Vendors’ assertion that a section
363 sale must await final resolution of the Adversary Proceedings by arguing that section 363(f)
of the Bankruptcy Code provides “ample authority” to allow for the sale of property subject to
dispute “so long as the [claimed interests] attach to the proceeds of the sale.”682 Further, in
attacking the Vendors reliance on In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., the Term Loan Agent
characterized the Vendor’s as “erroneous” and pointed out that, in that case, the Debtors were
unable to provide the consignors with adequate protection of their interests and therefore the
proposed sale would, in substance, effect a lien avoidance.683 Therefore, in that case, the lack of
ability to provide adequate protection gave rise to the need for the procedural protections of an
adversary proceeding, and where there is no such lack of ability to provide adequate protection,
there is no reason for section 363 sales to be deferred until the Adversary Proceedings are
concluded.684
Id. at p. 16-17 (further stating that “A plausible consequence of the termination is that the
Vendor will simply cease shipping new consigned goods to TSA.”).
680

681

Id. at p. 17.

682

Id. at p. 17 (quoting and citing In re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496, 504 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004)
(citing In re Wells, 296 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that trustee could sell
property free and clear of equitable interest in property with interest to attach to proceeds); see
also In re Bedford Square Assocs., L.P., 247 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (permitting
sale under § 363(f)(4) because debtor’s asserted right to commence strong-arm proceeding to
avoid interest created a bona fide dispute); In re Surplus Furniture Liquidators, Inc., 199 B.R.
136, 145 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (permitting sale under § 363(f)(4) where equitable lien was
disputed)).
683

Id. at p. 18 (citing In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., 2008 WL 2951974 at *7 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2008)).
684

Id. (citing Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 133 (while acknowledging the need for an adversary
proceeding to “complete” the debtors’ avoidance, allowing the Section 363 sale to go forward)).
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Fifth, the Term Loan Agent argued that, absent a lifting of the automatic stay, the
consignment Vendors may not take possession of the Prepetition Consigned Goods because the
Prepetition Consigned Goods are in the Debtors’ possession and a consignor seeking to recover
possession of goods in the possession of a debtor-in-possession must seek and obtain relief from
the automatic stay to do so.685 Further, subject to exceptions that the Term Loan Agent stated
were not present, requests for relief from the automatic stay must be made by motion, comply
with Local Bankruptcy Rule 4001-1,686 and be supported by a substantial evidentiary showing
that the Consignment Vendors would suffer “significant hardship” absent such relief.687
Therefore, the Term Loan Agent concluded that because no Consignment Vendor has formally
moved for relief from the automatic stay nor come forward with substantial evidence necessary
to support such relief,688 the court should not approve an order permitting any Consignment
Vendor to take possession of Prepetition Consigned Goods or receive payment of the
Consignment Sales Price.689
Lastly, in a heavily redacted portion of their reply, the Term Loan Agent appeared to
make a request for adequate protection, arguing that the provision of adequate protection under

685

Id. at p. 18-19 (citing Emerson Quiet Kool Corp. v. Marta Grp., Inc. (In re Marta Grp., Inc.),
33 B.R. 634, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that debtor’s possessory interest in consigned
goods triggered automatic stay, even where debtor’s held no ownership interest in such goods);
Liebzeit v. FVTS Acquisition Co. (In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co. of Sherwood Mich.), 465
B.R. 808, 814 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012) (holding that consignor violated automatic stay when it
took possession of consigned vehicle from debtor); In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. 463,
465 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (denying consignor’s request for relief from the automatic stay to
recover possession of consigned goods)).
686

Id. at p. 19 (also stating that Local Rule 4001-1 requires such a request to be accompanied by
filings of supporting documentation with the motion and provide notice to all affected parties).
687

Id. at p. 19-20 (citing Atlantic Marine Inc. v. American Classic Voyages, Co. (In re American
Classic Voyages, Co.), 298 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (denying relief from stay and
holding that a party seeking relief must show “significant” hardship)).
688

Id. at p. 20. Further, the Term Loan Agent argued that no Consignment Vendor could adduce
such evidence because the interests of both the Debtors and the Term Loan Agent in the
Prepetition Consigned Goods are superior to any interests of the Consignment Vendors and, in
the event a Consignment Vendor could prove a superior interest (and it is their burden to do so),
such interest could be adequately protected by escrowing the Consignment Sales Price. Id.
Therefore, no Consignment Vendor would be “significantly” harmed by a denial of relief from
the automatic stay. Id.
689

Id.
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section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is mandatory,690 and that the Debtors’ bear the burden of
proving that the Term Loan Agent’s interest in the collateral are adequately protected.691
Therefore, absent the Debtors’ ability to prove the Term Loan Agent’s interest are adequately
protected, the Debtors are prohibited from continuing to use the Prepetition Consigned Goods
without the Term Loan Agent’s consent.692
2. Limited Reply of Gordini and SP Images
In response to the Term Loan Agent’s Consignment Reply, both Gordini and SP Images
filed replies to motion asserting that the Term Loan Agent seeking to clarify that they had,
indeed, properly filed UCC-1 financing statements to perfect their respective PMSIs and
provided the necessary notifications to the Debtors and secured lenders.693 Specifically, Gordini
argued and provided documentation that it had filed its UCC-1 financing statement as well as
delivered notice and supporting documentation to the secured lenders in a Federal Express

690

Id. at p. 23 (citing In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 536, 539 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992)
(noting that a debtor’s right to use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business is
limited by Section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides “the court ... shall prohibit or
condition such use ... as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest”), aff’d 91
F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Worldcom, Inc., 304 B.R. 611, 618-19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); In
re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 290 B.R. 487, 491 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2003); In re Heatron,
Inc., 6 B.R. 493, 494 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980)).
Id. at p. 24 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(p)(1) (“In any hearing under this section . . . the trustee
has the burden on the issue of adequate protection . . . .”)).
691

692

Id. See also, id. at n. 15 (acknowledging that there is some limited authority suggesting that
the creditor seeking adequate protection must make a prima facie showing demonstrating a
decline or threatened decline in the value of it collateral, but arguing that this standard turns §
363(p)(1) on its head and that the Term Loan Agent could easily satisfy it for the reasons set
forth in the reply) (citing, e.g., Zink v. VanMiddlesworth, 300 B.R. 394, 402-03 (N.D.N.Y.
2003); In re Panther Mountain Land Dev., LLC, 438 B.R. 169, 189-90 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010)).
Limited Response of Gordini USA, Inc. to Term Loan Agent’s Reply (I) In Support of
Debtors’ Consigned Goods Motion and Other First Day Relief; and (II) to Vendors’ Objections
to Same, Doc. No. 1000, at p. 2-3 (the “Gordini Reply to Term Lender”); Limited Response of
SP Images, Inc. to Term Loan Agent’s Reply (I) In Support of Debtors’ Consigned Goods
Motion and Other First Day Relief; and (II) to Vendors’ Objections to Same, Doc. No. 1001, at
p. 1-3 (the “SP Images Reply to Term Lender”).
693
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delivery dated April 8, 2015.694 SP Images argued essentially the same point and provided a
letter to BofA giving notice of the filed UCC-1 financing statement, dated September 2, 2015.695
3. The Debtors’ Motion for Order Approving Settlement Agreement with Certain
Consignment Vendors, the Term Loan Agent’s Emergency Motion for Adequate
Protection, and Resolution on the Consignment Sales Front
Subsequently, the Debtors’ filed a motion for an order approving settlement agreements
with Consignment Vendors.696 The Settlement Agreement paves a clear path for resolving all
disputes with respect to the Consenting Vendors pertaining to the sale of the Vendors’ respective
prepetition and postpetition goods, as well as related issues implicating ownership and title.
Further, the settlement allows the Debtors to resume their ordinary course business operations,
continue to sell merchandise on hand and restock with new merchandise, and generate significant
returns for the Debtors’ estate. Lastly, the Settlement Agreement facilitates and re-establishes
advantageous and cooperative business relationships between the Debtors and the Consenting
Vendors on a go-forward basis.697
The key terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement were as follows:
•

Vendor agrees to continue to ship goods to TSA in the ordinary course of
business. TSA will pay for such Postpetition PBS Goods pursuant to the
terms of the PBS Agreement.

•

Vendor will receive 100% of the Vendor Allocation specified in the PBS
Agreement and Vendor will have a first priority, perfected security interest
in Postpetition PBS Goods delivered post-petition and the Vendor
Allocation of the proceeds therefrom that is senior to any rights asserted
by TSA’s existing and future secured lenders; provided, however, that
such security interest shall not entitle Vendor to any adequate protection
claim or other administrative expense claim.

694

Gordini Reply to Term Lender, at p. 2.

695

SP Images Reply to Term Lender, at p. 2, Exhibit A.

Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving the Settlement Agreement Between the Debtors and Certain
Consignment Vendors Party Thereto (the “Debtors’ Motion to Approve Consignment Settlement
Agreement”), Doc. No. 959.
696

697

Id. at p. 2.
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•

TSA will retain its portion of the proceeds and Vendor will receive the
Vendor Allocation of the proceeds of Postpetition PBS Goods, as
specified in the PBS Agreement.

•

The Settlement Agreement shall govern the treatment of Vendor’s PBS
Goods and the applicable allocation to Vendor of the proceeds therefrom
as set forth in the Settlement Agreement with respect to all sales by TSA,
to the extent, without limitation, that the Bankruptcy Court’s interim
and/or final orders and/or future orders granting TSA’s motion regarding
closing store procedures, any future order(s) granting the Debtors’ motion
for authority to sell all or substantially all assets, interim and/or final
orders approving DIP financing, or any other interim and/or final orders
conflict with the terms of the Settlement Agreement with respect to the
treatment of Vendor’s PBS Goods and the applicable allocation to Vendor
of the proceeds therefrom as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the
terms of the Settlement Agreement shall govern.698

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditor’s of Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., filed
a statement in support of Settlement Agreement. 699 The Committee supported the proposed
settlement with the Debtors’ consignment vendors because a resolution was necessary to the
Debtors’ continued going concern operations, which relied heavily on the supply of merchandise
consigned by over 160 consignment vendors. 700 However, the Term Loan Agents, objected to
the Settlement, claiming that the Debtors were effectively eliminating the rights of the secured
lenders to material amounts of a collateral interest (i.e. property of the debtor), under the guise of

698

Id. at p. 8-9.

Statement of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Support of the Debtors’ (I)
Motion for Entry of an Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(3) and Del. L.R. 9006-1(e),
Shortening the Time for Notice of Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Section 105(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving the Settlement Agreement between
the Debtors and certain Consignment Vendors Party thereto, and (II) Motion for an Order,
Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving the
Settlement Agreement between the Debtors and certain Consignment Vendors Party thereto.,
Doc. No. 979.
699

700

Id. at p. 2.
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settling “disputes” with consignment vendors. 701 The Debtors’ filed a reply statement in
connection with Consignment Sales Motion seeking to authorize final orders on authorizing the
Debtors to continue selling Consigned Goods in the ordinary course of business, arguing that this
way both ethical and legal.702
As a result, the Term Loan Agent filed an Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection.
The Term Loan Agent argued that it had an undisputed and perfected security interest in the
Prepetition Consigned Goods and the proceeds. 704Yet, the Debtors were selling the Term Loan
Agent’s collateral and paying the proceeds to junior creditors without providing adequate
protection to the Term Loan Agent. 705 Such actions were in direct violation of the Bankruptcy
Code and the Term Loan Agent’s and Term Loan Lenders’ rights. Therefore the Term Loan
Agent objected and demanded adequate protection to fully compensate the Term Loan Agent and
Term Loan Lenders for the diminution of their collateral that would be caused by such diversion
of their collateral proceeds to junior creditors. 706
703

A series of objections ensued. First, Agron707 objected to Term Loan Agent’s Emergency
Motion for Adequate Protection.708 In their objection, Argon claimed that the Term Loan
Agent’s Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection was merely incorrect and unproven
701

Term Loan Agent's Objection to Debtors' Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Section 105(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Authorizing the Settlement Agreement
Between the Debtors and Certain Consignment Vendors Party Thereto, Doc. No. 1139.
702

Declaration of Stephen Binkley in Support of the Debtors' Omnibus Reply in Support of
Entry of Final Orders on Certain First Day Motions, Doc. No. 995.
703

Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection, Doc. No. 1092.

704

Id. at p. 2.

705

Id.

706

Id. at p. 12.

707

As a reminder, Agron is a supplier of goods on a consignment basis to the Debtors. See
Section (VI)(D)(2): Agron’s Objection to the Consignment Sales Motion (discussing Agron’s
relationship with the Debtors as well as their initial objection to the Consignment Sales
Motions).
708

Agron, Inc.'s Objection to Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection,
Doc. No. 1277.
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assumptions and contentions. That is, although the Term Lender repeatedly asserted that it was
undisputed that it had a perfected security interest in prepetition consigned goods and proceeds
and that no party had challenged this contention, Agron had filed pleadings challenging the
Debtors’ alleged ownership of the prepetition consigned goods and the Debtors’ ability to even
grant the Term Lender a security interest in such goods. 709Ultimately, Agron argued that
continued performance under the prepetition contracts relating to the prepetition consigned
goods (whether pursuant to the more advantageous terms to the Debtors’ estates under the
proposed settlement or otherwise) provides the Term Lender with adequate protection (to the
extent it has any such entitlement) and is far better from the perspective of the Debtors’ estates
and the Term Lenders than any other alternative.710
Subsequently, ASICS’ America Corporation objected and sought joinder Argon, Inc.’s
opposition to the Term Loan Agent’s Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection.711 According
to the Debtors, as of the Petition Date, they were holding approximately $85 million in
consigned goods.712 Pursuant to the Debtors, the ASICS Property consisted of approximately
$13,445,744.95 at cost, representing 797,626 separate items of property.713 However, ASICS
objects to the relief requested in the Consignment Motion because the Agreement was
terminated, and neither the Agreement nor the ASICS Property is an asset of the Debtors’
estates.714 Thus, ASICS joined in, adopted, and incorporated by reference the points, authorities,
and arguments advanced in the Agron Objection and in any other similar objections that have
been filed or may be filed by other parties.715

709

Id. at p. 2.

710

Id. at p. 2.

711

ASICS America Corporation's (I) Opposition to Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion for
Adequate Protection, and (II) Joinder to Agron, Inc.'s Opposition to Term Loan Agent's
Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection, Doc. No. 1306.
712

Id. at p. 2.

713

Id.

714

Id. at p. 3.

715

See Doc. 1293 (Casio America, Inc.); 1302 (Ogio, International, Inc.); 1307 (Performance
Apparel Corp.’s); 1315 (SGS Sport’s Inc.); 1322 (Ameriform Acquisition Company, LLC);
1329 (Midland Radio Corporation); 1332 (J.J’s Mae, Inc); 1338 (Rip Curl, Inc.); 1350
(Colosseum Athletics Corp.); 1399 (XS Commerce).
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Sports Authority Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated debtors and debtors in possession then
responded to Term Loan Agent’s Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection.716 The Debtors
did not object to the motion to the extent that the Term Loan Agent sought an order requiring the
Debtors to escrow the Vendor Proceeds, so long as the Debtors retained the right to continue to
sell the Prepetition Goods.717 In fact, the Debtors requested identical relief at the outset of the
Chapter 11 Cases.718 The Term Loan Agent’s replied stating that UCC § 9-319 is unequivocal:
for purposes of priority among creditors, a consignment results in a “deemed” property interest
held by the consignee (the Debtors) through which a consignee’s creditor (the Term Loan Agent)
can be secured, even if “title” remains with the consignor (the Vendors).719 The Term Loan
Agent claimed that under UCC § 9-319, the Debtors transferred a security interest in consigned
goods when they granted the Term Loan Agent a security interest in Inventory.720 Thus, the
Term Loan Agent argued that a secured party may obtain a lien on consigned goods even though
the borrower’s only interest in the property may be possessory or contractual.721
Finally, after much argumentative interplay the issues regarding Consignment Sales
came to a resolution. The Court issued an order denying the Term Loan Agent’s Emergency
Motion for Adequate Protection722 and a final order authorizing the Debtors to sell Prepetition
Consigned Goods. 723 That is, the Court authorized the Debtors to continue to sell consigned
goods in the ordinary course of business free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances.724
Nevertheless, the Debtors were directed to remit the portion of the proceeds of the Prepetition
Consigned Goods allocable to the applicable Consignment Vendors, pursuant to the terms of the
716

Debtors' Response to Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection, Doc.
No. 1346.
717

Id.

718

Id.

719

Reply in Support of Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion For Adequate Protection, Doc.
No. 1395.
720

Id. at p. 2.

721

Id.

722

Order Denying Term Loan Agent's Emergency Motion for Adequate Protection. Doc. No
1702.
723

Final Order Authorizing the Debtors to Sell Prepetition Consigned Goods, Doc. No. 1704.

724

Id. at 2.
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applicable Consignment Agreement. 725Thus, in finality, this order governs the Debtors’ sales of
Prepetition Consigned Goods and the Vendor proceeds respective to the Consignment
Agreement.
D. Third Wave on the DIP Financing Front
1. The Debtors’ Reply in Support of Motion for Post-Petition Financing and Use
of Cash Collateral
In the Debtors’ Reply in Support of Motion for Post-Petition Financing and Use of Cash
Collateral they began by framing the DIP Financing Motion and the Committee’s DIP Financing
Objection before going through each of the Committee’s objections.726 In the Debtors’ view, the
DIP Financing Motion was the best possible result given difficult circumstances and the
Committee’s DIP Financing Objection was a “proverbial ‘wish list’ of concessions” that
overlooks material concessions made by the DIP Lenders.727 In line with this framing, the
essence of the Debtors’ reply was that all of the objected to terms of the DIP Financing
Agreement were reasonable, standard market terms given the exigencies of the case.
In response to the Committee’s objection that DIP financing was unnecessary, the
Debtors argued that they did indeed need DIP financing, and without it their operation would
“grind to a halt” for five reasons.728 First, the Debtors implied that using solely cash collateral
would be more expensive than beneficial because, absent DIP financing, the Secured Lenders
would contest any attempt to use cash collateral.729 Second, vendors would not ship goods to the
Debtors absent DIP financing.730 Third, the $66 million projected net cash flow figure was
predicated on the existence of DIP financing and vendor support.731 Fourth, the Debtors did not

725

Id. at 3.

726

Debtors’ DIP Financing Reply, at p. 1.

727

Id. at p. 1-2.

728

Id. at p. 2.

Id. (stating that “The Committee argues that the Debtors do not need the DIP Financing, but
rather should use $66 million in cash collateral (presumably on a contested basis) . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
729

730

Id.

731

Id.
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have any cash on hand because cash is swept on a daily basis per the terms of the Interim DIP
Financing Order.732 Fifth and finally, the then most recent budget showed that over the then next
five weeks the Debtors’ projected net cash flow was negative $40 million.733
In response to the Committee’s objection that the proposed fees and expenses for the DIP
financing were excessive, the Debtors argued that the fees and expenses were reasonable in
relation to comparable DIP financing and that the Committee significantly overstated the fees
and expenses.734 To support their argument, the Debtors provided statistics regarding comparable
DIP financings that showed many of the costs in the Debtors’ case as below average.735 Further,
the Debtors argued that it is “hardly uncommon” and “not remotely inappropriate or egregious”
for debtors to agree to roll-up financing and fell back on the business judgment rule.736
In response to the Committee’s objection that the DIP milestones were “designed solely
for the benefit of the Prepetition Secured Lenders,” the Debtors argued that the Committee’s own
proposed timeline has a sale closing only one month later.737 To support their argument, the
Debtors argued that their decision to sell property out of the ordinary course of business “enjoys
the strong presumption ‘that in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed
basis, in food faith and in an honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
732

Id.

733

Id.

734

Id. at p. 2.

Id. at p. 10. A copy of the statistics provided by the Debtors’ is provided as Exhibit 5:
Debtors’ Comparable DIP Financing Transactions.
735

736

Id. at p. 11. The Debtors also cited to a number of cases where courts allowed debtors to roll
up their prepetition secured debt, especially where post-petition financing could not be obtained
any other way and the claims of the prepetition secured lenders were fully secured. Id. (citing
Del. Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future Holding
Corp.), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19684, 20-21 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2015) (quoting In re Capmark Fin.
Group, Inc., 438 B.R. 471, 511 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) and discussing the nature of roll-ups as
ordinary course in the context of chapter 11 DIP financing). See also, e.g., In re UniTek Global
Servs., Inc., Case No. 14-12471 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 2, 2014), In re Coldwater Creek
Inc., Case No. 14-10867 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 12, 2014); In re Quantum Foods, LLC,
Case No. 14-10318 (KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Tuscany Int’l Holdings (U.S.A.)
Ltd., Case No. 14-10193 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 4, 2014); In re Southern Air Holdings, Inc.,
Case No. 12-12690 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 1, 2012); In re Appleseed’s Intermediate
Holdings LLC, Case No. 11-10160 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 20, 2011)).
737

Id. at p. 2.
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company.”738 The Debtors argued that, because the Committee failed to demonstrate that the
Debtors acted improperly, if the proposed sale process satisfied the business judgment rile, then
the proposed sale process should be approved under section 363(b)(1).739
In response to the Committee’s objection that the collateral package and adequate
protection claims proposed to be provided to the Prepetition Secured Lenders was excessive, the
Debtors argued that such provisions were standard market terms. The Debtors further argued that
the DIP Lenders have “all but assured” that previously unencumbered assets would remain
availably for unsecured creditors because the obligations of “New Loan Parties”740 under the DIP
financing would be junior to the payment in full of third-party creditors of those entities and in
collecting on DIP Collateral, the DIP Lenders would “marshal” recoveries to provide assurance
that previously unencumbered assets remain available for unsecured creditors.741 Further, the
Debtors argued that post-petition financing secured by previously unencumbered assets is
explicitly permitted by Bankruptcy Code sections 364(c) and (d).742 In response to the
Committee’s objections regarding liens on avoidance actions, the Debtors argued that the
Committee failed to cite to any law that precludes the Debtors’ from doing so.743 Further, the
Debtors argued that “it is black letter law” that any interest in property recovered by the Debtors
is property of the estate,744 the Debtors are explicitly authorized by section 364(c) to grant liens
on unencumbered property and superpriority claims if necessary to obtain post-petition
financing,745 and courts in Delaware have granted such relief in “numerous other cases.”746
738

Id. at p. 12 (quoting In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)); and citing In re Bridgeport
Hldgs., Inc., 388 B.R. 548, 567 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (holding that directors enjoy a
presumption of honesty and good faith with respect to negotiating and approving a transaction
involving a sale of assets)).
739

Id. at p. 12-13.

740

“New Loan Parties” were Debtors who were not obligors on the Prepetition Secured Debt.

741

Id. at p. 2-3.

742

Id. at p. 13 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) and (d)).

743

Id. at p. 14. This argument was made even while entertaining the assumptions that that the
DIP facility was secured by all avoidance actions (even though it was not) and even if the DIP
Lenders refused to Marshall (which they agreed to). Id.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (“Such estate is comprised of all the following property . . . :
(3) [a]ny interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543, 550,
553, or 723 of this title.”)).
744

745

Id. (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)).
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In response to the Committee’s objection to the Debtors’ section 506(c) waiver, the
Debtors first argued that such claims need not be paid until confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.747 Second, the Debtors argued that the ultimate amount of 503(b)(9) claims was
unknown and the claims resolution process had not even begun.748 Third, the Debtors argued that
the unsecured creditors would not bear the expense of case administration because DIP Lenders
had already agreed, subject to the Approved Budget, to fund all of the necessary case expenses to
bridge to a sale plus a carveout.749
To support their argument in favor of the section 506(c) waiver, the Debtors stated that
post-petition expenses were already being paid out of the Secured Lenders’ collateral pursuant to
the Approved Budget, and therefore subjecting them to the possibility of a surcharge under that
section would effectively “double-charge[]” the DIP Lenders for the restructuring.750 Further,
courts have “regularly approved similar 506(c) waivers.”751 While the administrative solvency of
the estates could not be determined until later in the case, the Debtors argued that it was certain
the DIP Financing provided “the only realistic chance of achieving such administrative
solvency.”752

746

Id. (citing In re Conexant Sys., Inc., Case No. 13- 10367 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 19,
2013); In re School Specialty, Inc., Case No. 13-10125 (KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 26, 2013); In
re Education Holdings 1, Inc., Case No. 13-10101 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 7, 2013); In re
Delta Petroleum Corp., Case No. 11-14006 (KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 11, 2012); In re
Evergreen Solar, Inc., Case No. 11-12590 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 8, 2011); In re Xerium
Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-11031 (KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 28, 2010); In re Source Interlink
Cos., Case No. 09-11424) (KG) (Bankr. D. Del May 28, 2009)).
747

Id. at p. 3.

748

Id. at p. 3.

749

Id. at p. 3.

750

Id. at p. 14-15.

751

Id. at p. 15 (citing, e.g., In re Rural Metro, Case No. 13-11952 (Bankr. D. Del Sept. 10, 2013);
In re Real Mex Restaurants, Inc., Case No. 11-13122 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2011); In re
Atrium Corp.; Case No. 10-10150 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 17, 2010)).
752

Id. Further, the Debtors noted that to confirm a plan administrative expenses must be paid in
full, but argued that the Debtors were trying to obtain DIP financing and not confirm a plan. Id.
at n. 8 (quoting In re Global Home Prods., 2006 WL 3791955, at *3 (Bankr D. Del. 2006)
(“administrative expenses must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan as provided in §
1129(a)(9).”); and also citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)).
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To support their argument against paying 503(b)(9) claims before plan confirmation, the
Debtors first attacked the sources cited by the Committee753 as not binding and pointed to other
precedent which mandated that 503(b)(9) claims, because section 503(b)(9) was a rule of priority
and not a guarantee of payment,754 should not be paid before plan confirmation “absent the court
weighing (1) the prejudice to the Debtors, (2) hardship to claimant, and (3) potential detriment to
other creditors, and it is appropriate to defer the payment of section 503(b)(9) claims until
confirmation of a plan.”755 Further, the Debtors argued that the Committee conflated prepetition
503(b)(9) claims with post-petition administrative expense claims typically paid under the “pay
the freight” doctrine.756 In the Debtors’ view, 503(b)(9) claims do not fall under the obligation to
“pay the freight” because none of the 503(b)(9) creditors are contributing to the operation of the
business in chapter 11.757 Moreover, the Debtors pointed to the then-latest revised Approved
Budget and argued that even if the Prepetition Secured Lenders were willing to subordinate
themselves to current payments of 503(b)(9) claims, the Debtors would not be able to afford
them without exhausting their borrowing base availability, effectively rolling up prepetition
unsecured 503(b)(9) claims. 758 Lastly, with regards to the Committee’s argument for payment of
Id. at p. 16. The Debtors pointed out that the Committee cited two “incomplete selections
from hearing transcripts where[] Bankruptcy Judge Sontchi noted his preliminary and
uncontroversial views regarding the importance of seeking to assure some payment of
administrative expenses in the context of DIP Financing.” Id. (citing n re NEC Holdings Corp.,
et al., Case No. 10-11890 at p. 80:21-24 (Bankr. D. Del. July 13, 2010) (Sontchi, Judge) ; see
also generally In re Townsends, Inc., et al., Case No. 10-14092 at pp. 12-26 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan.
21, 2011) (Sontchi, Judge)).
753

754

Id. (citing Global Home, 2006 WL 3791955, at *3 (citing Alan N. Resnick, The Future of
Chapter 11: A Symposium Cosponsored by the American College of Bankruptcy: The Future of
the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C.L. Rev
183, 204-205 (2005) (“Section 503(b)(9) ‘is a rule of priority, rather than payment.’ The new
section does not specify when payment will be made. ‘ Arguably, prepetition vendor claims are
never payable in the ordinary course of business because of the intervening bankruptcy and the
automatic stay, even if afforded administrative expense priority’”))).
755

Id. (citing In re Global Home Prods., 2006 WL 3791955, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re
Garden Ridge Corp., 323 B.R. 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)).
Id. at p. 17 (stating that the “pay the freight” doctrine generally provides that “‘he who
benefits [from conducting business in a chapter 11 case] has to pay the freight for that.’”
(quoting In re Allen Family Foods, Inc., at el., Case No. 11-11764 at p. 8:8-9 (Bankr. D. Del.
June 30, 2011) (KJC) (“Allen Family Foods July 27 Transcript”))).
756

757

Id. (citing Allen Family Foods July 27 Transcript, p. 27:5-11).

758

Id. at p. 17-18.
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stub rent, the Debtors argued that a significant portion of that rent is likely to be paid by the
purchasers of Debtors’ leases.759
2. Supplemental Interim Consignment Order as it Relates to the DIP Financing
Motion
The Supplemental Interim Consignment Order complicated matters for the Debtors and
Secured Lenders because the court required the Debtors to remit the proceeds of sales of
Consigned Goods to the applicable Consignment Vendor, as opposed to sweeping the proceeds
into escrow awaiting the Secured Lenders’ consent to remit such proceeds.760 While this minor
setback may not have been a deal-breaker for the Secured Lenders, it was an early indicator that
the court was closely scrutinizing the proposed DIP Credit Agreement and the slew of
protections proposed to favor the Secured Lenders.
3. Debtors’ Proposed Final DIP Order
On April 22, 2016 and before the April 26, 2016 Final DIP Hearing, the Debtors filed a
Notice of Filing of Proposed Final DIP Order (the “Proposed Final DIP Order”) which, aside
from modifications pertaining to its nature as a final rather than interim order, was largely the
same as their original Proposed DIP Financing Order.761
The significant modifications include: the provision of a “Stub Rent Account” similar to
the proposed indemnity account;762 a clarification regarding credit bids made pursuant to section
363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code;763 clarifications regarding the period and procedures for
challenges brought against the Prepetition Secured Lenders;764 a clarification that, upon the
occurrence of an event of default and after a service of a remedies notice, the Debtors would still
be permitted to use Cash Collateral to pay employees wages earned in the ordinary course

759

Id. at p. 18.

760

Interim Consignment Order at p. 3.

Notice of Filing of Proposed Final DIP Order (the “Proposed Final DIP Order”), Doc. No.
1371.
761

762

Proposed Final DIP Order, Exhibit B: Blackline, at p. 3.

763

Id. at p. 28.

764

Id. at p. 33.
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accrued up to the date of service of the remedies notice;765 provisions for the marshaling of
certain funds by the Secured Lenders;766 a clarification on the application of proceeds from the
sale or disposition of New Loan Party Assets;767 and a stipulation that “the DIP Obligations shall
constitute ‘Senior Debt’ for purposes of the 11.5% Senior Subordinated Notes due May 3, 2016
and issued by The Sports Authority, Inc.”768
Regarding the provision of a Stub Rent Account, the Proposed Final DIP Order provided
for the funding of an account with $8,500,000, under the control of the Debtors, to be used to
satisfy Landlord claims for stub rent for the Month of March 2016 on a pro rata basis.769 Such
payment was proposed to be conditioned upon such rent not having been: waived by the
applicable landlord as part of a lease termination agreement; agreed to be paid by an assignee of
the relevant lease.770 Payment was to be made after the conclusion of the auction of closing store
leases and the “Main Auction” of the Debtors’ assets, with the remainder of the account being
available to pay administrative claims as determined by the Debtors or ordered by the court.771
As for the credit bidding clarification, the Debtors modified their initial proposed order to
reflect that any credit bid would only be applied to reduce cash consideration with respect to
assets in which the credit bidder held a first priority security interest.772 Any other bid would be
made in cash and in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of the other party’s portion of the
Prepetition Secured Credit.773
As to the time period and procedures for bringing challenges against Prepetition Secured
Lenders, the Debtors’ modified their earlier proposed order to clarify that: any challenge brought
by the Committee would be deemed commenced upon filing a motion seeking standing that is
765

Id. at p. 42.

766

Id. at p. 52.

767

Id. at p. 52.

768

Id. at p. 53.

769

Id. at p. 44.

770

Id. at p. 44.

771

Id. at p. 43-44.

772

Id. at p. 28.

773

Id. at p. 28.
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accompanied by a copy of the draft complaint asserting the challenge;774 a challenge asserting
that the Prepetition Secured Lenders were not fully secured was not subject to the specified
period for bringing challenges;775 the Committee’s period for bringing challenges may be
extended by the court for good cause;776 any challenged that is timely commenced with requisite
standing would be preserved while all others would be deemed to be forever waived and
barred.777
The Debtors’ original proposal provided for no marshaling. However, their revisions
provided that marshaling would be permitted as applicable to DIP Collateral: (i) granted by any
of the Debtors that were not “Prepeititon Loan Party Debtors”; (ii) that was proceeds of a Lease;
(iii) certain proceeds of bankruptcy recoveries that would be held in escrow and would only be
applied after the DIP Lenders exhausted all other DIP Collateral.778
The Debtors’ clarifications regarding application of proceeds from New Loan Party
assets provided that such proceeds would be applied first to pay pre- and post-petition
obligations of the respective new guarantor owing to any pre- or post-petition creditors of the
applicable party.779 Second, the proceeds would be used to pay obligations arising under the DIP
Financing Agreements.780
Overall, the Proposed Final DIP Order seemed to indicate that the Debtors were holding
firm on their requested relief while tying up some loose ends such as the modification related to
payment of employee’s wages and the stipulation that the DIP Obligations were “Senior Debt.”
However, the Debtors (and, presumably, the Secured Lenders) did give a little bit by
memorializing the marshaling agreement and providing for some assured payment of stub rent.
The provision of stub rent could be considered tying up a loose end (or at least “picking their

774

Id. at p. 33.

775

Id. at p. 33, n. 4.

776

Id. at p. 34.

777

Id. at p. 35.

778

Id. at p. 52.

779

Id. at p. 52. This application excluded intercompany obligations. Id.

780

Id.
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battles”), as it likely placated the Landlord Objections somewhat, and at a minimal cost when
compared to the principal of the DIP Facility.781
4. Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing
On May 3, 2016, the court handed down its final ruling on the DIP Financing Motion and
largely granted the relief requested by the Debtors’ in their Proposed DIP Financing Order.782
The courts final order was identical to the Debtors’ proposal except for four modifications: one
to the Carve Out with respect to professional fees for Committees; an additional protection for
landlords; a refusal to totally waive section 506(c) surcharges; and a clarification with regards to
the Interim Consignment Order. While the court certainly did not gallop to the unsecured
creditors’ aid in fantastic fashion, all of its modifications seemed to lean towards aiding parties
other than the Secured Lenders by softening the Debtors’ proposed provisions.
With regards to the Carve Out, the Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing provided for
use of the Carve Out up to $100,000 for investigative work by any professionals of any
committee,783 as opposed to the Debtors’ proposed amount of $50,000.784
Further, the court provided additional protections to landlords whose leases were
assigned. Specifically, the Final Proposed DIP Order did not permit a landlord to be paid out of
the Stub Rent Account if the applicable landlord had agreed to be paid by an assignee of the
applicable lease so long as the landlord did not object to the assumption and assignment of the
lease.785 However, in its final order the court provided that such landlords could receive
payments from the Stub Rent Account even if they objected to the assumption and assignment,
provided that the objection was in good faith and based on: the proposed assignee’s failure to
provide adequate assurance of future performance under section 365; a dispute over the actual
781

The DIP Facility provided $595,285,000 on a final basis while the stub rent account provided
only $8.5 million, or 0.0142% of the DIP Facility.
782

Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Secured Financing Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 364; (II) Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims to Post-Petition
Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 364 and 507; and (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral
and Providing Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Lenders and Modifying the Automatic
Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, and 364, Doc. No. 1699 (the “Final Order
Authorizing DIP Financing”).
783

Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing, at p. 35-36.

784

Proposed DIP Financing Order, Exhibit B: Blackline, at p. 38.

785

Proposed DIP Financing Order, Exhibit B: Blackline, at p. 44.
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cure amount; violation of use or exclusivity restrictions or other similar provisions or similar
grounds.786
The court further catered the unsecured creditors by modifying the proposed provisions
related to section 506(c) surcharges against the Secured Lenders’ collateral, drawing a line
between pre- and post-petition collateral.787 In the Proposed Final DIP Order, the Debtors sought
to exclude all 506(c) surcharges.788 However, the court ordered that, while no charge-offs were
permitted, nothing in the final order shall limit the rights of the Debtors or any other party with
requisite standing to bring claims under section 506(c), thereby leaving at least some room for
potential recovery against the Secured Lenders’ collateral.789 Essentially, the court seems to set
up a presumption against section 506(c) surcharges, but it refused to go as far as to order a
waiver of such charges. Further, it should be noted that the court did include a waiver of claims
brought under section 552(a).790
The court also added a clarifying paragraph in the section titled “Inconsistency” where it
ordered that, if there was any inconsistency between any of the DIP financing documents and the
Interim Consignment Order, then the Interim Consignment Order would govern.791 This
provision was not contained in the Proposed DIP Financing Order,792 and was likely aimed at
resolving any doubts as to the handling of proceeds from the sale of Prepetition Consigned
Goods.
VIII. CONCLUSION: AFTER THE DUST SETTLED
As the dust settled in the winding-down process of the bankruptcy, Sports Authority’s
primary goal was to generate as much revenue as possible. Pursuant to the Consignment Sales
Motion and Store Closing Plan Motion, the Debtors’ sought to maximize the value of the estate
via a dual-track sales process. That is, the Debtors initiated an expedited sale process, while at
the same time continuing to deliver new goods to the going out of business sales. Sports
786

Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing, at p. 41.

787

Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing, at p. 43.

788

Proposed DIP Financing Order, Exhibit B: Blackline, at p. 45.

789

Final Order Authorizing DIP Financing, at p. 44.

790

Id. at p. 50.

791

Id. at p. 53-54.

792

See Proposed DIP Financing Order, Exhibit B: Blackline, at p. 55.
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Authority executed this sales tactic as it proved to be more advantageous than solely having
traditional inventory sales. The Court approved the Debtors’ request to conduct the sale.793 More
specifically, they approved the sale of all their retail assets to a group of other parties (i.e. the
Agents), whereby the agents conducted the going out of business sales, pursuant to the Agency
Agreement.794 As a result of the Final Consignment Order, the Debtors’ surrendered possession
of any such entities, assets, or other property within its domain.795 Per the Agency Agreement,
“all sales, excise, gross receipts, and other taxes attributable to the sales of Merchandise and
Additional Agent Goods (including any consigned goods as part of the Sale) …[are to be]
collected by the Agent in trust for the Debtors at the time of the sale and paid over to the Debtors
or collected by the Debtors” in order to consummate liquidation.
Subsequently, the Debtors then filed a motion asking to pay their executives on the way
out the door: ‘Debtors’ Motion for Order Approving Modified Executive Incentive Program’ (i.e.
Modified EIP) pursuant to sections 363(b) and 503(c), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 of the United
States Bankruptcy.796 The Debtors believed that it was critically important to properly
incentivize the three remaining members of their management team – the EIP Participants
(including Michael Foss, CEO & Jeremy Aguilar) – to achieve the goals that will maximize and
preserve value for the benefit of the Debtors’ stakeholders. Therefore, the Debtors sought
approval of the Modified KEIP.797 That is, the Modified EIP was narrowly tailored to incentivize
the key members of the management team, to focus their efforts on the task at hand and not on
their next career moves, and would serve as the means to ensure that value is maximized in the
bankruptcy process.798 In fact, the EIP Participants was only be eligible for payments under the
Modified EIP if the executive continued to provide the services required by the Debtors, fully
support the liquidation process and Chapter 11 Case.799 The individual incentive bonus payments
of the Modified KEIP ranged from $165,000 to $673,750, totaling a maximum cost of

793

Order, Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, Approving Sale of
Debtors’ Assets and Granting Related Relief (the “Order Approving Debtors’ Asset Sale”), Doc.
No. 2081.
794

Id. at p. 13.

795

Id. at p. 14-15.

796

Debtors' Motion for Order (A) Approving Modified Executive Incentive Program and
Authorizing Payments Thereunder and (B) Authorizing the Debtors to File the Unredacted
Modified Key Employee Incentive Program Under Seal, Doc. No. 2746.
797
798

Id. at p. 2.
Id. at p. 8-9.

799

Id. at p. 10.
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$1,500,000.800
Despite the Debtors’ efforts, the US Trustee and committee of unsecured creditors
objected.801 Andrew Vara, the acting United States Trustee (the “U.S. Trustee”), objected to the
Debtors’ Motion for Order Approving Modified Executive Incentive Program. Vara stated that
the “Bonus Motion seeks to pay three insiders up to $1.5 million dollars, after the sale of
substantially all of the Debtors’ assets, and when the Debtors are proposing to pay certain
administrative creditors and not others and provide no dividend to unsecured creditors.” Vara
continued by detailing that the Debtors appeared to be prioritizing insider executives above all
other parties in interest, including unsecured creditors and the thousands of employees who lost
their jobs. As such, U.S. Trustee argued that the motion should be denied.802
The US Trustee and committee of unsecured creditors then moved to have the case
converted from a chapter 11 to a chapter 7.803 The rationale was that there was “substantial [and]
continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation.”804 Upon inquiry and discovery, this held to be true. The Debtors’ had ceased their
business operations and had already completed the liquidation of substantially all of their assets.
The Court held that, under such circumstances, the only appropriate course of action was to
allow for an orderly liquidation of the Debtors’ remaining assets under chapter 7. Thus, the Court
appointed a chapter 7 trustee to wind-down the few remaining assets of the Debtors’.
As the final wind down process ensued, Sports Authority continued shedding layers of
their business assets, which can be categorized distinctly into groups of major sales, minor sales,
and distribution of proceeds. The process initiated with an order authorizing bid procedures for
the Main Auction in connection with substantially all the debtors assets. 805 In addition, the

800

Id.

801

Objection of The United States Trustee to the Debtors' Motion for Order (A) Approving
Modified Executive Incentive Program and Authorizing Payments Thereunder and (B)
Authorizing the Debtors to File the Unredacted Modified Key Employee Incentive Program
Under Seal (D.I. 2746), Doc. No. 2809.
802

Id. at p. 2.

803

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Motion to Convert Cases from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Doc. No. 2585.
804

Id. at p. 10.

805

Order (A) Approving Bid Procedures in Connection with (I) The Sale of Substantially All of
the Debtors' Assets and (II) The Transfer, Assumption and Assignment of Certain Unexpired
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Closing Store Lease bid procedures were attached to this order, which delineated the appropriate
manner of sale of the Debtors’ unexpired nonresidential real property leases.806 Further, the order
details notices of auctions and sales, as well as assumption and assignment procedures of certain
executory contracts. 807 Hence, as aforementioned, the Debtors’ intention was to maximize the
value to be realized from the sales. 808
On March 2, 2016, the major sales began with the large-scale Designation Rights
Agreement, which effectively transferred substantially all Sports Authority’s assets to Dick’s
Sporting Goods Inc. 809 On April 14, 2016, the Court approved the sale of substantially all of the
debtors assets, the transfer, and assumption and assignment of commercial property, and
scheduling for subsequent auctions and hearings. On July 15, 2016 the Court approved Dick’s
complete Asset Purchase Agreement, and subsequently thereafter the Designated Rights and
Assigned Agreements. The final major transaction was the debtor’s sale of the ‘Sport’s Authority
Field’ stadium in Denver, Colorado, naming rights worth $120 million to the NFL franchise, the
Denver, Broncos. 810 The pertinent terms of the Assumption and Assignment Agreement are as
follows:
• The Debtors will assume and assign the Naming Rights Contract to the Broncos,
effective as of July 31, 2016;

Leases of Nonresidential Real Property, (B) Scheduling Separate Auctions for and Hearings to
Approve the Sale of Assets and Unexpired Leases of Nonresidential Real Property Subject to the
Debtors' Store Closing Plan, (C) Approving Notice of Respective Date, Time and Place for
Auctions and for Hearings on Approval of Respective Sales, (D) Approving Procedures for the
Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in
Connection with the Sales, (E) Approving Form and Manner of Notice Thereof, and (F) Granting
Related Relief. Doc. No. 1186.
806

Id. at p. 2.

807

Id.

808

Id. at p. 3.

809

Notice of Consummated Assumption, Assignment and Transfer of the Debtors' Lease(s)
and/or Executory Contract(s) in Connection with Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. Designation Rights
Agreement. Doc. No. 3216.
810

Notice and Debtors' Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Assume and
Assign Stadium Naming Rights Contract to the Denver Broncos Pursuant to Section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Doc. No. 2717.
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• The Broncos will assume all obligations under the Naming Rights Contract, including
the obligation to make a payment of $3,601,890 due on August 1, 2016;
• The Debtors will pay $50,000 to the Broncos;
• The Broncos will indemnify the Debtors for any administrative expense liability the
Debtors’ estates incur to the MFSD under the Naming Rights Contract between July 31,
2016 and August 31, 2016 if assumption and assignment of the Naming Rights Contract
is not approved by the Court;
• The Broncos will release all claims they have against the Debtors, including, for the
avoidance of doubt, any asserted administrative expense claims; and
• The Broncos will withdraw the Settlement Objection and the Administrative Claim
Motion.
The final going out of business sales concluded on or before July 29, 2016, and the Debtors
vacated their remaining store locations by July 31, 2016.811
Other than the aforementioned major sales the Debtors’ sought to liquidate the remainder
of their estate via minor sales and settlements. Sports Authority retained a consulting company to
oversee the sale of intellectual property to Dick’s.812 That is, pursuant to the engagement and
exclusivity provision, the consulting firm, Hilco Streambank Inc., was to be the Debtor’s
exclusive agent to market and sell, assign, license, or otherwise dispose of intangible assets.
813
Specifically, Hilco Streambank Inc., was to oversee the marketing and sale of certain
remaining Debtor’s intangible assets, including: without limitation litigation claims, loans and
notes receivable, trade and barter credits, internet protocol addresses, and other rights and
interests that have not been sold by the Debtors’. 814 Further, they sold their e-inventory (doc.
2704). Under this order, the debtors’ sold all their e-commerce inventory which was free of liens,
claims, encumbrances, or other interests. In return for services, Hilco Streambank Inc., was to be
paid a commission of 8% of the aggregate of proceeds generated. 815
The final distribution of proceeds entailed a motion to approve settlement with the
811

Id. at p. 7.
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Order Authorizing the Debtors' Entry into the Supplemental Engagement Letter With Hilco IP
Services LLC D/B/A Hilco Streambank, the Intellectual Property Disposition Consultant For The
Debtors, Doc. No. 3467.
813

Id. at p. 7.

814

Id. at p. 2.

815

Id. at p. 3.
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committee of unsecured creditors.816 Pursuant to sections 105 and 503(B)(9) of the Bankruptcy
Code and Rule 3007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, all necessary agreements and
settlements were set in place via a restructuring plan in order to distribute all remaining proceeds.
As of the 503(b)(9) Filing Deadline, 213 503(b)(9) Claims were filed, asserting an aggregate
amount of approximately $176.8 million. Pursuant to section 5(b)(ii) of the Settlement
Agreement, the Debtors were authorized per the Wind Down Budget to distribute proceeds
appropriately to the committee of unsecured creditors. Hence, as the wind down process came to
a brisk and bitter conclusion, Sports Authority Inc. was left with it’s head on its knee’s at the five
yard line of corporate domination and success. Therefore, now only a faint memory of the
existence of Sports Authority Inc. remains, but the legendary lessons of the bankrupt retail giant
live on to tell the story.

816

Joint Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105 and Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy
Code and Rule 3007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Establishing Procedures to
Resolve claims Arising Under Section 503(B)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code for Purposes of
Distributing Settlement Proceeds, Doc. No. 3409.

158

Exhibit 1: Debtors’ Proposed Approved Budget817

817

DIP Financing Motion, at Exhibit A.
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Exhibit 2: Itemized Table of Expenses Proposed in the DIP Financing Motion818

818

Committee’s DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection, at Exhibit B.
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Exhibit 3: Proposed DIP Financing Lender and Agent Fees819

Borrowers:
Guarantors:

Aggregate
Commitments:
ABL Interest:
Commitment
Fee:
Agent’s Fee:
Closing Fee:
Outside
Maturity Date:

819

Prepetition ABL
1. The Sports Authority, Inc.
2. TSA Stores, Inc.
1. Slap Shot Holdings Corp.
2. TSA Gift Card, Inc.

$650,000,000

DIP Facility
1. The Sports Authority, Inc.
2. TSA Stores, Inc.
1. Slap Shot Holdings Corp.;
2. TSA Gift Card, Inc.;
3. The Sports Authority Holdings, Inc.;
4. TSA Ponce, Inc.; and
5. TSA Caribe, Inc.
$500,000,000

LIBOR plus 1.5% - LIBOR plus
2.0%
0.25% - 0.375%

LIBOR plus 3.25%

0.15% of commitments
$75,000 per annum
0.2% - 0.35% of commitments

$150,000 ABL Fee payable at closing (not
pro-rated per annum)
1.25% of commitments
Closing fee of $6.25 million
June 30, 2016

May 17, 2017

0.375%

Committee’s DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection, at p. 11.
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Exhibit 4: Table of Proposed DIP Financing Milestone Covenants820
Milestones
Bid Deadline
Auction
Hearing for the Proposed Sale
Transaction
Deadline to Close Proposed Sale
Transaction

820

Original Date
April 21, 2016
April 15, 2016
April 27, 2016

Suggested New Date
May 19, 2016
May 25, 2016
May 26, 2016

April 28, 2016

May 31, 2016

Committee’s DIP Financing and Bid Procedures Objection, at p. 18.
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Exhibit 5: Debtors’ Comparable DIP Financing Transactions821

821

See Debtors’ DIP Financing Reply at Exhibit C.
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